

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.—SOME FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CON-
TROVERSIES.

By Professor H. SIDGWICK.

THE discussion that follows seems to require a few words of excuse and explanation, on account of the triteness of the topics discussed, and the difficulty of saying anything substantially new upon them. So long as ethical thought is alive and disagreement continues on fundamental points, controversy must continue; at the same time I have no sure hope that the present profound disagreements are likely to be terminated, as similar disputes have been terminated in the progress of the exact sciences, by the rational confutation of all divergent opinions except one. Attempts at such confutation can only take one of two forms: (1) demonstration of inconsistency in the system assailed, and (2) demonstration of paradox—*i.e.*, of conflict with the common sense of mankind. The former method is often recognised as completely effective against certain parts of a system as expounded; but it is always difficult to feel sure that these parts are really vital, and that the substance of the doctrine assailed may not be so remodelled as to avoid the demonstrated inconsistency: nor may we even say that only one internally consistent system is possible to a reason-

able man;—rather we seem able to conceive an indefinite number of internally consistent systems, and though, doubtless, all or most of these if fully worked out would involve paradoxical elements, we can rarely be sure that the paradoxes will be completely deterrent. For (2) demonstration of paradox cannot be formally cogent, unless the moralist convicted of paradox has expressly accepted Common Sense as a decisive authority; and even in this case it often cannot be made completely cogent, owing to the amount of vagueness and ambiguity, of division and disagreement, which we find in the moral common sense of any one social group in any one age, and the amount of change that we find as we pass from age to age and from group to group. For myself, I feel bound to say that though I have always been anxious to ascertain and disposed to respect the verdict of Common Sense in any ethical dispute, I cannot profess to regard it as final and indisputable: I cannot profess to hold that it is impossible for me ever to be right on an ethical point on which an overwhelming majority is clearly opposed to me. And as I cannot admit this myself, I cannot expect any similar admission from opponents. Accordingly I should like it to be understood that in what follows confutation of opponents is not aimed at; in fact, it is by the definite exclusion of this aim that I hope to impart a certain novelty of treatment to my familiar matter. What is aimed at is merely a diminution of the amount of misunderstanding which philosophical controversy—especially on fundamental points—has always involved. Probably, complete mutual understanding will never be reached until we have reached complete confutation of fundamental errors; but it seems easier to approximate to the former result, since we have all experienced the interest and satisfaction of comprehending an intellectual position with which we are yet obliged altogether to disagree.

I desire, therefore, to promote mutual understanding on some fundamental points of ethical controversy: by further explaining my own view where my original exposition of it (in my *Methods of Ethics*) appears from criticism to have been incomplete; and by pointing out where and why some further explanation of my critics' views is needed to enable me to understand them.

I. I may begin by saying that no other aim but this of removing misunderstandings could have induced me to recur to the ancient problem of the Freedom of the Will. I have no pretension of providing a theoretical solution of this problem; and, indeed, the first misunderstanding which

I wish to remove is one which attributes to me such a pretention. A very courteous criticism of what I have previously written on this subject (in bk. i., c. 5, of my *Methods of Ethics*) which I find in Mr. Fowler's *Principles of Morals*, pt. ii.,¹ concludes with this sentence: "I venture to suggest that the difficulty raised by this antinomy is not really resolved in either direction by Professor Sidgwick's argument". This is quite true; but my argument, as I conceived it, did not aim—as Mr. Fowler seems to suppose—at a *theoretical* solution of the difficulty caused by the conflict between what I called the "formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for Determinism" and the Libertarian "affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action": it aimed merely at a *practical* solution of the difficulty, by showing that for purposes of practical reasoning the two opposed arguments cannot really collide. I tried to show that, on the one hand, so far as we reason to any definite conclusions concerning the *future* actions of ourselves or other human beings, we inevitably consider them as determined by unvarying laws: if they are not completely so determined—and we cannot avoid concluding that they are not, if we accept the Libertarian proposition—then our reasoning is *pro tanto* liable to error; but the general recognition of this possibility of error can introduce no practical difference in the conclusions of such reasonings; since the most thorough-going belief in the freedom of human wills cannot be made the basis of any definite forecast as to the effects of the volitions assumed to be free. On the other hand, I tried to make clear that when we are ascertaining—according to any ethical principles and method—what choice it is reasonable to make between two alternatives of *present* conduct, it is as impossible for us to use Determinist conceptions as it is impossible to use Libertarian conceptions when we are endeavouring to forecast *future* conduct. Now, if both parts of this argument are accepted, I submit that a practical escape from the perplexities caused by the Free Will controversy—perplexities which many thoughtful persons have regarded as most gravely practical—has been completely provided: a theoretical solution has certainly not been provided, but neither has it been attempted.

I proceed to ask, then, if either part of my argument, as above summarised, is disputed. I do not find either in Mr. Fowler's, or in any other, recent discussion of the question, any reasoning directed against my contention as

¹ Ch. ix., pp. 330-1.

to the inapplicability of Libertarian conceptions in rational forecasts of the future conduct of human beings; nor do I find that Mr. Fowler at least definitely denies what I have said as to the irresistible affirmation of Freedom in the moment of deliberate action. But he seems to hold that this affirmation is effectively neutralised by the "counter-argument" that "we are not sufficiently acquainted with all the springs of action and their relative force," so that "we may fairly argue that, if our experience were wider still, and we were fully acquainted with all the antecedent circumstances, every volition might be fully accounted for". And this, or something like this, seems to be the answer that Determinists generally are disposed to give when Libertarians urge the "immediate affirmation of consciousness".

Now, I contend that the completest acceptance of the hypothetical conclusion of this counter-argument can have no practical effect, unless it leads men to abstain from the effort to act rationally, and consciously surrender themselves to the play of mere impulse; and I do not think that any Determinist will argue that his conclusion either ought to have, or does ordinarily have, this paralysing effect on the practical reason. If it does not have this effect on me, if I still attempt to act rationally, then inevitably—whatever may be the ethical principles on which I attempt to act—I cannot fail to experience the old eternal conflict between the judgment of reason and irrational impulse. And, whenever I experience this conflict, I cannot see how my actual consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive to be right or reasonable, can be affected by my admission of the hypothetical proposition that, "if I were fully acquainted with all the antecedent circumstances of the volition that I am about to make, it might be fully accounted for". It still remains impossible for me to regard the absence of adequate motive to do what I judge to be reasonable as a rational ground for not choosing to do it; and it remains impossible for me to think that I cannot now choose to do what I conceive to be reasonable,—supposing that there is no obstacle to my doing it except absence of adequate motive,—however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclinations in the past. I do not, of course, deny that the *difficulty* of resisting vicious inclination is made greater by previous surrenders to inclination; but I cannot conceive this difficulty becoming impossibility, so long as the consciousness of voluntary choice remains. I am quite willing to admit that this con-

viction *may* be illusory: that if I knew my own nature I *might* see it to be predetermined that, being so constituted and in such circumstances, I should act on the occasion in question contrary to my rational judgment. But I cannot conceive myself seeing this, without at the same time conceiving my whole conception of what I now call "my" action fundamentally altered: I cannot conceive that if I contemplated the actions of my organism in this light I should refer them to my "self"—*i.e.*, to the conscious mind so contemplating—in the sense in which I now refer them. The admission, therefore, that my conviction of the possibility of my acting in accordance with reason *may* be illusory is an admission that can have no practical effect: I must use, in thinking about action, the only conception of human volition that is now possible to me; and this is strictly incompatible with the conception of my choice between rational judgment and irrational inclination as predetermined.

I do not quite know how far Determinists at the present day would deny the guarded statement that I have just given of the inevitableness of Libertarian conceptions. If they do not deny it, I think that most Determinists will probably admit that my *theoretical* suspension of judgment on the question of Free Will does not prevent me from attaining a complete *practical* solution of the difficulties of the question.

But it appears that Libertarians, if I may take Dr. Martineau as a specimen, are not willing to admit this; in fact, Dr. Martineau seems to regard the position that I take up as more untenable than that of a thorough-going Determinist.

"I can," he says, "understand and intellectually respect the thorough-going determinist intensely possessed by the conception of causality that rules through all the natural sciences, and never doubting that, as a 'universal postulate,' it must be driven perforce through the most refractory phenomena of human experience. I can understand the emphatic claim of the reflective moralist for the exemption of his territory from a law which admits of no alternative. . . . But I cannot understand the intermediate mood which imagines the chasm of difference reducible to a step which, for all practical purposes, it is not worth while to bridge over or fill up." Dr. Martineau can "grant, indeed, that in drawing up an objective code of actions to be prohibited and required the two doctrines would not widely diverge in their results . . . but," he thinks, it is inconceivable that the acceptance of Determinism should not make a fundamental "difference of the dynamics of the moral life". "On such a ground," it seems to him, "you may build your mill of social ethics, with all its chambers neat and adequate, and its great wheel expecting to move; but you have turned aside the stream on which it

all depends ; the waters are elsewhere ; and your structure stands dead and silent on the bank." ¹

I understand the meaning of this eloquent passage to be that the conception of the Freedom of the Will supplies a moral motive to action which is necessarily withdrawn by the adoption of the Determinist conclusion : I do not, however, obtain from it any clear idea of the precise nature of the motive that is supposed to be supplied. As I have already said, I find the consciousness of freedom, in a certain sense, inseparable from the only conception of human volition that I am now able to form ; and it is possible that Dr. Martineau may mean no more than this. But I find no practical difficulty in acting with the consciousness of free choice as above defined, while, at the same time, always reasoning on a purely Determinist basis in forecasting the future, or explaining the past actions of myself and others, and while also recognising that a reconciliation of these distinct intellectual attitudes is a speculative *desideratum* ; and I do not see in what way a speculative conviction of the Freedom of the Will would either directly strengthen the motives to do what I judge to be, on the whole, reasonable, or weaken the force of the impulses that conflict with rational judgment ;—unless it be through a certain process of theological reasoning which I do not regard as conclusive, and to which Dr. Martineau does not expressly refer.

I cannot see that the speculative belief in Free Will would alter my view of ultimate ends. If Happiness, whether private or general, be the ultimate end of action on a Libertarian view, it must be equally so on a Determinist view ; and if Perfection is in itself admirable and desirable, it surely remains equally so whether any individual's approximation to it is entirely determined by inherited nature and external influences or not :—except so far as the notion of Perfection includes that of Free Will. Now Free Will is obviously not included in our common notions of physical and intellectual perfection ; and it seems to me also not to be included in the common notions of the excellences of character which we call virtues : the manifestations of courage, temperance and justice do not become less admirable because we can trace their antecedents in a happy balance of inherited dispositions developed by a careful education.

Again, I do not see how the affirmation or negation of Free Will can reasonably affect our practical conclusions as to

¹ *Types of Ethical Theory* (2nd ed.), vol. ii., p. 42.

the fittest means for the attainment of any of these ultimate ends, so far as the connexion between means and end is believed to exist on empirical or other scientific grounds. I do not see how an act now deliberated on can be scientifically known to be less or more a means to any ulterior end, because it is predetermined; and, so far as in considering how we ought to act in any case we have to calculate the probable future actions of others and also of ourselves, I have already shown that our decision on the question of Free Will cannot practically affect such calculations. I admit, however, that the case is conceivably altered when we introduce theological considerations. According to the received view of the moral government of the world, the performance of Duty is the best means of attaining the agent's happiness largely through its expected consequences in another world in which virtue will be rewarded and vice punished by God: if, therefore, the belief in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul is held to depend on the assumption of Free Will, this latter becomes obviously of fundamental ethical importance. It is possible that this is what is really meant by Dr. Martineau in the passage before quoted; and if so, I cannot but admit that the denial of Free Will removes a rational motive to the performance of duty, so far as the reasonableness of duty is rested on the particular theological argument just mentioned. I must, however, point out that the assumption of Free Will cannot be said to be generally regarded as indispensable to the establishment of the belief in the moral government of the world, since an important section of theologians who have held this belief with most intense conviction have been Determinists.

I do not, however, wish to enter upon the theological argument at the threshold of which I have now arrived. If it is admitted (1) that the assumption of the Freedom of the Will is in a certain sense inevitable to anyone exercising rational choice, and (2) that the affirmation of Free Will as a point of speculative doctrine is only important ethically so far as it is implicated in a certain theological argument, then the misunderstandings which I am concerned to remove will have vanished.

II. In speaking of the notion of "free" choice as inseparable from the only conception of conscious action that experience enables me to form, I have restricted my consideration to the choice between the alternatives of "rational" and "irrational" conduct. It is, I conceive, this alone that concerns us, from an ethical point of view; not the possibility of merely indeterminate choice,—of what Green calls an

"arbitrary freak of unmotivated willing,"—but the possibility of acting in accordance with our rational judgment when it conflicts with irrational impulses. The phrase just used affords a transition to a second fundamental misunderstanding, which I am anxious, if possible, to clear up;—all the more, because it is a misunderstanding among persons who are in general agreement as to the right method of dealing with particular ethical questions. According to my view, what I have just spoken of as a "rational judgment" on a practical question is normally expressed in the form "X is right" or "X ought to be done"; and if the judgment be attained by deduction from a principle, such a principle is always capable of being expressed as a proposition in which the word "right" or "ought" occurs. The notion that these words have in common is, therefore, the same in different ethical systems: different systems give different answers to the fundamental question, "what is right," but not, therefore, a different meaning to the question. The Utilitarian, in my view, affirms that "what is right" in any particular case is what is most conducive to the general happiness; but he does not—or ought not to—mean by the word "right" anything different from what an anti-utilitarian moralist would mean by it. Again, according to me, this fundamental notion is ultimate and unanalysable: in saying which I do not mean to affirm that it belongs to the "original constitution of the mind," and is not the result of a process of development: that is a question of Psychology—or rather Psychogony—with which I am not concerned: I merely mean that as I now find it in my thought I cannot resolve it into, or explain it by, any more elementary notions. I regard it as co-ordinate with the notion expressed by the word "is" or "exists". Possibly these and other fundamental notions may, in the progress of philosophy, prove capable of being arranged in some system of rational evolution; but I hold that no such system has as yet been constructed and that, therefore, the notions are now and for us ultimate.

I find, however, that these opinions do not seem to be shared by other writers who agree with me in adopting—with or without reserves and qualifications—the Utilitarian standard. But I find a great difficulty in making out exactly where the difference lies. Even in the case of Bentham, who uniformly aims at the most uncompromising clearness of exposition, I nevertheless find this difficulty. For instance, there is a passage in his *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (ch. i., § 10) in which he expressly controverts the opinion that I have just expressed as to the identity

of the meaning of the terms "right" and "ought" in different ethical systems. He says:—

"Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility"—i.e., which has "a tendency to augment the happiness of the community greater than any it has to diminish it"—"one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may also say that it is right it should be done, or at least that it is not wrong it should be done; that it is a right action, at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words *ought* and *right* and *wrong* and others of that stamp have a meaning; *when otherwise, they have none.*"¹

This seems unmistakable; and we naturally infer that whenever Bentham is found using the words "ought and right, and others of that stamp," he will mean by them "what tends to augment the general happiness". But how then are we to explain the proposition found in a note to the same chapter (§ 1, added July, 1822)—*viz.*, that his fundamental principle "states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question as being the right and proper, and only right and proper, end of human action"? We cannot surely suppose that he merely means to affirm that it is conducive to general happiness to take general happiness as the sole end of action. If not, what meaning can we give to the term in the proposition just quoted, except precisely the same meaning that it would have if used in a denial of this principle by an anti-utilitarian moralist?

Bentham unfortunately cannot answer; and I do not quite know who at the present day will answer for him. I therefore turn to Mr. Fowler, whose view—though it differs importantly from Bentham's—I have a somewhat similar difficulty in understanding. Mr. Fowler expressly states that he "does not agree" with me "in regarding as ultimate and unanalysable" the idea expressed by the word "right" or "ought". His reasons for disagreeing are, as I gather, given in the following passage: "We maintain (1) that the idea of right is relative to the circumstances in which man is placed; (2) that it is explicable by the idea of good; and (3) that it is possible to discover its origin and trace its growth in the history both of the individual and of the race".² Now of these reasons—which (I ought to say) are not expressly addressed to me—only the second appears to me *primâ facie* relevant to the particular point at issue between Mr. Fowler and myself. "Relativity to the

¹ These last italics are mine.

² The numbers are introduced by me for convenience of reference.

circumstances in which man is placed" seems to me a characteristic of the *application* of the idea of right, but I do not see that it affects the ultimateness and unanalysability of the idea itself; it affects the answer given to the question "what is right," but not the meaning of the question. Again, as I have already said, the fullest knowledge of the origin and growth of the idea would not necessarily affect the question whether it is now capable of analysis; nor do I see that Mr. Fowler's account of its origin and growth contains anything that bears on this question—unless it be the second of the three statements above quoted, that the idea of right is "explicable by the idea of good".

What, then, does this "explication" amount to? I thought at first that Mr. Fowler's meaning must be that "rightness" is essentially an attribute of *means* not of *ends*, and really signifies that the object to which it is applied is thought to be the only fit means, or the means best fitted, to the realisation of some end, which we conceive as "good" but not "right,"—although the notion of the end may not always be distinctly present in consciousness when we affirm "rightness" of the means. This may hold, so long as we fix attention on actions as distinguished from their ulterior ends; but when we fix it on the *ends* of action, the question arises how the notion of "good" is to be defined, and whether we do not conceive "ultimate good" as the "right and proper end of human action"—to use Bentham's phrase. It seems to me at any rate paradoxical to deny that we commonly think of certain ultimate ends—or the conscious adoption of these ends—as "right": and other parts of Mr. Fowler's discussion would lead me to conclude that he does not mean to deny this. Thus he recognises (p. 227) that man has a "reason capable of comparing the ends to which his feelings impel him," and that when this comparison is made we approve (p. 231) of the "conscious choice of the greater good or lesser evil," even when it involves a sacrifice (p. 234) of "the interests of ourselves to the interests of others"; indeed he considers that it is in this conscious choice and the self-approval that supervenes thereon that "morality first makes its appearance". Again, he recognises as an element of "the process of approbation" what he calls "an act of judgment on the character" of the volition approved, besides and distinct from the mere "feeling of satisfaction" which is sometimes denoted by the word approval. I conclude, therefore, that the approval of the conscious choice of another's greater good in preference to the chooser's lesser good, is regarded by Mr. Fowler as a normal moral

judgment: and I do not see how in this judgment the notion "right" can fail to come in. For this judgment must be expressible in the proposition "that conscious choice, &c., is right," and the word "right" in this proposition cannot *mean* "conducive to greatest good on the whole," since that meaning would reduce the proposition to insignificance. In what way, then, can the idea of right, as used in the judgment of approval of the conscious choice of another's good in preference to one's own, be "explicable by the idea of good"? And if no such explication is here admissible, may we not say that the idea of right, as here applied, is "ultimate and unanalysable" in the sense in which, as above explained, I use the latter term?

III. I am the more concerned to get this point clear because the principle that another's greater good is to be preferred to one's own lesser good is, in my view, the fundamental principle of morality—the ultimate, irreducible basis to which reflection shows the commonly accepted rules of Veracity, Good Faith, &c., to be subordinate. And this leads me to a third point of fundamental importance on which it seems possible to clear away some misunderstanding: I mean what I have called the "Dualism of the Practical Reason". I am not particularly pleased with the phrase, which has a pretentious sound, and is perhaps liable to mislead by suggesting that I claim for my view a completeness of systematic construction which, on the contrary, I wish to avoid claiming; but it seemed the most convenient phrase to express the conclusion in which I was forced to acquiesce after a prolonged effort to effect a complete systematisation of our common ethical thought. Along with (a) a fundamental moral conviction that I ought to sacrifice my own happiness, if by so doing I can increase the happiness of others to a greater extent than I diminish my own, I find also (b) a conviction—which it would be paradoxical to call "moral," but which is none the less fundamental—that it would be irrational to sacrifice any portion of my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at some time compensated by an equivalent addition to my own happiness. I find both these fundamental convictions in my own thought with as much clearness and certainty as the process of introspective reflection can give: I find also a preponderant assent to them—at least implicit—in the common sense of mankind: and I find, on the whole, confirmation of my view in the history of ethical thought in England. I admit that it is only a minority of moralists who explicitly accept this

dualism of rational or governing principles; but I think myself justified in inferring a wider implicit acceptance of the dualism from the importance attached by dogmatic moralists generally to the conception of a moral government of the world, and from the efforts of empirical utilitarians to prove—as in Bentham's posthumous treatise—that action conducive to greatest happiness generally is always also conducive to the agent's greatest happiness.

Well, I have to acknowledge that this dualism—at least, my statement of it—does not appear to be accepted by any of the writers who have criticised my book. This naturally shakes my confidence in the view; but it shakes it less than would otherwise be the case, because, while to some critics the sacrifice of self to others seems solely rational, others avow uncompromising egoism; and no one has seriously attempted to deny that the choice between one or other alternative—according to any forecast of happiness based on mere mundane experience—is occasionally forced on us. I have not, therefore, seen cause to modify my view; but I admit that I put it forward without a sufficient rational justification, so far as Egoism is concerned. This objection was forcibly urged in a review of my book (2nd edition) by Prof. v. Giżycki in the *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* (Jahrg. iv., Heft 1), where it was pointed out that I had made no attempt to show the irrationality of the sacrifice of self-interest to duty. I will not pause to explain how the plan of my book—concerned as it was with “methods” rather than “principles”—led to this omission: I quite agree with Prof. v. Giżycki that the missing argument, if demanded, ought to be supplied; and certainly the assumption upon which the rationality of Egoism is based has been denied by philosophers; though the denial seems to Common Sense so absurd that a serious demand for its explicit statement is rather paradoxical. The assumption is simply that the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently “I” am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals. If this be admitted, the proposition that this distinction is to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an individual cannot be disproved; and to me this proposition seems self-evident, although it *primâ facie* contradicts the equally self-evident proposition that my own good is no more to be regarded than the good of another.

If the question were put to me: 'But suppose that there is no practical solution of this contradiction, through any legitimately obtained conclusion or postulate as to the moral government of the world, or in any other way: what then? Do you abandon morality?' I should answer: 'Certainly not, but I abandon the idea of rationalising it completely. I should doubtless still, through sympathy and sentiments protective of social wellbeing, imparted by education and sustained by communication with other men, feel a strong desire for the general observance of rules conducive to general happiness; and practical reason would still impel me to the performance of duty in the more ordinary cases in which what is recognised as duty is in harmony with self-interest properly understood. But, in the rare cases of a recognised conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side; the conflict would be decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two groups of non-rational impulses.' That is, I should lapse to the position which many utilitarians since Hume have avowedly held—that ultimate ends are determined by feeling, not by reason. Here, as I understand, Prof. v. Giżycki would disagree: he holds that, while the demand for the reconciliation of Virtue and Happiness—which he recognises as normal to humanity—is merely an "affectives Bedürfniss," the preference of Virtue or general happiness to private happiness is a dictate of reason, which remains no less clear and cogent, however ultimate and uncompensated may be the sacrifice of private happiness that it imposes. I do not deny this position to be tenable; since, even if the reality and essentiality of the distinction between one individual and another be granted, I do not see how to prove its fundamental practical importance to anyone who refuses to admit it; but I find such a refusal impossible to myself, and I think it paradoxical.

Suppose now that the reasonableness of the assumption required for the reconciliation of Duty and Self-interest—the assumption of the "moral government" or "moral order" of the world—is granted: suppose it granted that Virtue may be assumed to be always conducive to the virtuous agent's happiness on the whole, though the connexion between the two is not scientifically cognisable. The view of morality that I advocate—the systematisation of the morality of Common Sense on a utilitarian basis—does not then seem to involve any fundamental practical difficulty; though it is still liable to many doubts and disagreements as

regards details, from the inevitable imperfections of the hedonistic method. It remains, however, open to a fundamental theoretical objection, urged by Mr. Rashdall in a penetrating criticism of my views which appeared in *MIND* No. 38. Mr. Rashdall considers that the "central difficulty" of my position lies in the "assignment of a different end to the individual and to the race". He argues that if "it is pronounced right and reasonable for A to make sacrifices of his own happiness to the good of B," as this must be equally right and reasonable for B, C and D, "the admission that altruism is rational" compels us to conceive "the happiness which we ought to seek for society," not as mere happiness but as "moral happiness". The ultimate end, for the race as well as for the individual, thus becomes composite: it consists of a higher good, Virtue, along with a lower good, Happiness, the two being so related that in case of conflict the higher is always to be preferred to the lower.

Here I admit, as in a sense true, the starting-point of Mr. Rashdall's argument; I admit substantially the contention that my view "assigns a different end to the individual and to the race," though for a reason that I shall presently state, I regard this phraseology as misleading. But, granting to the full the alleged difference, I am unable to see why it constitutes a difficulty, since the individual is essentially and fundamentally different from the larger whole—the universe of sentient beings—of which he is conscious of being a part: just because he is conscious of his relation to similar parts of the same whole, while the whole itself has no such relation. I, therefore, do not see any inconsistency in holding that while it *would* be reasonable for the aggregate of sentient beings, if it could act collectively, to aim at its own happiness only as ultimate end—and *would* be reasonable for an individual to do the same if he were the only sentient being in the universe—it is yet *actually* reasonable for an individual to make an ultimate sacrifice of his happiness for the sake of the greater happiness of others, as well as reasonable for him to take his own happiness as ultimate end; owing, as before explained, to the double view which he necessarily takes of himself as at once an individual essentially separate from other individuals, and at the same time essentially a part among similar parts of a larger whole.

At the same time I am not prepared to deny that a consistent system might be worked out on the basis of such a composite End as Mr. Rashdall suggests, and I shall not attempt to prove, before seeing it in a fully developed

form, that it would be more open to attack on the score of paradox than my own. But I can give a decisive reason for not accepting it myself: *viz.*, that when Virtue and Happiness are hypothetically presented as alternatives, from a universal point of view, I have no doubt that I morally prefer the latter; I should not think it right to aim at making my fellow-creatures more moral, if I distinctly foresaw that as a consequence of this they would become less happy. I should even make a similar choice as regards my own future virtue, supposing it presented as an alternative to results more conducive to the General Happiness; and for this reason, among others, while holding the fulfilment of Duty to be ultimately reasonable for the individual no less than the pursuit of self-interest, I think it misleading to say that Virtue is an ultimate good to the individual as well as Happiness. As I have explained in my *Methods of Ethics*, bk. iii., ch. 11, § 3, I distinguish the question "whether the dictates of Reason are always to be obeyed" from the question "whether the dictation of Reason is always to be promoted"; and, while I answer the former question unhesitatingly in the affirmative, I leave the latter to be determined by empirical and utilitarian considerations.

II.—MENTAL ACTIVITY.

By Dr. EDMUND MONTGOMERY.

I.

THE attempt is here made to discover the proximate source of what usually goes by the name of "mental activity". In setting about this task, one way only is open, and that is to examine the nature and import of the various components of our conscious content. For it is a self-evident and settled truth, that our knowledge consists solely of what we consciously realise.

Of all differences discoverable among the congeries of conscious states that make up our moment of mental realisation, the one that has struck observers as most salient is that obtaining between sensations and thoughts, or, more properly, between perceptions and conceptions. These two modes of mental realisation seem to bring with them the knowledge of two different worlds. One of these worlds apparently subsists outside of us, figured in open space before our senses. The other is more or less clearly apprehended within our own inner self, by force of what we call our reason or intelligence,

To thinkers of all times it has been a standing puzzle to make out the exact relation of these two closely interdependent and yet so widely disparate worlds. "*De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*," has ever been a leading theme with philosophers. And it will be admitted, that this ancient topic still in our time occupies a central position in theoretical philosophy. Whether considered, metaphysically, in relation to a real world revealed to the senses, and another most real world of all revealed to intelligence; or considered, psychologically, simply as relating to perceptual and conceptual experience;—it is the topic which above all others is at present engrossing the attention and exercising the ingenuity of those who are busying themselves with philosophical interpretation.

In an inquiry of the kind before us it is advisable to follow historical lines. The recent critical re-examination of their respective standpoints has led almost all schools alike to go "back to Kant". Spiritualists and Materialists, Transcendentalists and Associationists, Nativists and Empirical

Evolutionists, do not disdain to hitch in common their museful Pegasus to the lumbering chariot of the Critical Philosophy. No wonder. All leading views with their contradictories find themselves there discriminated and represented. Metaphysically, Kant believed in a supersensible world to which Reason in its completeness points. But he believed also in a world of Things-in-themselves giving material to the senses. Psychologically, he reinstated in German philosophy perceptual presentation as a mental occurrence differing in kind, and not only in degree, from conceptual knowledge. And while from the physical standpoint he looked upon cosmical development as an outcome of mechanical necessity, from the moral standpoint he taught that a power of free mental causation is flowing through man into nature from a supernatural source.

In Germany the going back to Kant meant principally a reaction against an undue preponderance attributed to intellectual agency in the make-up, not only of individual knowledge, but of nature at large. In England, on the contrary, it meant a reaction against an undue preponderance attributed to the efficiency of mere sensorial elements in the constitution of experience.

Kant himself, while apparently weighing in equal scales the respective merits of sense and intellect, really tipped with a prejudiced and overwhelming thrust the beam in favour of the latter.

At the dawn of the neo-Kantian era, the present writer took pains to point out and to expose the fundamental misconception which allured Kant to attempt once more the task of rationally unifying the then seemingly so disparate worlds of sense and intellect.¹

Like the Cartesians, Kant had formerly seen his way to no other than a mystical solution of the great standing problem. "Nempe nos omnia intueri in Deo:" this was, at that time, his, as well as Malebranche's, conclusion. But the alleged discovery of synthetical judgments *a priori*, presupposing a power in us capable of constructing geo-

¹ *Die Kant'sche Erkenntnislehre*, &c., 1871, pp. 92-93. "The fundamental mistake made by Kant was the arbitrary bisection of the cognitive faculty into a passive and an active half; with the attribution of the entire passive part to sensorial perception, and of the entire active play to abstract conception." "According to his view there is received through sense nothing but a given chaos of non-cognised impressions; and, consequently, it falls to this one active power in knowledge, namely, to intelligence, to bring into this casual, subjective and passive congeries of sensorial affections, unity, order, necessity, objectivity—in fact, everything that imparts to it animation and efficiency."

metrical knowledge without the aid of any sense-derived material,—this alleged discovery made the relation of intellect to form appear to Kant in a new light. Space itself—the form in which such *a priori* geometrical constructions, as well as all *a posteriori* sensorial appearances, manifest themselves—must, then, be an original endowment of our own sensibility. And it must be the spontaneous activity of the intellect that shapes the geometrical figures within the empty and passive perceptual form, and that thereupon works up these specific spatial determinations into universally valid knowledge.

The intellect was, under this aspect, conceived as an agent whose productive activity is capable of impregnating with perceptual existences the changeless spatial form, determining it in those active ways that alone enter into knowledge. And this same intellect was, moreover, conceived as the synthetical power which works up this self-determined spatial material to complete cognition.

Such being the case, the sensorial material yielded during perceptual presentation by sense-affections can, in the entire absence of intellectual elaboration, also subsist in an undetermined and unsynthesised state. And if presentations in Space are, as such, wholly undetermined and unsynthesised, then, all the more, as presentations in Time, they, as well as all non-spatial presentations in this constantly lapsing medium, must remain chaotically incoherent, until brought under the grasp of knowledge-constructing intellect.

From this point of view, it inevitably follows, despite Kant's struggle against it, that all presentations of the "outer" and "inner sense," *i.e.*, all material for knowledge, whether consisting in appearances given in Space, or of anything at all given in Time,—that all such experiential stuff is virtually non-existent as constituent element of actual conscious experience. For, according to Kant, before determinate extension is actually constructed by the spontaneous activity of the Intellect, and the successive moments of such construction gathered up and combined by this same activity, there is no cognition, and therefore no conscious experience of actual Space. Before "motion as an action of the subject" produces succession, and the lapsing moments of such succession are noticed by the Intellect and unified into simultaneous apperception as definite duration, there is no cognition and therefore no conscious experience of actual Time. Consequently, under these conditions, there can be without intellectual activity no cognition of any kind, no

conscious experience of any sensorial content of intellectually undetermined and unsynthesised Space and Time.

Assuming with Kant that the Intellect is really the sole constructing and unifying power underlying experience, it has unavoidably to be conceded that the world we actually know, with all its definite spatial configurations and timely determinations, must be out-and-out its own fabrication. Detached sensorial elements can under this supposition count for nothing in cognition. For, to form part of knowledge, every element must have already been subjected to the determining and combining influences of the Intellect. What the Intellect realises, by dint of such spontaneous activity of its own, is a unitary world in which every element falls into place as an integrant part, occupying thus by force of its definite relations to all other parts a necessary, pre-established position in the entire body of thought. And as no sensorial raw-material can possibly force itself as a new increment into this already completed totality of thought, it follows, that Intellect, universally conceived, must itself be the creator and sustainer of the world we consciously realise. Our individual thought, then, merely *re-cognises* the pre-formed, self-created content of universal Thought.

This, indeed, is the consistent outcome of the Kantian doctrine of an Intelligence endowed with constructive efficiency and synthetical powers. And Kant's followers soon found courage to adopt as their philosophical creed the extreme logical consequences of this modern reversion to principles necessarily leading to something like Alexandrian Platonism. In their view, not only the outside world affecting the senses, but the sensorial affections themselves, dwindled away into non-existence. Perception was again degraded to a rank wholly subordinate to conception. And Being came once more to be looked upon as entirely identical with adequate conceptual Thought.

But whatever exegetical ingenuity idealistic followers of Kant may employ to draw the master to their side, it must be patent to unbiassed students, that he, at all events, never doubted that sense-material falls into Space and Time from some source external to our Being and its Intellect. His laborious examination led him unequivocally to the final conclusion, that the Intellect is capable of exercising its constructive and synthetical powers only on *sense-given* material; the experienced order and connexion in nature being, however, entirely the product of those intellectual powers. Still he never lost sight of his other, extra-mental, world, the one toward which intellectual conception in its completeness

was pointing. Amid all the iconoclastic thoroughness of his theoretical speculations, it remained his consoling faith, that our innermost Self stands rooted in a central, supernatural sphere, drawing therefrom its highest efficiencies. To his matured thought, it was this supernatural Self of ours that has power, not only morally to modify the work of mechanical necessity, but also to use as its fixed and necessary functions the categories, constituting with their aid valid knowledge by systematising all combinations yielded by them within its synthetical unity of apperception.

However much our present Trancendentalists may profess to lean on Kant, or, on the other hand, may strive to graft their exalted theories on the humble growth of Locke's ideas, the good of Kant's labour, as well as that of English Experimentalism, is all but lost to philosophy when Being is conceived as identical with Thought. This perplexing question of the relation of Thought to Being is the essential point on which in its various phases the contention of modern philosophy is turning. Is the power that binds into interdependence and unity the existences of the sensible world the same power which gathers up into a logical whole all fractions of our individual experience? Does our thought in its order and combinations follow a given order and given combinations of sensible things; or is it, perchance, our thought, as such, that coerces into systematic order the sensible manifold of what we call nature; or, again, are the order of succession and the casual combinations of natural existences transmuted into a logical totality of experience, by becoming organically incorporated into the matrix of our unitary consciousness? In fine, is thought-activity the source whence the significant order of nature emanates; or is it from the significant order of nature unified in our world-responsive organisation that its thought-manifestation is born? Surely it cannot be reasonably maintained that this great question of Thought and Being has yet been satisfactorily settled one way or the other.

Through Leibnizo-Wolffian influences Kant had in early days been led to look upon formal logic, with its principle of identity and contradiction, as the only instrument of knowledge. The study of Hume, however, convinced him that logical connexion and natural connexion are two entirely different modes of dependence. To his great surprise he had to acknowledge that so-called causation, or the intimate connexion obtaining among experiential facts as we become aware of them, is not of logical but of empirical origin. In actual experience one event does not follow another according

to logical principles. It is experience alone that can teach what occurrence in nature will issue from definite antecedents.

Kant, though not fully understanding Hume's purely sensorial Experientialism, was quick to perceive, that, if all knowledge is thus experientially put together by simply remembering bit by bit the sensibly impressed order of natural connexion, without our being in possession of general principles by force of which we may legitimately constitute knowledge overreaching the experiential data,—that then all metaphysical constructions indulged in by former philosophers had been mere air-built edifices, and that there can be no knowledge whatever transcending the facts and combinations of actual sensorial experience.

It was to escape this tremendous implication, carrying with it the overthrow of everything supernatural, that, after the alleged discovery of *a priori* synthetical propositions, Kant set himself strenuously to work to gauge the compass and general reach of the spontaneous mental power, which must necessarily be operative in such intellectually constructed knowledge. When his task was accomplished, his theoretical speculation had indeed rid itself of the influence of super-sensible entities. But though on the one side it fearlessly demolished every kind of spiritualistic Ontology, on the other side it brought him into *irreconcilable* opposition to the sensorial Experientialism of English thinkers.

It was the view of these latter, that the synthesis obtaining among sensorial particulars is due to a gradual consolidation, established through reiterated experience of their order when received as actual sensorial impressions. Kant's view, on the contrary, was, that the given order of sensorial impressions has nothing whatever to do with their synthesis; that the sensorial material remains wholly unsynthetised until gathered up and combined by the specific *a priori* powers of the Intellect. With the English thinkers the significant order and coherence of mental occurrences originate experientially on the sensorial side. With Kant it is established through pre-established modes of intellectual activity.

In their explanation of synthetised experience both views seemingly refrain from calling in the help of agencies lying outside the mental content. Hume, who had pushed sensorial Experientialism as far as it would go, pretended not to believe in anything awakening sensorial impressions from outside the mind. And Kant persuaded himself that his synthetical powers were of "transcendental" and not of "transcendent" origin and nature; *i.e.*, that they were natural mental functions existing solely as modes of combi-

nation found actually operative in the synthesis of sensorial data.

These diametrically opposed attempts to construct a *theory of knowledge* by merely taking notice of what is actually found in consciousness, without reference to anything existing beyond it, could succeed only by means of fictitious assumptions and the neglect of essential implications. Knowledge necessarily implies something different from itself, of which it is the knowledge. Whether a result of the intimate agglutination of sensorial particulars or a product of the synthetical activity of the Intellect, the synthetised mental content would, as such, be wholly meaningless if it did not refer to something beyond itself.

Consequently, we find that Hume's experientially established order of mental occurrences receives its true significance as knowledge only in reference to the *given order of actual impressions*. These impressions, though defined by Hume as "merely the perceptions themselves," clearly imply something which impresses them, and also something which receives them. A perception cannot possibly originate its own self; and this, moreover, out of nothing. Nor can it exist self-sustained in its own medium. But, besides, when I see a flame, and the idea of heat is called up in consequence, the really important fact here is, not that I have the *idea* of heat, but that I shall receive the actual *impression* of heat as soon as I get sufficiently near the flame. Now it is evident that the directly experienced connexion between actual impressions is not of *mental* consistency. The actual impression or perception of a flame does not call up the actual impression or sensation of heat, but only its remembered idea. The established mental connexion between the perception of a flame and the *idea* of heat is, however, avowedly moulded on the connexion obtaining between the actual impression or perception of the flame and the actual *impression or sensation* of heat, which prototypal connexion is not of mental origin and consistency. Consequently, the mental order, as knowledge, refers to a pre-established, extra-mental order.

The primary assumption of nothing but actual and remembered sensorial impressions is the reason for Hume's blinking of this realistic implication necessarily inherent in his theory of knowledge. Later Associationists, with less logical consistency, have very generally referred to an extra-mental order as prototype of the intra-mental order; while at the same time laying most stress—as chiefly conducive to systematic thought-realisation—on the order in which the

remembered ideas of impressions appear in the conscious content.

Kant, strange to say, though generally pre-eminently credited with the formulation of a profound theory of knowledge, has really completely failed in this most arduous endeavour of his. For it is obvious that his intellectually constructed mental objects have no reference whatever to anything beyond themselves. They certainly do not refer, as knowledge, to the sensorial raw-material, which is declared to contain nothing at all cognisable in itself. Much less can they refer to the thus utterly estranged world of Things-in-themselves, from which wholly unknowable sphere Kant believed sensibility to be somehow impregnated with a chaotic material having nothing objective in its own make-up.

But the real oversight that led Kant to believe he was explaining knowledge, without cognitive reference to anything beyond what is found in actual consciousness, lay in his theoretical neglect of the transcendent sphere, whence he was in truth all the time deriving his synthetical power. In his system it is, and must be, a prepotent agent that from some dwelling-place beyond consciousness sets going the synthetical functions whereby "nature is made" as object of knowledge. Kant gives to this prepotent, supernatural agent the name of "Intelligible Ego". And with him it is, in verity, this intelligible Ego, as bearer of the all-efficient Intelligence and its synthetical unity of apperception, that fashions by force of its own spontaneous activity the system of knowledge going by the name of nature. It is clear, then, that the active, order-establishing power in nature, whose modes of activity are recognised by us, inhered with Kant, as with Hume, not in the conscious content itself, but somewhere in extra-conscious latency. Only it was conceived by the former as intellect-inspiring, by the latter as sense-affecting.

No wonder that, by consistently following Kant's way of interpreting the conscious content, Fichte found himself soon landed in pure Solipsism. Later, however, the magnanimous concession, that other thinking beings cannot well be mere phantoms of one's own making, and that all these thinking individuals are evidently realising in their consciousness one and the same world—these and other considerations led at last to Objective Idealism.

This ultimate view, to which Transcendentalism has very generally arrived, conceives the totality of existence subsisting in all eternity as the thought of a universal Intelligence, which reality-constituting Thought comes to be more and

more completely *re*-cognised by human individuals, by means of a revelation conveyed through a progressive historical evolution. Here the object of knowledge, as with Hume and Kant, is likewise something existing beyond the content of individual consciousness—namely, the activity of universal Intelligence, which alone is believed to constitute veritable Reality or Being.

II.

The conscious content, which exhibits in immediate presence all the experience we awaredly realise, refers, as we have seen, incontestably to some kind of reality beyond itself. The question is: Where is the dwelling-place of this reality, and what is its nature?

By naturalistic thinkers and the universal intuition of mankind, the reality known through consciousness is believed to subsist independently of this its mental realisation, becoming more and more fully revealed to us by means of specific sensorial affections and their derivatives. Transcendentalists, on the contrary, believe the implied reality to subsist as the thought-creation of a universal Intelligence, revealed to our human mind through conceptual recognition.

It has to be conceded that the consistent sensorial view fails to take proper account of such constituents of the conscious content as transcend in meaning and worth all that can possibly be of sensorial origin. For, assuredly, our complex emotions, thoughts and volitions, at least, are of strikingly super-sensible significance. The consistent intellectual view, on the other hand, seeks to suppress in a most arbitrary manner the manifest import of perceptual consciousness.

But leaving these deficiencies of the two views for the present out of sight, whence does the conscious content itself receive its being and activity? What is it that originates and sets going the diversified display experienced by us as conscious revelation?

Admitting the fictitiousness of the "psychological idea," or, in other words, the non-existence of the subject of empirical psychology commonly called "soul," Kant, nevertheless, assumes in each of us (as already stated) an actuating agent of the conscious display, belonging to the intelligible or supernatural order. With him the perceptual appearances, as such, are utterly passive, and their various modes of combination, the categories, are, as such, in no way self-acting. It is not the category of causation, for instance, that has of itself power to seize hold of the perceptual particulars in order

to weld them together in necessary dependence. In the Kantian system it is the intelligible Ego, with its spontaneous intellectual activity, which uses the categories as its instruments to fashion the conscious world we know. With the thorough-going post-Kantian Transcendentalists all actuating power inheres in a universal Intelligence. And we ourselves, as well as our entire conscious revelation, are only moments of reflex-thought in the eternal Mind.

But Hume, who tried to get rid of all supernatural and extra-conscious assumptions, by accounting for the conscious display through experiential agglutinations between the sensorial particulars and their derivations,—where does he place the actuating power amid the busy shifting and changing experienced within his self-conscious panorama? He tells us plainly that the idea of power, force, energy or efficacy is a mere fiction; that neither external nor internal impressions have anything of the kind in them. "We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power" (*Treatise*, iii., § 14). Yet when he comes deliberately to give a definition of mind, he finds it indispensable to assume power or efficacy somewhere. He says: "The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other" (*Ib.*, iv., § 6).

Here we find it unequivocally maintained that the "different perceptions" which form the conscious display, *themselves* "produce, destroy, influence and modify each other". According to Hume, it is, and indeed must be, in the conscious particulars themselves that the power or efficacy resides, which brings them into being and gives them compelling influence over the existence and constitution of one another. We have thus self-produced existences of an obviously ephemeral character, which—themselves vanishing into nothingness—draw out of this same nothingness other previously non-existent existences, with which they are nevertheless found to be intimately pre-connected by the mighty bond of causation.

Such, indeed, is the nonsensical and nihilistic collapse that must overtake this and all other attempts to lodge the producing and actuating power in anything forming part of the conscious content.

It belongs—as I hope conclusively to show—to the essence of all constituents of the conscious content to be out-and-out evanescent and forceless. Our conscious content or

mental presence emanates from moment to moment as a new-creation from unconscious depths of being, and its successive moments with their revealing flash vanish, as such, wholly out of existence. It is of the utmost importance clearly to realise the merely indicative significance and speedy evanescence of conscious states. Where, indeed, can there be found any permanency, self-activity or efficiency in anything of conscious consistence? And though everything we are cognisant of is revealed to us as forming part of our conscious content, yet it is a philosophical superstition to believe that there can be a self-rounded, self-significant science of purely psychical occurrences; for it is certain that psychical occurrences, as such and among themselves, have neither meaning nor power.

Philosophers who think they are constructing a science of self-sustained and self-moved psychical existences forget that all the while they are supplying from the ample resources of their own completed human individuality whatever is needed to bring the purely psychical existences into being and interaction. When I say, 'The perception of a flame brings up the idea of heat,' I really mean that in me and others this connexion has already been established, and is subsisting at all times within us in extra-conscious¹ latency. The obtaining nexus is, consequently, of extra-conscious and not of conscious consistency. It is not the perception of the flame, as a conscious fact, which produces or forces into conscious existence the idea of heat. But the same compelling influences which awaken in me the perception of a flame awaken also by dint of pre-established, extra-conscious connexion its accompanying idea of heat. It is in the pre-established constitution of the realising subject that the efficiency inheres, not in the flame as a particular percept. These realistic implications necessarily attach to the recognition of our individuated being as the enduring subject of the conscious play. And they cannot be legitimately neglected in the interpretation of our conscious content. Though there can be a psychology without a *ψυχή*, there can never be one without the feeling and thinking *ἄνθρωπος*.

Psychology, as a science of self-originated and self-acting conscious existences, rests on eminently fictitious assump-

¹The preposition 'extra' and its equivalents are used in this discussion in the sense of *not within* the conscious content and by no means in the sense *outside of* it, spatially conceived. Of course, the terms 'inside' and 'outside' spatially conceived apply only to perceptual phenomena.

tions, and can lead only to nihilistic results. Such a science, constructed without reference to an abiding, extra-conscious source of actuation and emanation, and without investigation of the specific states of this pre-organised matrix—such a merely introspective science, if at all consistent, will ever hang in vacancy, vaguely describing an illusive, meaningless and mostly incoherent play of evanescent phenomena. Our conscious content, brought into existence by extra-conscious powers and processes, and referring as knowledge to extra-conscious existences and activities, how can its examination yield valuable instruction when these *all-important* realistic implications are left out of account?

But, in actual interpretation, realistic implications are never left wholly out of account even by those who believe they have evaded the difficulty of an underlying reality by endowing particular constituents of the conscious content with whatever efficacy they desire. All such efforts are, however, brought to naught by the simple fact, that nothing of conscious consistency is the bearer of anything like force or power.

The constituents of our conscious content can in no way be legitimately compared to the interdependent and interacting parts of a mechanical whole; nor the order of their conscious appearance to a mechanical process. Surely, perceptual coexistences, such as colour and extension, or the shape and colour of a violet and its odour, are nowise mechanically interdependent and interacting. Nor do the many adjacent forms which coexist in a complex perception, hang together by any kind of mechanical bond. Much less can the fixed order of successive appearances within the conscious content be attributed to anything in the remotest degree resembling the successive phases of a mechanical process. The sight of a flame does not bring up from its extra-conscious hiding-place the associated idea of heat through anything like mechanical contiguity and friction.

Attempts to interpret the conscious content and its changes, by applying in some way or other 'statical' and 'dynamical' principles to its psychical facts and occurrences, must ever remain a futile undertaking, however consummate the ingenuity bestowed upon it. The constituents of the conscious content are, as such, immaterial and forceless. They are evidently devoid of what is mechanically called 'mass,' and are therefore wholly unresisting. And as nothing without resistance can possibly be in possession of force and momentum, nothing within

the conscious content can be capable of imparting or of receiving energy.

Believers in psychical energy, whether as Transcendentalists they place it in the intellect, or as Associationists and Herbartians they invest with it sensorial particulars, or as Spencerians seek to apply the principle of the persistence of force and its convertibility to psychical phenomena—one and all they have no legitimate ground to stand upon. It is only in the world of inferred extra-conscious powers that force can possibly dwell, and that energy can be received and imparted.

This emphatic denial of anything like efficacious power appertaining to mental existences or states, as such, rather boldly challenges common conviction. But surely it is only in the vaguest metaphorical sense that such terms as force, energy and their like can be applied to the ghostly flittings and inwardly occluded play of feelings that make up our conscious content.

This view of the forceless nature of the conscious content has recently been corroborated in a very striking though unconscious manner by the mathematical physicists. Their object of research, supposed to be of physical consistency, is really composed of nothing but the time- and space-relations of compelled percepts and their movements. For these inquirers purposely refrain from referring to the perception-compelling influences, or to anything beyond the complex perception as such. In consequence of this limitation of physical science to the investigation of the time- and space-relations of mere perceptual appearances, these mathematical physicists can discover in this purely ideal play of conscious phenomena neither resisting material, nor force, nor energy; and they have thus been led to discard as superfluous all such realistic and inferential conceptions, reducing everything to mere phenomena of interdependent motions.

How strange this immaterial consummation of the science of material objects! What eloquent and instructive irony speaks out of this assiduous chasing of physical reality in the psychical medium, ending with the grasp of nothing but moving phantoms—an unsubstantial play, as forceless and evanescent as the spectral visions of a dream! Fortunately, the existents whose characteristics and activities are emblematically and unsubstantially shadowed by the compelled percepts happen to be themselves endowed with sufficient permanency and efficacy to allow us to conclude that the world does after all not entirely consist of "such stuff as dreams are made off".

Of course, it is easy to get over the fundamental difficulty of psychology by simply assuming—as most psychologists actually do—an efficient subject capable of seizing hold of, and of manipulating more or less at will, the psychical events that make up his conscious content. But, then, who and of what nature is this self-acting Subject? And how does it set about understanding the meaning and controlling the direction of the conscious play experienced as taking place within its own being?

To identify this acting Subject with anything psychical is to identify it with something forming part of the conscious content; for this is the only actual experience we have of anything psychical. And when we call this Subject "Reason," "Intelligence" or "Will," we simply elevate into fictitious existence, and arbitrarily endow with the desiderated powers, a generalised conception of one or the other class of conscious occurrences.

Permanency and efficiency are what we are in need of. But the conscious occurrences are as such transient and forceless. It is clear, then, that it is not in them we can find the requisite qualities wherewith to equip our assumed Subject. When we maintain, that "Reason" is the efficient power; or that "the Intellect" discriminates, assimilates and retains conscious facts, or perceives them, or that "Will" is the actuating force within the conscious content and otherwise, we certainly hypostatise as self-acting and efficient agents, under the name of known conscious occurrences, something of which no experience whatever is given as making up the conscious content.

To unprejudiced thinkers it must, indeed, seem at once obvious, that the Subject that has and controls the conscious content cannot possibly itself form part of this content, but must possess a nature altogether transcending it.

Now the real question is: Do we naturally, and can we as philosophers legitimately, infer as endowed with permanency and efficient power something not forming part of our conscious content? On the answer to this question depends essentially the character which our world-conception will assume.

I am confident that *positive proof* of the existence of a world of efficient powers beyond our conscious content—a world to which our own efficient Subject belongs—can be readily given to all who admit the existence of other beings like themselves. For it is incontestable, and in keeping with the forceless character of psychical occurrences, that we become conscious of the existence of other beings,

not in the least through awareness of anything forming part of their conscious content. When we perceive another human being, this perception does not contain any of his conscious states. His sensations, perceptions, emotions, thoughts and volitions are not given, as such, in the coloured and moving figure which constitutes our visual percept of him ; nor are they contained, as such, in the air-vibrations which his articulate speech sets in motion, and which mechanically strike our ear. It is evident that no constituent of his conscious content has, as such, any power whatever to affect our senses. Consequently, that part of his being which has power to affect our senses must possess a nature differing altogether from anything forming part of his conscious content. It follows, irrefragably, that the vivid and characteristic percepts which signalise in our conscious content the presence and peculiarities of another being are awakened in us, not by what we call his 'mind,' but by what we call his 'body,' or whatever name we may give to his non-psychical, extra-conscious nature.

It is important to take notice of a necessary and obvious correlative of this consideration, namely, that this bodily part of a human being's nature which has power to affect the senses of observers can never, as such, form part of this being's own conscious content. The well-known congeries of sensations and perceptions which figure as our own body in our conscious content is certainly not the existent that has power to affect the senses of an observer, but only our own perceptual realisation of such existent ; which psychical realisation is of the same merely representative order as the observer's perception of it. Now, unmistakably, it is the non-psychical, sense-affecting and, therefore, power-endowed part of a being's nature which constitutes his veritable, permanent Self. And it is within this extra-conscious Self that are evolved the transient though highly significant occurrences which make up his conscious content.

Surely these are legitimate inferences from the universal and sane conviction, that there exist other beings like ourselves. And it need hardly be mentioned that these well-grounded inferences are of paramount importance, not only to philosophy at large, but also to psychology. As the key to the significance, order and relation of the manifold, ever-changing constituents of the conscious content is found solely in their realistic implications, it is clear that no valid science of psychical phenomena can possibly dispense with a constant reference to these implications.

Physical science, even in its most abstruse mathematical

flights, confines itself to the investigation of the time- and space-relations of *sense-compelled* percepts, in which class of psychical facts and occurrences the realistic implications are of the most direct and obvious kind. By fancying for a moment a physical investigation of last night's dream-vision, one may realise how all-important the realistic implication is to science.

Psychology, which has to deal not only with sense-compelled percepts but with all manner of psychical facts and occurrences, has no easy task to discover the true realistic import of all the crowding throng of often only remotely representative psychical marks that make up the conscious realisation of nature in its widest sense. But neither these marks themselves, sensorial, perceptual, emotional, conceptual or volitional, nor their mutual relations, can possibly be understood without reference to what they are marks of. The magic web of Space- and Time-conquering ideas, the delicate graduation and profound thrill of emotions, the prescient reach of volitions,—what meaning can there be found in it all, without piercing beyond the mere psychical manifestation to what in extra-conscious reality it implies?

The simple consideration, that psychical states and occurrences have, as such, no power to make themselves directly known to other beings, contains also a sufficient refutation of such Idealism as believes us capable of being directly affected by the thought of a universal Intelligence. For, as no kind of *experienced* thought inherent in another being has power to affect us directly, and as *inferred* thought of any kind can be imagined only in analogy to experienced thought, therefore no kind of inferred thought can have, as such, power to affect us. This argument seems plain enough, and should be candidly pondered. Its frank admission or valid overthrow would greatly conduce to unify our divers world-conceptions.

But how does the legitimately inferred Subject come to understand the meaning of its conscious content, and to gain so large a control over it? Perhaps the most difficult task in philosophy is to find a sufficient explanation of these world-apprehending and self-acting faculties of the Subject. It has been shown that nothing experienced within the conscious content can at all account for them. Is it then, perchance, possible to derive some partial clue to this great enigma from that part of the Subject's being which has power to affect the senses of observers, and compel in them the vivid and minutely characteristic percepts that constitute our knowledge of its extra-conscious nature?

It is an undeniable fact that we infer activity wherever we perceive motion of any kind, and we infer it only when motion is perceived, or legitimately conjectured as present. When I see the parts of a machine change their relative positions, I conclude that the machine is acting. When I see a person move in certain ways, I say he is acting in this or that manner, or is performing this or that action. Now it is quite obvious that I, who in these cases am realising as my own perception the moving objects, am not myself the agent who performs the actions perceived by me. My percepts, together with their motions, are only characteristic signals aroused in me by the signalised, sense-stimulating existents and their specific activities. *Motion is, therefore, only our conscious sign for activities that take place in extra-conscious existents, or emanate from extra-conscious agents.*

The motions of, or within our, *compelled* percepts are, then, as conscious facts, not themselves activities, but merely signs of extra-conscious activities. And these perceptual signs of activities that are taking place in other beings derive *their own existence* from definite extra-conscious activities that are taking place in the subject in which they themselves occur. This has become a scientifically established truth by the general admission that, whenever we are conscious of a compelled percept and its motions, or, indeed, of any other psychical occurrence, an outside observer would, under favourable conditions, be able to become aware (as his own percept) of definite motions in that part of our being which he perceives as our brain. And these perceptual motions in the conscious content of the observer are undoubtedly signs of definite activities taking place in the extra-conscious or non-psychical being of the observed subject. For it is, as has been shown, this extra-conscious being which alone has power to affect the sensibility of an observer, and compel in him the percepts he is conscious of.

We may then fairly maintain that, whenever we are conscious and whenever this our conscious content changes or moves, there are corresponding activities astir in our extra-conscious being, which activities manifest themselves to observers as definite brain-motions with their further organic outcomes.

The activity which arouses from outside our compelled percepts and their motions belongs to the extra-conscious nature of the arousing powers. The activity which within ourselves gives being and movement to our conscious content belongs to our own extra-conscious nature. Activity, therefore, whether taking place in our own being or outside of it,

is always merely inferred, and never directly experienced as constituent of our conscious content. But, though a mere inference, it receives its justification and validity from the evident fact that our immediate awareness of other beings and their doings consists in compelled percepts and their motions, which conscious revelation is certainly aroused in us by *extra-conscious* powers. And—once more be it stated—‘extra-conscious’ or ‘non-psychical’ must these percept-arousing powers be called, because nothing of conscious or psychical consistency in other beings has power to arouse percepts in us.

We may then use as legitimately available factors in our explanation of so-called mental activity, first, our own conscious content; secondly, the compelled percepts and their motions aroused in an observer by our extra-conscious being and its activities; thirdly, this our extra-conscious being and its activities as thus positively and distinctly signalled through the compelled percepts and their motions within the conscious content of the observer.

As mental activity, like all other modes of activity, can be only of extra-conscious origin and nature, we cannot expect to gain information regarding it by simply examining, without reference to extra-conscious implications, that part of our being which constitutes our conscious content. Our conscious content, as such, has neither intrinsic power over its own constituents, nor extrinsic power to arouse signalling percepts in observers. It is, as has abundantly been shown, utterly forceless, and, therefore, incapable of initiating or performing any kind of action. Information regarding the origin and nature of mental activity, if at all attainable, has to be gathered from compelled percepts, which alone reveal the efficient characteristics of the acting Subject.

However meagre such perceptual information regarding our extra-conscious and efficient nature may be—consisting, as it does, of nothing but sensorial signs, that in the highest reach of perceptual realisation amount to mere coloured forms and their motions—still, various essential points concerning the nature of the Subject and its mental activity may be made out upon the evidence of these emblematic signs. First of all, as being of chief importance, the substantiality of the acting Subject can be scientifically explained. It can be shown, namely, how under constantly enforced change the acting Subject nevertheless succeeds in retaining its essential identity. This cardinal point, when merely psychologically—and, therefore, wrongly—inter-

preted, constitutes the stronghold of Idealistic Transcendentalism. I have discussed it in my article on "The Substantiality of Life" (*MIND* vi. 321). Next in importance is the spontaneity of the essential activities of the Subject, or its power of meeting or opposing outside inducements or encroachments with its own indwelling specific energies; and this also can be satisfactorily demonstrated from observed motor signs. I have, on various occasions, shown how this takes place for protoplasmic individuals in general.

But the question that, in connexion with our present inquiry into the source and nature of mental activity, has now chiefly to occupy us, is: whether the specific perceptual motions, which may be aroused in an observer by our extra-conscious Subject during its moments of conscious awareness, are capable of revealing anything instructive concerning the activity here at play.

From what has, I hope, been clearly and decisively shown, it has become evident that, when I will to move my arm, it is not anything found in my conscious content which performs the action. The action is performed by my extra-conscious being or Subject. An outside observer of this action perceives, as his own sensorial affection, a moving arm. And this, his percept, with its motion, is a mere sign of the action performed by me, the perceived Subject. The perceptual arm, moving within the conscious content of the observer, can certainly not be the real arm of the Subject who performs the action. If there were a thousand observers, each would realise, as his own percept, a moving arm. The extra-conscious existence and activity of the one Subject would be accurately signalised within the conscious content of a thousand other beings. Now, it is evident that I myself, the Subject, as a sense-stimulated observer, am in exactly the same position as any other outside observer. When I perceive my arm moving, this perceptual revelation is merely the conscious sign of an actual performance emanating from my extra-conscious being. When I say, 'I am moving my arm,' the true meaning of such an assertion is, that my extra-conscious Subject is actuating a certain part of my being, which actuated part is consciously signalised to myself and others as a moving arm. What in the world could a perceptual arm moving within my conscious content signify to me, if it meant nothing substantial and efficacious beyond itself, if it were merely without extra-conscious significance the forceless, evanescent thing it actually is in a dream? Taken as a mere consti-

tuent of the conscious content, in connexion with nothing but other constituents, the perceptual motion of a perceptual arm would be uncaused, unconditioned and meaningless. And as with this perceptual arm, so with every other psychical phenomenon. Nothing whatever of conscious consistency has, as such, meaning in itself and for itself; nor can it ever be a cause or condition of any occurrence. It has meaning only in reference to extra-conscious existents, and is always caused by extra-conscious activities.

The belief that something within us of a conscious or psychical nature moves our limbs is one of those fundamental illusions of the intuitive mode of interpretation which lead to an entirely erroneous conception of the nature of our being. The ideas and feelings that in our conscious content stand for the volitional forecast and fiat, are merely the immediate central and inner awareness of the same organic process, whose peripheral outcomes are perceived as the movement of limbs by means of the eminently circuituous way of sense-stimulation and consequent awakening of specific percepts in observers. Surely our own inwardly realised ideal forecast and volitional fiat cannot possibly produce the movement of those perceptual limbs now present in the conscious content of any observer who chooses to witness the performance. Nor is it likely that ephemeral psychical phenomena, arising out of ideal latency, can have power to set going those definite molecular brain-motions of whose necessarily pre-organised matrix they are utterly unconscious. Evidently the same organic process within my extra-conscious being, whose central outcome is for myself an inner awareness of certain voluntary ideas and feelings, is also perceivable in the conscious content of an observer—first at its central starting-point as molecular motion of brain-particles, and then in its peripheral outcomes as the mass-motion of limbs.

The intimate connexion existing between emotions and thoughts and their peripheral expressions, a connexion so delicate and definite that, quite apart from its facial phenomena, so-called mind-readers are able to make out definite thoughts by merely noticing their unconscious expression through the muscles of the hand,—this one fact alone indicates with sufficient clearness that both phenomena—the inner awareness of the observed subject and the perceived muscular movements—are outcomes of one and the same organic process. No less indicative of the same kind of dependence is the connexion between thought and speech, a connexion so close that these two totally disparate

phenomena, the inner awareness and outer expression, are rightly looked upon as two different aspects of one and the same fact of nature. The one underlying fact is, however, not anything forming part of the conscious content of the thinking subject, nor is it the articulate expression as an observed perception, but the gradually established and definitely organised extra-conscious nexus, whose actuation gives rise to both.

Various psychological subterfuges are resorted to in order to obtain a permanent and efficient *psychical* matrix of conscious existences. It is, for instance, quietly assumed that the matrix of conscious emanation is composed of all possible psychical existences, having a nature identical with the constituents of actual consciousness. And these latent psychical existences are declared to be only partially or inadequately realised in each moment of actual consciousness; or they are considered too weak to rise above the threshold of such actual consciousness without being reinforced, either by actual stimulation or by the spontaneous activity of the subject. Surely it must be looked upon as a desperate stretch of introspective interpretation to suppose that something non-existent as constituent of the conscious content can be of the same nature as something whose existence and essence consists in forming part of the conscious content.

But if, on the one hand, it must be deemed a momentous mistake to maintain that something of the nature of the constituents of our conscious content is actuating what we call our body, it must, on the other hand, be deemed just as momentous a mistake to maintain, with some of our most prominent physiologists, that what we call our body is actuated by molecular motions starting in the brain and propagating themselves through the nerves to the muscles. These molecular motions are certainly out-and-out only perceptual signs in the observer, and they can, therefore, nowise be producers of the actions performed by the perceived subject.

Here it is relevant to remark that not all molecular brain-motions, which an observer might perceive as signs of those extra-conscious activities of the observed Subject that are accompanied by psychical awareness, signify sensorial or perceptual phenomena having reference to what we call physical nature. The most complex of those perceptual signs would, on the contrary, signalise such states of activity in the extra-conscious nature of the observed Subject as correspond to what is more exclusively called mental or spiritual life, which life is principally evinced by social emotions and their

expressions. The enormous incongruity obtaining, especially in this latter case, between the mere stir of material particles and the exalted feeling accompanying it, has led most thinkers to discard the idea of these two so disparate occurrences being connected by any necessary and indissoluble bond. Yet we have ample reason to conjecture, that to the meagre perceptual signs of the observer there correspond as their awakening cause in the observed Subject a marvellously high-pitched activity of a marvellously high-wrought existent, of which wondrous activity the Subject's own exalted mental experience is, moreover, another far more direct and adequate sign.

As signs conveying information regarding the characteristics and activities of extra-conscious being, the distinct percepts and their localised motions are, however, of the greatest importance to knowledge. We cannot doubt that our perceptual revelation—with all its vivid and minute distinctions, compelled in us by influences emanating from extra-conscious existents—does, so far as its nature allows, faithfully signalise specific characteristics of the compelling influences. Our being, wholly formed and specialised in living interaction with the outside powers, is sure to have its reactive efficiencies correctly attuned to the stimulating influences.

This is practically proved by the correctness of our work wrought upon *outside existents*, but executed under the guidance of our own *perceptual ideas*. The outside effect of such work, eventually signalised to us through changes in the compelled percepts, is found to agree with our ideal forecast. Our idea of a building to be erected, for instance, taken along with the compulsory percepts of the building when erected affords by itself sufficient proof of the accurate correspondence of our perceptual world to the world of extra-conscious and sense-stimulating existents. It would be absurd to maintain that it is the ideal forecast or anything else forming part of the conscious content that has wrought the changes in the outside existents. And it would be just as absurd to maintain that the changes had been wrought, not upon the outside extra-conscious existents, but upon our own percepts.

It cannot be too often repeated that all instructive science has reference to extra-conscious agencies. And this because without such reference there can be found no meaning in the congeries of facts and occurrences of the conscious content, nor can there be established any valid connexion between them. The assumption, for instance, that

our body as a mere *perceptual existence* stands in effective connexion with the rest of our conscious content, or, in other words, that the true modes of interaction and interdependence between body and mind are ascertainable as direct phenomena of the conscious content,—leads to inextricable psychological and philosophical confusion. It should be obvious that it is a slowly acquired knowledge by means of compelled percepts, presupposing the existence, and signifying the characteristics, of a permanent, extra-conscious reality—a knowledge present in the conscious content merely through remotely representative marks—that can alone enable us to draw valid conclusions regarding the connexion of what we perceive as our body with the rest of our conscious content. And, as all constituents of the conscious content are only specific marks of the characteristics of either outside existents or of the Subject's own extra-conscious nature, it is clear that all instructive interpretation of the conscious content has to take notice of what these more or less remotely representative marks in reality signify.

How, without extreme realistic suppositions, could we possibly conclude that our body, which as a perceptual phenomenon can never constitute more than a fragment of our conscious content, is, nevertheless, the true bearer of the entire conscious content? And, surely, this realistic conclusion can well stand its ground against the speculative conception, that our body has its true existence, and displays its true powers, during the time and in those relations in which it appears to us in casual glimpses as part of our conscious content.

From the considerations brought forward in the course of this discussion, it follows that the term "mental activity," if at all retained, has to be construed as signifying, not anything happening within the conscious content itself, but the functional play of all that part of our extra-conscious being, from which such conscious content is the supreme emanation.

III.—THE CLASSIFICATION OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

By HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

EACH science marks its advances by an increased definiteness in the use of terms. Connotations are brought out clearly and either cut off as irrelevant or retained as inherent parts of the denotations. It will not be disputed that at this time Psychology as a science stands greatly in need of a more exact nomenclature and of a more common agreement among its workers as to the meaning of terms. This paper embodies an effort to gain definiteness in one direction; to render a little more distinct our conceptions, and a little more definite our terminology.

Fortunately, we start without any indefiniteness as to the subject-matter of discussion. All know what is meant by Pleasure and what is meant by Pain; but unfortunately this certainty of subject-matter goes very little way to help us in efforts towards mental orientation. That the terms relative to our subject are used with very vague meaning the most superficial view serves to show. The use of the word 'Feeling,' of which there has of late been so much discussion, may be taken as a typical example of English uncertainty. It is used by psychologists of the highest rank—Mr. James Ward, for instance—to indicate the field of Pleasure and Pain, and *that alone*. But Mr. Ward himself acknowledges¹ that the word has often very different meanings, not only for the ordinary man, but for psychologists also.

Not only is it used, in ordinary speech, now as equivalent to Touch, now as descriptive of organic sensations such as Hunger and Thirst, and again as the proper designation of the typical Emotions (anger, fear, &c.), but it is used by men of psychological authority to indicate the fundamental effect in all experience. It is used thus by Mr. Spencer in his *Psychology*.² Prof. James also uses the word in this

¹ *Encyc. Brit.*, 9th Ed., Art. "Psychology".

² *Principles of Psychology*, § 65. "A relation proves to be itself a kind of *feeling*—the momentary *feeling* accompanying the transition from one conspicuous feeling to another." &c. Mr. Spencer's free use of the word 'Feeling,' by the way, not unnaturally worries his German

wide sense. He says,¹ "We ought to say a feeling of *and*, a feeling of *if*, a feeling of *but*, and a feeling of *by*, quite as readily as we say a feeling of *blue*," &c. So also, as I understand him, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson would use the word 'Feeling';² and John Stuart Mill used the word in much the same way. It is, again, very common to find 'Feeling' used to cover not only the field of definite Emotions, but also the wider field of indefinite Sentiment. It is to be noted, further, that while 'Feeling' does not to all mean merely Pleasure and Pain, on the other hand Pleasure and Pain are themselves, as we shall presently see, classed very frequently away from anything which is ordinarily understood as 'Feeling'—notably with Sensation.

The German psychologists, as a rule, use the term *Gefühl* as exclusively equivalent to Pleasure and Pain; but it is not infrequent to find it here also used as indefinitely as by the English.³ Wundt in his *Physiologische Psychologie* gives a section to "Empfindungen des Gefühlssinnes," meaning sensations of pressure, temperature, &c., and within a few pages gives us a chapter on "*Gefühlston der Empfindung*," in which he treats of Pleasure and Pain. The plural *Gefühle*, too, has many connotations which lead to indeterminateness.

If we turn to France we find a similar uncertainty. Dumont calls his study of Pleasure and Pain *Théorie scientifique de la Sensibilité*, while Prof. Delbœuf gives us his general theory of all consciousness as a *Théorie générale de la Sensibilité* also. If one wish to make further study of the indeterminateness of French terminology, one need but to turn to ch. i. of Bouillier's *Du Plaisir et de la Douleur*, where it is described with ample fulness.

It is clearly advisable from the start to avoid the use of terms which may create misapprehension. A word is sorely needed to cover the whole ground of Pleasure and Pain, and one which shall not carry with it hidden assumptions in directions which are open to question. The word 'Feeling,' which Mr. Ward would have us use thus, will not, in my opinion, serve this purpose. It is impossible practically to limit the meaning of the word to cover the Pleasure-and

students considerably; for most of whom 'Feeling' is thought as equivalent to *Gefühl* (cp. Stumpf, *Tonpsychologie*, p. 9).

¹ MIND ix. 5.

² Cp. MIND, xiii. 165.

³ See Wundt, *Vorlesungen ii. d. Menschen und Thierseele*, ii., § 30; also cp. Volkmann in his *Lehrbuch d. Psych.*, p. 302 e.g.

Pain-modes only. It is too serviceable a word in its wider use to be replaced easily, and its verb 'to feel,' with a very broad significance, has become quite indispensable to the average English speaker. As we have seen, 'Feeling' has very different meanings for different people, and if it be used in the narrow sense, some reader is almost certain to carry into the writer's thought his own meaning of the term in place of that intended.

I shall use the term Pleasure-Pain to cover this ground, and if the repetition become wearisome, I must beg the reader to grant indulgence in consideration of the paucity of accepted psychological terminology.¹

It will be well to make a cursory examination to see what classifications of Pleasure and Pain are made *naturally* by thinkers working in diverse paths, without special reference to Pleasure-Pain theory; perhaps we may thus obtain some guide. For this purpose, we must needs take some general classification which is supposed to cover the whole ground of psychic experience. As English speakers, we may in this preliminary view make use of Prof. Bain's classification—Sensation, Intellect, Emotion, Will—without being found fault with.²

First as to Sensation. As Mr. Ward has said, "most psychologists before Kant, and our English psychologists even to the present day, speak of Pleasure and Pain as Sensations". And this remark can only be called too

¹ There is a difficulty in this use of 'Pleasure-Pain' as identical with Mr. Ward's 'Feeling,' and the ordinary German psychological use of *Gefühl*, in that it may be understood to assume the non-existence of Indifference as a state allied to Pleasure and Pain. No such assumption is intended. The discussion of Indifference must be deferred for the present.

² I do not wish to indicate a belief in any such partial and distinct psychic action as may be inferred from the use of this division, *i.e.*, a belief that these classes of psychic facts are so clearly separated as to be found quite apart without overlapping in character and without coincidence in time of presentation. But even if one avoid such a view, it is certainly true that our states of consciousness have at times such emphatic and comparatively distinct elements, that it is legitimate to let these emphatic elements give the name to the whole states. It is on this ground that, personally, I am willing to describe Emotions as the psychoses of the muscular actions of expression; [Darwin's school would say, "Expression is caused by emotion," Prof. James would say, "Emotion is caused by the expression": I leave this causal relation aside and merely claim concomitance, *cp.* *MIND*, Nos. 34, 36], and this not because any Emotion which I experience is that and nothing more, but because these muscular elements appear to me to be the ones which vary least, and which *fix* the psychosis so that it gains a name.

sweeping if it be made to imply a *deliberate* classification. Perhaps a few instances may be worth citing. M. Taine says "that in the nerves of muscle and skin there are three and only three kinds of sensation: those of contact, those of heat and cold, those of pleasure and pain".¹ Prof. Delbœuf² says that he considers that "la fatigue et la sensation sont des phénomènes de même nature et comparables". Fechner's method in the extension of the principle of *Schwelle* to the region of *Gefühl* seems to me to imply this classification, indicating a mode of thinking which transfers the laws discovered in some sensations to others of the same grouping.³ Our English scientific writers who are not psychologists habitually use the term Sensation to cover Pleasure-Pain, more especially when speaking of Pain. Among psychologists, Lewes speaks of the "sensations of hunger, thirst, giddiness, . . . pain, &c".⁴ Even so careful an analyst as Prof. James uses the expression⁵ "Sensations of hearing, touch, sight and pain" in one of his late writings. Mr. Spencer's words would clearly indicate a similar identification with Sensation; where he says:⁶ "Presentative feelings, *ordinarily called sensations*, are those mental states in which, instead of regarding a corporeal impression as of this or that kind, or as located here or there, *we contemplate it in itself as pleasure or pain*". Mr. Spencer here, however, seems to take out of the word Sensation all of its ordinary meaning; certainly all the meaning which is implied in the Sensation of Prof. Bain's classification which we are using. But on the other hand Prof. Bain⁷ agrees to follow Mr. Spencer in a view which he attributes to him, making "Feeling the generic term of which Sensation and Emotion are the two species". This does not appear to me to be consistent with the words of either author in other connexions, but if it be accepted as intended to be the more exact statement of their view, we should be led to say that they identify Pleasure-Pain with Sensation *and* Emotion. Thus they form a link with those who would class pleasure and pain *altogether* as Emotions. In fact the theory held by

¹ *On Intelligence* (Trans., 1871), p. 137.

² *Éléments de Psychophysique*, p. 46.

³ Cp. *Vorschule der Ästhetik*.

⁴ *Problems of Life and Mind*, 3rd series, ch. iv., and elsewhere.

⁵ *MIND* No. 45.

⁶ *Essays*, p. 310.

Senses and Intellect, 3rd Edition, p. 668.

both Prof. Bain and Mr. Spencer, that Emotions are representative sensations, leads them both to use the word 'emotional' as equivalent to Pleasure-Pain with great frequency. Still they mean by Emotion in general what I mean, *viz.*, those states which are typified in love, fear, anger, &c. Prof. Bain especially emphasises the emotional connexion by treating Pleasure and Pain under the heading Emotions in his *Emotions and Will*.

Other writers who use the word 'emotional' exactly as he does are not so wide in the placing of the Pleasure-Pain limits. For instance Dumont¹ argues for the classing of Pleasure and Pain with Emotions, and Paulhan² uses them as interchangeable terms.

Among the Germans *Freud* is commonly coupled with *Schmerz*, and similarly in English it is very common to find the word Pleasure or the word Pain replaced by the designation of some pleasant or painful Emotion. Hume, for instance, says, "pity is an uneasiness, malice is a joy"; the word 'joy' being evidently equivalent to 'pleasure'.³

Turning from Sensation and Emotion to Intellect and Will, we find no similar tendency to class Pleasure and Pain with either member of the latter pair; no indication that they are looked upon *naturally* as of Intellect or of Will. On the other hand, however, we find no difference between the ordinary expressions for the relation between Intellect and Pleasure-Pain, and those for the relation between Sensation and Emotion, and Pleasure-Pain. People speak almost as commonly of Intellectual as of Emotional or Sensational Pleasure and Pain. The pleasures of judgment stand on the same footing as do many pleasures which are called purely emotional. The pains of physical fatigue evidently bear the closest relation to the weariness of constrained attention upon intellectual problems. The pleasures of the imagination are so important an element in some minds as to have been made by certain theorists the exclusive basis of *Æsthetics*. And passing towards

¹ *Théorie scientifique de la Sensibilité*, p. 24.

² *Phénomènes affectifs*, pp. 22, 95.

³ An interesting instance of the tendency to identify Pleasure-Pain and Emotion may be seen in the answer made by Mr. Ed. Gurney (*MIND* No. 35) to Prof. James's article, "What is an Emotion?" A large part of Mr. Gurney's criticism seems to be founded upon an unstated argument which would read something like this:—It is evident that a large number of pleasures are *not* feelings of muscular character:—but pleasures are emotions:—hence emotions cannot be exclusively muscular in origin.

Will, apart from the theoretical connexion in antecedence and in result, there is evidently a close bond between Pleasure-Pain and the Will-act itself as expressed in discussions concerning the fixity of attention, the feeling of effort and similar topics. Still it is not a bond which to the ordinary man will appear strong.

The confusion which is here indicated is not lessened when one turns more closely to the consideration of definite Pleasure-Pain theory. One constantly finds difficulty in comparison of statements due to an underlying conviction that the opposed theorists are really writing of different things; perhaps of different parts of one subject, but without distinction of word. Contradiction of one honest thinker by another necessarily means that experience in the two differs or that words bear different meanings to the two. It is this condition of affairs which makes it important to reach a clearer agreement.

What has been thus far gathered may be roughly stated thus:—Whatever be the nature of Pleasure and Pain they are in one way or another connected with all the states of consciousness, which we have for our purposes considered under the divisions Sensation and Emotion—Intellect and Will: and the connexion is closer with the former pair than with the latter; so much closer, in fact, that there is a natural tendency to class Pleasure-Pain now with one and now with the other of the pair.

Apart from any theory which might make Sensation and Emotion developments of Pleasure-Pain, to which we recur later, it will be well therefore first to ask whether there be any strong ground for the classification with Sensation; whether any for the classification with Emotion.

One point of importance may well be presented here, though it be so commonplace that it ordinarily passes unnoticed, *viz.*, that Pleasure and Pain are invariably classed together. They are now called opposites—related as heat is to cold; now, Pain is looked upon as normal and Pleasure as its mere absence; and, again, Pleasure is normal and Pain its mere negation: but the bond between the two is never questioned. The ground for this lies in the fact that the two appear to arise in Consciousness as disparate parts of a continuum. One fades away into the other. Strong stimuli, if continuous, gradually fail in the production of pleasurable and as gradually become pain-producers. One displaces the other, the two being incompatible.¹ It is

¹ In other words, no element of consciousness can be both painful and pleasurable at the same moment. It will be noted, however, that

the judgment of common sense: Pleasure and Pain are two states which are too disparate to be commonly known by any one word, but so inseparably connected that they must be mentioned in one breath. This community of character should seemingly lead us at least to hold that where we class the one there we must class the other also. We cannot with reason say, for instance, that Pain is to be classed with Sensations and then that Pleasure is an Emotion, still holding Sensation and Emotion to be diverse in character. This, however, is just what the ordinary man is *very* likely to do. It seems to me clear from common speech that the ordinary man naturally thinks of Pain as a Sensation and of Pleasure as an Emotion. This fact needs explanation, which I attempt below; but just here it serves to cast doubt upon any view which would class Pleasure and Pain exclusively with Sensation, as it also does one which would class them exclusively with Emotion.¹

Turning to details: (1) Can Pleasure-Pain be classed with Sensation? A few facts seem sufficient to give a decisive negative. None of the typical sensations have the character which we have found in Pleasure-Pain of being aroused by the widest range of psychic occurrences; on the contrary, each has a very special means of production by which it and it only is brought into consciousness. The typical sensations do not habitually change from one form to another under continuation of conditions, as we have seen that Pleasure fades into Pain. Again, in the case of ordinary Sensations, within the limits of normal activity, increasing or diminishing intensity of physical stimulation brings corresponding alterations of psychic intensity, although the relation is complex and not simple. But with Pleasure-Pain the case is quite different. An increase of intensity of stimulus often at first increases a pleasure, then decreases it, then produces an increasing painfulness: a series of which we find no counterpart in sensational experience. Again, Sensations are connected with the action of distinctive organs acting in relation to the environment; but, in my opinion, nothing else than a preconception of the sensational nature of Pleasure-Pain can lead

this does not state that no *psychosis* can be both pleasurable and painful at the same time. To this we recur.

¹ Richet (*Revue Philosophique*, An. ii. 2) does not hesitate to proclaim that it is reasonable to accept the existence of a *centre* for painful sensation; but what indication is there of a *centre* for pleasure, I would ask; and yet under this view, if a *centre* be granted for one of the pair, one must be granted for the other also.

one, on the evidence thus far obtained, to a decided opinion in favour of special Pleasure-Pain organs.¹

The definiteness — the distinctness — of Pleasure-Pain, especially in its Pain-phase, might indeed lead to comparison with Sensation. This view is emphasised by observation of the facts of Analgesia, which have been interpreted to mean that insensibility to Pain in general can be brought about much as insensibility to touch or to heat-impression may. The facts seem to me to be open to another interpretation, *viz.*, that the capacity to experience one form of sensation (*e.g.*, that of touch) in a part of our body may be cut off, together with the capacity for pain which goes with it, without cutting off in the same parts the capacity to experience other sensations (*e.g.*, those of heat) with *their* capacity for pain. If this be a correct interpretation, the most effective argument for making Pain a specific Sensation loses its force. It is to be noted, also, that we are unable to show, what we might expect under the ordinary interpretation, *viz.*, a method of cutting off our capacity to obtain Pleasure without cutting off also the sensation or other psychic phase connected with it.

On the whole it seems clear that the essential characteristics of Sensation are not traceable in Pleasure-Pain; and yet this must not blind us to the evident closeness of connexion between the two.

(2) If Pleasure and Pain cannot properly be classed with Sensations, can they with any more propriety be classed with Emotions? Here the connexion may seem to many even closer than with Sensation. We constantly experience sensations which seem to be colourless as to pleasure and pain; but Emotion seems to not a few to lose its full meaning apart from one or the other. Still there are the strongest reasons for separating the two. If we accept Pleasure-Pain as emotional, what are we to do with Sensational Pleasures and Pains? We must hold in explanation of the facts that this double-faced Emotion is one which is capable of being brought out by any sensation, pure and simple, under favourable conditions. But what other Emotion acts in such a way? Do we find simple colours or pure sounds or tastes or touches each one by itself and all

¹ Mantegazza, in his *Physiologie de la Douleur* (ch. x.), after carefully going over the disputed ground, finds it necessary to acknowledge (notwithstanding a strong personal inclination to the contrary view) that science to-day does *not* admit the isolation of any special fibres for the transmission of pain. Still, he begs us to await the further advances of histology.

alike producing such emotions as fear or anger or love, as we know the sensations each and all to produce Pleasure-Pain phases? In fact, do we find any of them drawing out any one such typical emotion apart from all associative objectification? Certainly such is not the teaching of experience. To be sure, certain sensations have a close connexion with certain emotions: as red is the typical color indicative of the hostile attitude, and as minor chords have a tendency to produce sadness; but this fact is generally believed to be explicable as due to associative bonds with more or less definite objects which have in the past acted to bring forward the emotion. In fact, under normal conditions the typical emotions have as necessary antecedents the perception of objects. There is no fear proper without an object to fear; and, even in those abnormal cases where the emotion is artificially aroused without the antecedent thought of a real object, the one experiencing the emotion finds it very difficult and at times impossible not to imagine an object or objective condition acting upon him. But Pleasures and Pains show no such characteristic.

Some of the objections urged against the classification with Sensation, with certain shiftings of point of view, hold here also. Typical emotions do not run into one another as do pleasures and pains, upon the variation of intensity or continuity of presentation. Changes of intensity of emotion and differences of individual make-up bring alterations and differentiations of Pleasure-Pain phase—Emotion here acting exactly as does Sensation.

Again, if Pleasure-Pain be emotional, we are led to note that the Emotion is of a peculiar variety at all events: one which is brought into activity by the functioning of its companion emotions. But we know of no other emotion which is capable of acting as a stimulus to produce any one other emotion. Though "pity be akin to love," it is the fading away of one emotion and the arising of another which is described; not the production of one by the other nor the superposing of one upon another; Pleasure-Pain, however, in different forms is superposed upon the typical emotions, and alters in intensity and even in phase with their change of strength. Moreover, no emotion, if Pleasure-Pain be excluded, has the double yet single character which is here presented.

Bouillier, in his *Du Plaisir et de la Douleur* (see p. 87), presents an atomistic theory which would make Pleasure and Pain elements which in greater development become well-marked special emotions. He would make Pleasure

and Pain the simple forms of what in complexity or summation are the Love of Life and the Fear of Death respectively, the former of which he holds to be the greatest of all pleasures and the latter the greatest of all pains. That these two Emotions are respectively the greatest of pleasures and pains cannot be held above question. Certainly pessimism and suicide argue against the universality of the love of life as the greatest pleasure, and it cannot be granted that the fear of death is universally an all-engrossing pain.¹ In another direction insurmountable difficulty arises if one attempt the explanation of other emotions than Love and Fear; or if this be escaped by disclaiming the necessity for such explanations, it becomes equally difficult to deal with the generally acknowledged connexion between Love and Fear and the other emotions, and with the relation of these other emotions to Pleasure and Pain.

Whatever objection there may be to the classification of Pleasure and Pain with Emotion, it is to be noted, nevertheless, that here, as with Sensation, the connexion between the two is intimate.

Pleasure-Pain, then, is not Sensation, and yet is closely bound up with Sensation: it is not Emotion, but is closely bound up with Emotion also.

If, then, we see no trace of it elsewhere, we may expect to be able to identify it as a bond to connect these two great classes of mental phenomena somewhat after Mr. Spencer's manner. But, as we have already seen, traces in other mental fields are not wanting, for we find the best thinkers connecting intellectual states in the same general manner with Pleasure-Pain. Intellectual Pleasures and Pains are no meaningless terms: they are as full of actual import as are the phrases Sensational and Emotional Pleasures and Pains. We, therefore, must give up looking for Pleasure-Pain as of Emotion and Sensation, to the exclusion of Intellect, and at the same time there would be no possible justification for its subsumption under Intellect to the exclusion of Sensation and Emotion.

If subsumption under any of these great classes of mental phenomena be impossible, and still the bond with all be close, three different hypotheses seem to be open to us for the explanation of the observed facts.

¹ It is to be noted that Mantegazza (*Physiologie de la Douleur*, p. 78) thinks that the fear of death is of moment as a pain, but principally in old age. It may be that this fear is of greater weight among the Latins than among their neighbours in the North.

A. Pleasure-Pain modes may be the fundamental—the original—elements, the basis of all psychic life, from which other forms arise by development or transformation.

B. Pleasure-Pain modes may be psychic elements *sui generis* brought into consciousness indirectly by the efficiency of Sensation, Emotion and Intellection.

C. Pleasure-Pain modes may be *quales*,—which *may* arise with all psychic elements,—special qualities common to all mental phenomena.

Hypothesis A. is fascinating for one who by nature tends to look for monistic conceptions of the world of experience. In its widest form this view has found its most thorough-going defender in Horwicz, who in his *Psychologische Analysen* attempts to carry it out to its results through all mental fields. But his work, though filled with interesting detail and fine psychological analysis, has failed to carry conviction in the direction of its main theme among the best thinkers who have followed him. It fails for lack of satisfactory evidence. Were there no other objections, it seems to me that the diversity between the two phases pleasure and pain brings up an effective one. If Pleasure-Pain be the basis of all psychic life we ought to find it possible to trace two distinct lines of development or transformation, one corresponding with Pleasure and the other corresponding with Pain. Such division of mental life, however, we nowhere find.¹

Let us turn to hypothesis B.; viz., that in Pleasure-Pain we have a mental series *sui generis*. This view has been upheld explicitly or implicitly by the highest authorities in the past, and does not lack supporters in our own time. It may be stated as Wundt puts it: "Das Gefühl ist der Zustand, in

¹ From one point of view Mr. Spencer may be called a defender of hypothesis A. considering his wide use of "Feeling" and his apparent identification of "Feeling" with "Pleasure and Pain"; but his use of the word "Feeling" is so obscure (cp. *Psychology*, § 65, with his definition of "Feelings" and then of "Presentative feelings—ordinarily called Sensations" in his Essay on "Bain on Emotions and Will") that one can scarcely feel justified in calling him an advocate of this view.

According to other statements, Mr. Spencer might be said to hold to such a position only in part (and here Prof. Bain might be held to follow him—see *Senses and Intellect*, 3rd Ed., p. 668) in making "Feeling the generic term of which Sensation and Emotion are two species". It seems to me, however, that the same objection is effective against such a narrower generalisation which holds against the wider. We should be able to divide our Sensations and our Emotions on lines of development or transformation of Pleasure and of Pain which Mr. Spencer makes no attempt to do, and which Prof. Bain distinctly states to be impossible.

welchen die Seele durch ihre Empfindungen und Vorstellungen versetzt werde":¹ "the subjective complement of objective Idea". This view Wundt accepts with the note that even here we have an "Erkenntnissact" at the start; the primal fact being that "wir empfinden"; the product of which in becoming objectified into ordinary "*Empfindungen*" involves a subjective aspect, which is "*Gefühl*".² This view, as I understand it, is founded upon the acceptance of Pleasure-Pain phases as psychic elements *sui generis* which are brought out by the activity of all sorts of *Empfindungen* and *Vorstellungen*. The same general position seems to be implied in Mr. Ward's statement that each state of mind is irreducible beyond the three facts — Attention, Feeling, Presentation.³ Prof. Dewey, in his lately-published *Psychology* (p. 247), expresses the same notion in these words: "Feeling is unique and unsharable . . . cannot be defined . . . can only be felt"; and still later, Prof. Ladd⁴ tells us: "Feeling is an original and underived form of consciousness or mode of the operation of conscious-mind"; "Feeling can never be stated in terms of knowledge: the nature of feeling is not capable of being defined, it must be felt".⁵ It would not be difficult, it seems to me, to show in Prof. Bain too a tendency at times to take this position B. Under "Emotions of Intellect" he treats of the operations of Intellect *as giving occasion to* a certain select class of feelings; speaks of "the trains of contiguous association"

¹ *Phys. Psych.* (3rd Ed.), i. 542; cp. 543.

² Cp. *Vorlesungen ü. d. Menschen- und Thierseele*. It would seem scarcely proper to refer back to this early work for Prof. Wundt's view, if he did not do so himself even in the last edition of his *Phys. Psychologie* (p. 543, note). I must confess that I am not able to reconcile his statements in this regard. His acknowledgment of the *Erkenntnissact* in *Gefühl*, grasping or anterior to it, would appear to place his view under hypothesis C., were he not so emphatic in the complete separation of *Gefühl* and *Vorstellungen*. I note, however, with gratification that in the revision of his great work there are indications of a change of view in the direction of hypothesis C. Note the opening paragraph of the chapter on "*Gefühlston der Empfindungen*" (p. 508), where he has added to the text of his 2nd Edition the words: "*Beide [Lust u. Unlustgefühle] sind qualitative Zustände*". There are other indications of the same character. The lack of clearness is doubtless due to the fact that he approaches the subject from another standpoint than the one here taken.

³ *Encyc. Brit.*, Ed. ix., art. "Psychology".

⁴ *Elements of Physiological Psychol.*, p. 504.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 499. I will not stop to inquire how it is that we can bring the matter of Pleasure and Pain under intellectual analysis at all, if their grasp by us is so completely apart from knowing.

as presenting "no special *stimulant* of the Emotions". "The element of feeling, or pleasure and pain viewed as such," he elsewhere says, "enters into *alliance* with the more intellectual states of mind," &c., as though it were a matter entirely apart from them and brought out in some way by their action.

The same position is implied in all theory (and here Prof. Bain's stand is decidedly affirmative) which looks upon Pleasure-Pain modes as always present with or in all psychic elements, Indifference being a third Feeling phase rather than the absence of Feeling: a theory which seems to me to be the outcome of an acceptance of hypothesis B., but otherwise untenable.¹ But the attempt to fix definitely such a view on any thinker is not so important as is the question as to the validity of the position. In the first place, its acceptance looks a little like the clinging to a remnant of the old faculty-psychology, so attractive because it cuts off all necessity of treating the particular mental phase with reference to other divisions of the psychic stream or to the stream as a whole. This should put us on our guard, although, of course, it will not lead us to discard the view if other objections do not arise. The principal foundation for the acceptance of hypothesis B. is laid in the supposed subjectivity of Pleasure-Pain, its lack of objectivity, "of localisation, of elaboration into percepts or intuitions of the external".² Here I am unable to follow, although it is naturally with great diffidence that I raise objection against, the high authorities who support this position.

There is no doubt that subjectivity is ordinarily easier to grasp in the region of Pleasure and Pain than in other mental regions, and this is a fact demanding explanation; but I am unable to draw any line in this respect between Pleasure-Pain and other mental states. Those who ponder

¹ The view that there is no such thing as Indifference except as balance of Pleasure and Pain, where *balance* means *neutralisation of one by the other*, does not at the first glance seem necessarily to imply this theory B.; but, as we shall see below, the theory of balance is not easily brought into relation with hypothesis C., and that makes its acceptance also dependent upon the acceptance of B.

² J. Ward, *Encyc. Brit.*, Ed. ix., art. "Psychology". Cp. Volkman, *Lehrbuch d. Psych.*, ii. 300. Also Wundt, *Vorlesungen*, ii. 14, where he says: "So bald man einmal die Beziehung auf einen subjectiven Zustand fallen lässt, so waltet kein Grund mehr, die dann noch übrig bleibenden Gemüthszustände zu einer gemeinsamen Klasse zu vereinigen".

much over psychological matters fail to find it difficult to think of sound or light as subjective; in fact, to think it objective becomes difficult, and yet how hard a thing for the common mind to grasp! On the other hand, we are losing all the true meaning of objectification and localisation if we fail to consider that objective and localised which we *place* in definite parts of our body, as we do constantly with Pleasure-Pain. But what if one distinctly places a pain clean outside of his body, as one does who thinks he feels pain in a limb which has been amputated? It is to be noted also here that an objectiveness of the Pleasure-phase is tacitly accepted by no less an authority than Kant when he separates the pleasure of the beautiful from the merely agreeable on the basis of the universality of the former. This universality is surely an objectification.

The argument for subjectivity as a mark of Pleasure-Pain looks something like this. The ordinarily acknowledged "qualities" of presentation are found to make up the basis of objectifications. Now on the theory adopted there can be no separation of the object without also a separation of the subject, and, as the elements already discussed become notably objective, one must look for the necessarily correspondent subjective elements; and Pleasure and Pain being notably subjective, they are held to be specially subjective elements. It is evident that this argument is based upon a preconception, objectionable because it is a preconception; *viz.*, that there must be a special *kind* of activity for subjectiveness. Again, there stands against the theory the fact that there is an opposition between *Empfindungen* and Pleasure-Pain, an apparent tendency for one to exclude the other, which seems to me to be an unlooked-for fact, to say the least, under a theory which calls for a subjective mind-operation of disparate character to correspond with each objective mind-operation; and yet we find authorities speaking of the two points almost in one breath.¹ The *superior* subjectivity, "innerness," of Pleasure-Pain, even if granted, does not appear to me to be a sufficient ground upon which to base the acceptance of such a hypothesis as B. Subjectivity, in fact, is not so much of the *matter* of what rises into consciousness as it is of its *reflective form*.²

¹ Cp. Wundt's *Vorlesungen*, ii. 6. Strange to say, Wundt explains the apparent exclusion exactly as he does the exclusion of one *Empfindung* by another on the ground that we can only grasp one idea at a time in an *Erkenntnisact*.

² Evidence of this, and at the same time an argument against the exclusive subjectivity of Pleasure-Pain, is seen in our ordinary argument

There stands opposed to this hypothesis B. the fact already noted that thinkers of high ability (to pass over ordinary men) do not find themselves *naturally* taking this view that Pleasure-Pain forms are mental modes *sui generis*, but on the other hand *naturally* endeavour to relegate Pleasure and Pain to other classes of mental forms.

Again, under such a theory as B. we should, from the standpoint of the physiologist, naturally look for a very distinct form of nerve-organ, the action of which would be found concomitant with the presence of Pleasure-Pain. This not being found, we are forced into one of two positions. Either (1) we have here reached the point where the action is that of the whole soul, above all organs—a view which must be entirely unsatisfactory with our modern views of the relation of mentality to the physical basis, and which will be found objectionable also because it implies a break—a separation among mental modes of which there is elsewhere no evidence. Or (2) we must say that there *is* a concomitant in the action of a special kind of Pleasure-Pain organ, but that we have not yet been able to discover this organ; and then we meet with other equally serious objections. In the first place, such a position seems incompatible with the acknowledged primitive nature of Pleasure-Pain. Surely its special organ ought to stand out emphatically. Again, if there be an organ stimulated by the action of the organs of other psychic modes, what shall we say of the relations of Pleasure-Pain to intensity? It is not easy to understand why a certain degree of intensity in one sense-organ *a*, differing widely from the intensity in another sense-organ *b*, should nevertheless be able to produce the same sort of activity in the hypothetical Pleasure-Pain organ: a series of *mental levers*, so to speak, with varying lever-arms must be postulated to explain the facts; and of the existence of such quasi-levers we have no adequate evidence. This objection becomes more difficult

for the physical basis of mind. What really happens is this. A certain complex psychosis arises of sufficiently definite and fixable nature to have a word correspondent which is "the present action of sense-nerve"; but this after all is still a mental complex and nothing more, so far as we are here concerned. It however has the characteristic of objectivity. "Sensation"—a comparatively simple and isolated psychosis which also arises when the complex psychosis "present action of sense-nerve" arises:—has *not* this objective aspect, and hence we learn to look upon the action of nerve as the objective condition of mentality which is subjectiveness. But it is to be noted that this subjective thing may be, and as usually studied is, as far as possible purely colourless as to Pleasure and Pain.

to contemplate when we pass out of the region of pure sense into the wider emotional and intellectual fields. The difficulty, to be sure, may be glossed over to some extent by the assumption of the Indifference-phase, which, if it have no other value, has the advantage which always comes with the raising up of a cloud of mist behind which the credulous may be easily led to picture all manner of wonders. It enables one to surmise that in that field of Pleasure-Pain of which we know nothing, if we could but see it, we might find the explanations of the parts which we do see. But to one who discards the Indifference-phase and believes in it as merely a name for presentation where pleasure and pain are absent, or to one who believes it to be mere balance between Pleasure and Pain, there is no such comfort. Moreover, it is not easy to accept the hypothesis of a definite Pleasure-Pain organ without looking for *special* organs for Pleasure and for Pain, or even for the special varieties of Pain if we are unable to bring ourselves to class the uneasiness of cravings with the anguish of tissue-destruction; and such specialisation should have led to the discovery of some one of the organs, and this discovery again to the localisation of all. It is needless, however, to say that here too our evidence fails us. In fact, the lack of favourable evidence is the greatest obstacle which stands in the way of the acceptance of either of the hypotheses thus far touched: preconceived theory has been responsible for their elaboration, and not an analysis of fact or evidence forced upon us from experience.¹

If, after the objections which appear, this lack of evidence is accepted as conclusive, it forces us to turn to hypothesis C.—*viz.*, to hold that Pleasure-Pain modes are *quales* of all mental states.

At the start it will be well to take some pains to get at the meaning of this with clearness. Hypothesis C. would make Pleasure-Pain modes primitive *quales* which may appear with any mental element; simple primitive Ideas

¹ It is not unlikely that some one may ask, What becomes of the distinction which common sense expresses as existing between "head and heart," if we make no broad distinction between Pleasure-Pain and the *quales* of Presentation? This question itself implies the subsumption of Pleasure and Pain under Emotion, which is what is really meant by the word "heart"; and this subsumption we have abandoned. The distinction between "head and heart" is a true one: it is a phrase expressive of the opposition between Intellect and Impulse: what I would also call for is the separation of Pleasure-Pain from Impulse, and its acknowledgment as a *quale* of Impulse as well as of the purer Intellectual operations.

in the Lockian sense, and therefore correctly classed by him;¹ simple primary differentiations of presentation which are grasped by us essentially after the same manner in which we know the mind to act in other directions, but in the most primal form of such action.

It is possible to look upon all special simple presentations, as we experience them, as differentiations of some original primal form of presentation which in truth we can only speak of theoretically because we must grasp it *as* presented in its differentiations; our mental fields are too late a development to appear apart from *all* differentiations. Now there are some differentiations, some *quales*, which have become so distinctly marked as to be clearly classifiable; being thus distinct because they are determined by a *limitation* of the presentative field, by the action of the presentative organ (so to speak) on limited and narrowed lines, *e.g.*, light-presentations, sound-presentations, taste-presentations. All are presentations, *quales* if you will, of the hypothetical primal presentation, but quite distinct, quite apart from one another, and not to be confounded. There may be further differentiations of these specific *quales*, as colour under light, but the specific character always remains; blueness is always of light, never of sound. Now hypothesis C. would not place Pleasure-Pain as a special member of any such limited and definite differentiation of presentation, but as primary *quales* which affect *all* presentation, however wide, however narrow, somewhat after the manner in which we grasp the notion of Intensity as being common to all presentation.

Any theory which would place Pleasure-Pain on a par with the narrowed differentiations looks in the direction of hypothesis B. which we have discarded.

It is perfectly true then, as Mr. Ward says, that "Pleasure and Pain are not simple Ideas, as Locke called them, in the sense in which touches and tastes are"; but I would hold that they *are* Lockian Ideas for all that, although *not* "in the sense in which touches and tastes are".² The distinction is important because it really is little other after all than the distinction between B. and C. If the view which Mr. Ward attributes to Locke be correctly attributed, he was an

¹ *Essay*, bk. ii., ch. 20.

² Locke may or may not have meant what Mr. Ward seems to attribute to him. Under my view he was wrong if he classed Pleasure-Pain with sensational Ideas, but right to use the term in his wide sense as applied to pleasure and pain.

upholder of hypothesis B. But the limited *quales*, as it is convenient to call them, are clearly connected with distinct differentiations of nerve-organ, which cannot be confounded on their physical or mental sides. Now, as we have already seen, no such organ appears for Pleasure-Pain, and this fact would be enough of itself to lead us to make a distinction between the two positions.

At the very beginning of our examination of hypothesis C. we find encouragement in the fact that the objections which appeared against hypotheses A. and B. do not hold.

That psychic life is not divided on the lines of Pleasure and of Pain is no objection to a view which makes Pleasure and Pain *quales* of *all* presentations composing our psychic life as we know it; for the distinctly marked-off psychic states are not supposed to be developments from the Pleasure-Pain modes, but states still subject to these qualifications.

No special nerve-organ, and no distinct differentiations of such organ or organs, is to be looked for to account for *quales* which relate to the whole field of mental life, for their physical conditions, whatever they be, must be looked for in all that which we learn to look upon as the physical basis, in all of nerve which is necessary for mentality, whatever special parts are for any one moment called into activity. Each case of distinct presentation may thus be said to bring forward its own Pleasure-Pain organ, so to speak, fitted to act under proper conditions.

The varying relation of Intensity to the degree of Pleasure-Pain arousal in different organs loses its force as an objection as soon as we take this view and cease to look upon its modes as produced in concomitance with action in a special organ or organs stimulated from without. In the cases mentioned under the discussion of hypothesis B, our difficulty disappears with the realisation that we are dealing with a real difference of Pleasure-Pain organ, if we may so speak. Other difficulties of the same general nature also here find explanation. A stimulus which now produces the same Pleasure-Pain phases (or a definite succession of phases) in two sets of presentations, as taste and smell, again on another occasion produces a very different phase or succession of phases in the two organs. Or again: a flow of thought brings change from pleasure to pain in rapid succession without any apparent orderliness. Such facts hypothesis B. fails to render comprehensible. With the *quale*-hypothesis, however, the difficulty disappears; for we find in each case either a shifting of the field of presentation,

which brings, as it were, new Pleasure-Pain organs into play, or else a lapse of time during which it is easy to conceive that there may be an alteration of the conditions upon which the Pleasure-Pain phase depends.

But beyond the fact that these objections do not hold against hypothesis C., there is much corroborative evidence in its favour. The view is confirmed by the already noticed everyday use of terms, not only among those who are not of a scientific bias, but, what is of more moment, among thoughtful men in all spheres of effort, *viz.*, the indiscriminate application of Pleasure-Pain terms to all mental phenomena, whether elementary or complex. The study of the views of theorists shows similarly broad use of terms and great diversity of view. Such diversity of dogma at the first glance appears perplexing; but an examination must lead to the suspicion that we have here merely the effective influence of the thinker's 'personal equation'.

The emphatic Pleasure-Pain field varies in different people; indeed, shifts from year to year in the same person; and this naturally leads to the conjecture that the theoretical exclusion of certain psychic fields from participation in the Pleasure-Pain *quales* is due to the actual lack of emphasis of the Pleasure-Pain quality within these fields in the theorist himself. Quite in accord with this position is the fact that a mental bent (which is implied in the strenuous holding to a theory) itself indicates a tendency to more than average mental activity in the direction covered by the theory. But it is super-normal activity in ordinary which is emphatically pleasurable or painful, and we should therefore *expect* our strenuous theorist to find *his* Pleasure-Pain field just about where he describes it as being, and nowhere else so emphasised as to be specially noticed.

Again, the hypothesis seems to be the *natural* one to accept, if for no other reason than because it will bring the phenomena of pleasure and pain into unity with all other mental phenomena. We no longer have the mind grasping Pleasure-Pain in a manner apart from its grasp of presentation; but we look upon these phenomena as differentiations of the presentation, mind functioning here not otherwise on general lines than it does with all differentiations.

This view is also corroborated by the aid it gives us in the conception of the make-up of hedonic complexes, especially to an æsthetic result, for we here learn the important fact that any presentation may be pleasurable and may go to make up, under proper conditions, a part of an æsthetic totality.

I do not despair either of our being able some day to catch the meaning of the inferior objectivity of Pleasure and Pain. It is objectivity in the narrow sense with which we deal in reaching this notion, *viz.*, that *distinct* objectivity which has to do with the gathering together and unifying of disparate elements ; and Pleasure-Pain modes do not present the conditions which would bring this *distinct* objectivity into prominence, while their *contents* do. If one follow Mr. Shadworth Hodgson in attributing the specific character of "subjectivity" to "the *passing* of a content into a distinct perception" as opposed to "the distinct percept into which it has passed," he finds ready an explanation of the greater *Gefühl*ness of subjectivity (to reverse the ordinary statement), for there can be no question as to the superior activity and vividness, and therefore superior Pleasure-Pain colour of the mental processes involved in the coming to a relatively fixed mental position, over those involved in the relatively fixed mental position which is reached. A fuller explanation, moreover, appears to be adumbrated in the contrast, already noted, between the limitation of the presentative field in the case of sensational *quales* and the width of field open to the production of Pleasure and Pain.

Now I myself feel convinced that many of the best thinkers of the past would have assented to this view had it come before them in the form in which it comes to us in our line of thought : they have approached the consideration of pleasure and pain from standpoints (mainly ethical) which have not called for an analysis on the lines here taken up.

Thinkers of to-day speak for themselves ; and, judging from the drift of general writing on these subjects, I have some confidence, notwithstanding adverse statements on some sides and silence on others, that the answer of a good part of our modern psychologists would be favourable to the acceptance of this hypothesis of *quale*. Still, although I think it is widely tacitly assented to, there are a number of its implications which are not generally noted and accepted. To some of these I have already called attention ; and in closing I would note a few more points of the same character.

We may consider what hypothesis C. has to tell us of Representation as applied to pleasure and pain.

Revival is determined by a return of original conditions. Under hypothesis C., then, revival as applied to Pleasure-Pain strictly means merely the recurrence within the wide bounds of presentation of the conditions of the particular Pleasure-

Pain phase under consideration. But this is clearly not usually meant when *representation* of pleasure or pain is spoken of. A revival of some definite presentation is thought of. As far as Pleasure-Pain revival is connected with such definite presentation, *representation* means a reappearance of some presentation under the same conditions relative to Pleasure-Pain production which held when the presentation was original. But it must be noted that the revival of the presentation (*i.e.*, the re-presentation) will not *necessarily* bring the same Pleasure-Pain phase which held when the original presentation was before the mind, if the conditions upon which Pleasure-Pain phase depends be altered when representation occurs. The original presentation may have been painful while its revival may be neutral or pleasurable, if the proper conditions differ in the two cases.

Most people, however, speak of a revived pleasure or of a revived pain as if it were either a mental state *sui generis*, which is revived apart from any presentation, a view which we have already decided against; or else as if the Pleasure-Pain phase were an inherent part of the presentation or necessarily connected with it,¹ so that revival of the original presentation (its re-presentation) could only occur in the same phase as that which coloured the presentation. But experience denies such a notion. We ought in fact to speak of a pleasant representation, not of a representative pleasure, and similarly of pain.

It is upon this unfounded position in regard to representation that must rest any theory which would make Emotions a complex of revived Pleasure-Pain states, a product of Pleasure-Pain summation, after the manner of Jas. Mill and Mr. Spencer and their followers.²

For the theory is entirely without force unless the Emotion, which is a psychosis of comparative fixedness, is made up of elements which have a similar fixed character, and this implies the acceptance of either hypothesis B.³ or the

¹ As a late expression of this view, compare Prof. Dewey's *Psychology*, p. 286. To speak of representation of Pleasure or Pain in this sense is quite like speaking of representations of Intensity.

² Höffding in his *Psychologie* makes a statement of this view (to which he holds) in what seems to me to be its best and most attractive form, but brings no new or effective arguments to prove the position. In fact, the theory in all its statements rests upon dogma rather than upon proof.

³ It is hard to see how so complex a thing as an Emotion could be formed by summation of such simple mental elements as hypothesis B. would imply Pleasure and Pain to be. The most we should expect

invalid position that Pleasure-Pain is an unchangeable part of the presentation making up the emotions. Some such view as this seems to me to be also implied in Fechner's application of the principle of *Schwelle* to the region of *Gefühl* as involved in his principle of æsthetic *Hülfe*. That two pleasures may occur apart without coming into consciousness, and yet when occurring together may make a sum of pleasure strong enough to arise above the threshold, implies that pleasures are Ideas in much the same sense in which tastes and touches are, and this places his view under B.¹ The objection is not to the acceptance of a sub-conscious region of *Gefühl* but to the treatment of this hypothetical field. In the objectionable treatment Pleasure-Pain is looked upon as stimulated by action in the other specific mental regions, and thus subject to increment by action of disconnected diverse elements. I would hold that pleasure and pain, being *quales* of all presentation, the Pleasure-Pain increment in each case of limited presentation must be in the line of that part (x) of the mental presentative field which is before the mind; that the added functioning, with Pleasure-Pain phase, of another disparate portion (y) of the presentative field will not act as an aid nor as an obstruction to the first Pleasure-Pain quality (x), but each must stand on its own merits; that x itself must alter in its action if its Pleasure-Pain quality is to alter, and so of y ; that thus it is quite conceivable that there may stand side by side one presentation of the pleasurable phase and another of the painful phase, or two presentations of like phase, without acting upon one another in the direction of increase or decrease of Pleasure-Pain intensity, although acting to increase or decrease the apparent 'fulness' of the predominant phase, that is, its continuousness with the shifting of the presentative field and throughout the wide region of the field apart from the *Blickpunkt*.

Here an interesting side-light is cast upon the problem of Indifference; for under this view it is impossible to hold a neutralisation of Pleasure by Pain as we could if we were to accept hypothesis B. Were Pleasure and Pain modes *sui generis*, we might imagine the two sets of mental *lever arms*, which seem to be demanded, as acting in opposition

from such summation would be an increase or decrease of Pleasure or Pain; for, as Aristotle says, "Pleasure is a certain whole" the form of which cannot be perfected by any time-process nor by any process of summation of elements. The same may equally well be said of Pain.

¹ See *Vorschule der Ästhetik*, pt. i. pp. 50 ff.

to prevent the Pleasure-Pain organ from functioning, or might surmise that one stimulus counteracted another to the production of the neutral result. But under the *qualé*-theory each pleasure and each pain exists of itself in and with its own *content*. A pleasure and a pain may exist at the same time in consciousness, or a complex of presentations which are pleasures and a complex which are pains, side by side, so to speak, at the same moment, as we often find it in experience; but it cannot be granted that fusion is possible, or neutralisation of one by the other. If one such complex arises clear above and to the exclusion of the other, it is not because it has absorbed its opposite complex in any quasi-mechanical sense, but because of the change of the field of attention. We all know how we often find the field of consciousness shifting back to the lately hidden Pleasure-Pain complex (explaining it thus instead of thinking it due to the failure of the previously effective absorption-capacity), and in such cases it must be noted that the presentative field shifts also.

That there is a state of neutrality between pleasure and pain is acknowledged in the mere statement of the problem of Indifference.

To call this Indifferent state a state of Feeling seems, as I have said, to imply theory B.; explaining Pleasure-Pain as due to the functioning of an organ which must be active always in one way or another. It seems more consistent with hypothesis C. to hold that presentation may exist without any Pleasure-Pain quality as a purely neutral state, the conditions, as yet ill-defined, of the rise of both pleasure quality and of pain quality being wanting. That all mental states which lend themselves to the emphasis of reflection are Pleasure-Pain-coloured is beyond question; but if hypothesis C. is to be held, we must think of presentation as the primal fact of which Pleasure-Pain modes are primal qualities, and this gives us ground for holding the primary and essential existence of presentation *per se*, apart from these *qualés*.¹ If this view of the existence of neutral presentation apart from Pleasure-Pain *qualés* be accepted, it would also prevent the acceptance of any theory which

¹ It is not necessary here to decide whether this neutral field is more or less wide or whether it is narrow and merely appears wide in some instances because the pleasurable or painful qualities are brought out in too low a degree to be emphatic. I favour the latter position, and am glad to feel that in this whole view of Indifference I am in substantial accord with the position taken by Mr. J. Sully, as indicated in his late addition to the discussion of this problem in *MIND*.

would make either phase the essential one: the opposed phase being a mere mark of the other's absence.

Neither the theory of pessimism, which makes pain normal and pleasure its absence, nor the theory of optimism, which makes pain the abnormal and pleasure the normal state¹—neither can be held to be in accord with hypothesis C., which would lead us to make the difference between pleasure and pain dependent upon real difference of condition, and to name both as *positive* states. If the two are incompatible, this must mean merely that the conditions in the two cases are incompatible in the same organ at the same time.

The Herbartian view, if it can be made to stand against its objectors (which I think impossible), will not be disturbed by hypothesis C., which would merely make the application of the theory as wide as consciousness. Similarly, hypothesis C. seems to me to present no opposition to theories which would explain pleasure as the mental side of efficiency and expansion, and pain as the mental side of lack of efficiency and contraction (Ward); nor to a theory that pleasure indicates equilibrium and pain departure therefrom (Delbœuf, Spencer); nor to that which makes pleasure equivalent to a tendency to persistence and pain to a tendency to change (L. Stephen, Bradley). Whatever is to be said *pro* or *con* may be argued quite within the lines of the *quale*-hypothesis.

It may be well here to inquire how it is that men make the ordinary classifications of Pleasure-Pain with Sensation, Emotion, Intellection, which we noticed in the beginning. An explanation seems not difficult to find.

The word 'Feeling' or the word-complex 'Pleasure and Pain' carry necessarily a mental content; and this content differs materially with different people.

When I ask myself what I mean by 'Feeling,' the general field of the contents of representation to which 'Feeling' is attached in my experiences tends to arise and does arise more or less distinctly. When you ask yourself the same question, another field of contents than such as mine arises; and so it is with each individual. Again, the associative revived horizon connected with the word 'Pleasure' is made up of all the more or less dim revivals of those mental states which are pleasurable for us. So the associative revived horizon connected with the word 'Pain' is made up of all those more or less dim revivals of what are pains to us. In both cases the focus, so to speak, of

¹ Cp. Mr Bradley's article in MIND No. 49.

this pain- and of this pleasure-horizon is made up of those mental states which are the most common sources of the more vivid pains and pleasures respectively. In the case of pain, these sources in general are, in my experience, without question the presentations of Sensation, with Emotions of the most active sort holding a second place. In the case of pleasure there is no such special line of vividness, although the emotional field holds an especially strong position. It is most natural, therefore, that when we raise the *words* pleasure and pain together, their *common* associative horizon should be most distinctly marked, and that they should usually be classed as Emotions. When we take them separately we should expect to find, as we do, that *pain* is commonly spoken of as a Sensation, and *pleasure* as an Emotion.

It seems to me that the grounds for accepting the hypothesis of *qualia* are ample, and the view, if correct, ought to help us in the determination of the general laws of Pleasure and Pain. One result alone seems to be of sufficient importance to warrant this discussion: *viz.*, if the hypothesis be accepted it will be possible to trace the laws of Pleasure and Pain in one special class of mental states which are elementary and to a great degree fixable, so that we may feel sure that during the examination our Pleasure-Pain field does not shift; we may then look for the application or modification of these laws in the other regions of mind which are less clearly defined.

It may not be too much to hope that the doctrine here advanced may help us towards a knowledge of the physical basis of Pleasure and Pain, which we naturally should look for in some conditions or modes of activity relating to the whole of the nerve-tissue whose action apparently forms the basis of all mental life.

In closing, I must turn again to the matter of terminology. It is evident that if the position which is here defended be the correct one—if pleasure and pain are distinct qualities, which may attach to any mental element, and do not involve any special mental mode—then we no longer have need of any word to cover the whole region of Pleasure and Pain and the hypothetical region of Indifference. 'Feeling,' therefore, to the great relief of ordinary men, may properly be retained in its present wide use to cover *any* particular mental action in the sense in which it is used by Mr. S. Hodgson, Prof. W. James, and Mr. H. Spencer.

In ordinary, the use of the word Pleasure, and of the word Pain, or of the couplet Pleasure and Pain, will be satisfactory

in place of the word 'Feeling,' as Mr. Ward would have us use it.

A word is perhaps needed to designate certain states which are ordinarily and roughly called Emotional (and which would be called Pleasure-Pain states under the terminology which I have used in what has gone before): states of mind in which the Pleasure-Pain quality is the only thing which we can grasp; in which the balance of attention is so perfect that no special "contents" appear in the mental field, the pleasure- and pain-qualities being emphasised by their continuance and by what may be described without misconception as a process of summation.

It is not unnatural that the word 'Emotional' should be roughly used to cover this ground, for so large a part of our emotional life is made up of this vague Pleasure-Pain field without any emphatic content. The tendency in the future, however, will be, I believe, to limit the use of the word 'Emotional' to the description of those well recognised states (love, fear, hate, &c., &c.) which seem to be fixable by their content of muscular sensation, and it is not desirable, therefore, to attempt to use the word 'Emotional' to describe the vague region connected with those more definite states. Perhaps the best word at command for this purpose is the word 'Sentiment,' although it is open to the objection that for many it suggests the emotion of love in one way or another, a strained and unnecessary connotation, and one which we may easily cast aside.

It will thus be perfectly proper to speak of the feeling of Pain and of the feeling of Pleasure; to say that one feels an Emotion and feels a Sentiment.

IV.—DISCUSSION.

RELATION OF FEELING TO PLEASURE AND PAIN.

By HIRAM M. STANLEY.

Should the term Feeling be made to include certain states of consciousness which are neither pleasurable nor painful? Or should all such neutral states be designated by some other term? We are concerned here with an important matter of definition which implies an extensive analysis of consciousness with reference to pleasure and pain. It will not be difficult to find many so-called feelings which are neutral, or seem to be so; but it is the duty of the psychologist to carefully analyse all such states, and point out the proper use of the term Feeling.

Common observation neglects minute analysis, and is unreliable when it speaks of certain indifferent states as feelings. When a man speaks of feeling queer, or strange, or bewildered, or surprised, and says that the state of mind seemed neither agreeable nor disagreeable, we may suspect that by a perfectly natural tendency he is extending the name Feeling to closely-connected states of cognition or will. In identification and definition common observation is for all sciences notoriously untrustworthy, and especially in psychology; so on this question the evidence of language and popular testimony counts for little one way or the other. This is strikingly evident when people speak of feeling indifferent as to some matter, meaning that they have no feeling on the matter. The term Feeling is used in such a broad and vague way that 'I feel indifferent' means 'I am indifferent,' 'I have no feeling'. The mistake here is in using the word Feeling as an equivalent to Ego, or any quality of Ego. A feeling of indifference is no feeling at all. Popular evidence then, I believe, can be no guide in this matter. In passing, I may also say that the very abundant use of analogy by some writers on this subject seems to me ill-advised. Analogy does very well to bring up the rear, but it is often very useless and confusing as an advance-guard.

Prof. Bain (MIND No. 53) insists that ideas tend to actualise themselves by neutral intensity or excitement, which is feeling; or rather, he says, a "facing-both-ways condition". This last expression is certainly not very helpful or satisfactory. Prof. Bain admits that typical will is incited by pleasure and pain, but he maintains that sometimes, as notably in imitation, will is stimulated by purely neutral excitement or feeling. In the discussion of this subject much has been said about Excitement, and, as Mr. Sully has suggested, this requires careful definition.

Reflection assures us that every mental activity has a certain intensity, and the word Excitement may, in the most general sense, denote this intensity. The intensity may be so slight as to be unnoticed by the subject, and remain wholly unindicated to the keenest observer; or it may be so strong as to be perfectly evident to both; or it may be evident to the subject and not to the observer, or *vice versâ*. Thus the obvious division of Excitement from this point of view is into subjective, where it is immediately recognised and felt in the consciousness of the subject, and objective, where it is unnoticed, or noticed only by observer. Classifying by another principle, we may distinguish Cognition-intensity, Feeling-intensity and Will-intensity, and the natural subdivisions under these according to the accepted subdivisions of mental activities. Excitement is not, however, generally used in the large sense we have just mentioned, but as denoting intensity of a high degree so as to be very noticeable to the subject, or observer, or both.

It is plain that Excitement, as subjective intensity, is the only kind which bears on the question under discussion. It is with excitement as a feeling, *viz.*, the feeling of intensity, and not with excitement as quality of feeling, that is, intensity, that we have to deal, and it is necessary that this distinction be clearly borne in mind. One may be excited but not feel excited, may have intensity of feeling but not feeling of intensity. Using the term, then, as equivalent to feeling of intensity, it is to be noted that it is a reflex or secondary mental state. It is the feeling resulting from consciousness of intensity of consciousness. The intensity of any consciousness may increase to such a point that it pushes itself into consciousness, first as mere recognition of intensity, but immediately and most manifestly as feeling of intensity. In rapid alternations of contrasted states, as of hope and fear, intensity soon rises to such a degree that it forces its way into consciousness as feeling of intensity. This feeling of intensity may be itself either weak or intense. In very reflective natures, the cognition and feeling of intensity may be reflex at any power: there may be cognition of the intensity of cognition-of-intensity, &c., in indefinite regression. Most persons stop with the single step in the regression.

It is evident that as far as excitement is regarded merely as intensity, as a fundamental element in all feeling and mental action, it is a confusion of terms to apply quality to it, to speak of it as either pleasurable, or painful, or neutral. Intensity of mental action has degrees but not quality, just as pitch in sound has degree, but not timbre or quality. Regarding excitement as feeling-of-intensity, it has the general characteristics of all feelings, and is not more likely to be neutral than any other feeling. Taking the case of surprise, which is so frequently instanced as a neutral feeling, let us analyse it with special reference to the excitement as feeling of intensity of cognition. A typical case would be the surprise from hearing thunder in

January. The presentation is quickly compared with a representation of observed order of facts, and the disagreement of the two marked. This is so far purely cognitive activity; but immediately connected with the perception of disagreement is the forcible recognition of the breaking up of a more or less rigid order. There is a disturbance in cognitive activity and the tension breaks into consciousness as excitement, the feeling of intensity. The conflict of a settled conviction with recent presentation intensifies consciousness, and this intensity with the abrupt change in quantity and quality of mental activity breaks into consciousness as intellectual sense of shock accompanied and closely followed by feeling of unpleasantness and pain. It is to be noted that when we come upon the feeling-element in surprise we find pain. Surprise in the strict sense is then the reflex act of consciousness in which the mind becomes aware of and feels the sudden disturbance and tension set up in itself by the sudden weakening of an established belief. The painful shock has some relation to the force of the disturbing factor, but is more closely connected with the strength of the belief assailed. The feeling of the disagreement as pain is due to the fact that this disagreement impinges on subjectivity, personal opinion and conviction, and the disturbance will be more or less disagreeable according to the degree of personal interest. Note that by exact statement the feeling is not painful, but is the pain concomitant or resultant upon the mental perception. The surprise for a person of rather weak habit of mind and of little generalising power will be almost wholly intellectual. Disagreement will be noted, but not felt. For one of strong intellectual interests, the surprise will mean definite and acute pain. For a meteorologist who has written a book stating that in this latitude thunder does not occur in January, the surprise might be very grievous. The intellectual element in surprise is emphasised in the statement 'I am surprised,' the feeling-element in 'I feel surprised'. If antecedent states of representation, comparison and inner perception are placed under the term feeling-of-surprise, we may expect consequent states to be likewise easily confused. When one speaks of being agreeably or disagreeably surprised, the pleasure or pain is not really, however, a part of the surprise. The sense and feeling of intellectual destruction, which constitutes surprise, is so quickly and thoroughly swallowed up in pleasure in having hope realised, or in pain in having fear realised, as the event may prove, that the term is naturally applied to what engrosses attention. Thus, 'It was a very pleasant surprise' means 'The surprise was followed by very pleasant consequences'. When I am surprised by the arrival of an intimate friend whom I supposed a thousand miles away, the mental disagreement, and the pain from conflict of conception and perception, are quickly eliminated by the event according with desire, and by the mind anticipating joys. We see, then, how easily the antecedents and consequents of surprise

are confounded with surprise itself, which is the reflex act of consciousness recognising and feeling sudden disturbance in intensity, quality and quantity in cognitive activity. I conclude that surprise, as feeling, is pain coloured by cognition of shock and by volition to avoid disturbing element.

Absorption in thought may be attended by what seems to be neutral excitement, but is not really so. The intensity of thought may press into consciousness as a knowledge and feeling of intensity, but so far as it is a feeling it is indubitably pleasure or pain. This pleasure or pain may remain as continuous undertone with frequently repeated intrusion into full consciousness. Careful analysis in this case shows that apparent neutrality results from a strong attendant recognition, or from the natural volitions being quickly overruled by feelings consequent upon other considerations. Intellectual men are not apt to be guided by excitement. Prof. Bain says that imitation is a test-case, that this is a volition which is obviously stimulated by neutral feeling. In some cases imitation seems clearly a mechanical, ideo-motor affair, an instinctive action without either conscious feeling or willing. In all other cases of imitation analysis will show excitant pleasure or pain. As Preyer and others have shown in the case of young children, mimicry arises mainly from pleasure in activity as such, and not from its peculiar quality as imitation. For children, and often for adults, imitation is simply a method of joyous and novel activity. The stimulant in higher grades of imitation is pleasure in attainment. As far as excitement is stimulant, it is, on the general principle before stated, either pleasure or pain. The pleasant feeling of intensity will tend toward continuance of imitative action, the unpleasant toward discontinuance. The pleasurable sense of activity, as inciting and continuing will in imitation, is a good example of excitement as feeling of volition-intensity.

If volitional excitement as instanced in imitation, and cognitive excitement as exemplified in surprise and absorption of thought, cannot be termed neutral, it is quite unlikely that we shall find any neutral feeling-excitement. A person at a horse-race may at first have so small a degree of pleasurable hope and painful fear aroused that the intensity does not force itself into consciousness. The increasingly rapid pendulum-swing of consciousness from hope to fear and back again becomes soon so intense that this objective intensity of feeling forces its way into conscious life as feeling of intensity. This excitement may be mainly regarded as accompaniment, or it may be valued in itself as excitement for excitement's sake. This absorption in the feeling of intensity is eagerly sought for by the *ennuyé*. The devoted theatre-goer often induces both pleasures and pains simply for this resultant feeling of tension which he regards as enjoyable for its own sake. Feeling-excitement in the simpler and earlier form and in this later artificial form is plainly

pleasure or pain coloured by slight element of cognition as recognition of intensity, and by volition in continuing or in stopping the causative activity.

Bearing in mind the analysis of excitement just made, the true interpretation of several matters which have been suggested is obvious and clear. Mr. Johnson (*MIND* xiii. 82) remarks that very intense mental pleasure and pain tends to run into a state of neutral excitement. This I interpret as the mental law that intensity of any mental activity, of any pleasure or pain, tends to displace this activity by feeling of intensity. This feeling of intensity is indeed neutral as regards previous states—that is, it is not, of course, the feeling whose intensity it feels; but, as I have sought to show, it is nevertheless always pleasure or pain. Again, as to the question whether states of mind equally pleasurable or painful may have different degrees of excitement. If excitement means here subjective excitement, then I answer that they do not have any degree of excitement, for feeling of intensity can never be a quality of the feeling whose intensity is felt. If excitement is the objective form, and refers to the intensity in general, then, as has been before said, it is a confusion in terms to apply the terms pleasure and pain to it. The anticipation suggested by Mr. Johnson as a case of neutral excitement is precisely analogous to the case of excitement at a horse-race, which has been analysed. Mr. Johnson concludes that feeling is not only more or less pleasure or pain but also more or less excitement. The proper way of stating this is: all feelings, including the feeling of excitement, consist of pleasure or pain and have degrees of intensity. Again, let me note the relation of intensity, and consequently feeling of intensity, to quantity of consciousness—a subject suggested by Mr. Sully (*MIND* xiii. 252). The fundamental properties of consciousness—quality, quantity, intensity—and also their inter-relations, would be a fruitful theme for extended discussion. I think that the clearing-up of many problems would result from thorough investigation and careful definition in these points; but at present I can only offer a remark or two upon the subject. It is plain that intensity varies with different qualities, that certain kinds of mental action are more generally characterised by high degrees of intensity than others. Presentations tend to higher intensities than representations, and pains than pleasures. It is noticeable that our psychological nomenclature, both popular and scientific, is mostly concerned with qualities, which shows that quantities and intensities have not received the attention they deserve, and have not been carefully discriminated. A representation of the same house comes up in the minds of two persons, one of whom has lived in it, the other merely seen it several times. Each psychosis is as representative as the other: they have the same quality, but in quantity and intensity they vary greatly. In a single multiplex act of consciousness, the former embraces a wide reach of detail and association and a

high degree of intensity which is lacking in the meagre and faint image of the latter. Physiologically, quantity is as the mass of co-ordinate coincident activities of brain in highest centres, and intensity is as the arterial and nervous tension in the highest centres. Intensities may be equal, and quantities very unequal; as compare one greatly interested in a game of cards with a person watching a near relative at a critical moment of illness. Intensity of pleasurable hope alternating with painful fear may be equal in both cases, but in quantity the larger nature of the friend will greatly exceed. Very quiet natures are often characterised by largeness of quantity of consciousness. Other things being equal, intensity tends to reduce quantity and obscure quality of consciousness. Quantity, like intensity, may cause a reflex act of consciousness when it becomes so great as to push into consciousness as recognition and feeling of quantity; and as a feeling of largeness, elevation and mental power it is clearly distinguishable from excitement as feeling of intensity. Intensity is dependent on the force or strength by which a mental state tends to persist against other states which may be crowding in, and it is also closely connected with rapidity of mental movement; but it is primarily tension, consciousness at its highest stretch, specially as touching upon interest, an element more or less involved in all consciousness.

It would seem highly desirable, in order to keep clear the distinction between intensity and feeling-of-intensity, to restrict the term Excitement to the latter meaning, and substitute the general term Intensity for all objective excitement so-called. It is also greatly to be desired that the reflex states which arise from sudden or great changes in quality, quantity and intensity of consciousness, and which are commonly termed feelings, should receive more general attention from psychologists than heretofore. I have in this paper essayed something in this direction, but it is a very large field, and comparatively unexplored.

However, so far as the problem of feeling as indifference is concerned, enough has been said on Excitement and Intensity, and I shall now consider Neutralisation as giving neutral feeling, a method suggested by Mr. Johnson (*MIND* xiii. 82), and developed by Miss Mason (xiii. 253). Does a feeling, neutral as regards pleasure and pain, result from the union in one consciousness of a pleasure and pain of equal intensities? Is there a composition of equal mental forces so that resultant equals zero? Such a question implies a clear apprehension of what is meant by being in consciousness, and as to the possibility of perfect coincidence and equality in mental activities. It is plain that so far as consciousness is linear, neutralisation cannot occur. Where there is but one track, and but one train at a time, collision is impossible. Mental states often appear coexistent while they are really consecutive. It is doubtful whether pain from toothache and pleasure from music ever appear in absolute synchronism in consciousness, but they may alternate so rapidly sometimes as to

appear synchronous to uncritical analysis. To a man drowning, a lifetime of conscious experience seems condensed into a few seconds. This means a consciousness made very sensitive and very rapid in its movement, and which acts like a camera taking pictures with a lightning-shutter. Even if a pleasure and pain did coincide, it is probable that in no case would they be exactly equal. In mental life as in organic life every product has an individuality: as every leaf differs from every other leaf, so every mental state is on completest observation *sui generis*. This is evidently a most delicate investigation, but I doubt whether it can ever be shown that two equal pleasures and pains ever appear in the same sense in consciousness at the same time. Practically equal pleasures and pains in consecutive consciousness lead to vacillation, and the secondary pain of alternation and excitement drives intelligent agents to new activity, or in stupid agents the alternation may be carried to exhaustion.

It is undoubtedly true that consciousness, in all the higher forms at least, is a complex; yet full and complete consciousness is probably of one element only, and the remaining portion of the nexus grades off into subconsciousness and unconsciousness. There is a network of coexistent states of consciousness in different degrees in mutual reaction, each striving for dominance but only one at a time reaching it. Some portions of the nexus, as Ego-tone, are quite permanent elements. The light of a large and brilliant consciousness may illumine a considerable area, but brightness most certainly diminishes in rapid ratio as the distance increases from attention, the single point of greatest illumination. A highly developed brain may sustain a highly complex consciousness, but it is only at the point of highest functional activity that we find the physiological basis of a full consciousness. While high grades of mental life are so complex, we do not find anywhere a mental compound. Two diverse or opposite elements never combine into a compound which is totally unlike either. Close analysis will fail to reveal any process of neutralisation or combination whereby we experience neutral states of feeling.

I have endeavoured to set forth the real nature of certain so-called neutral feelings; but at bottom the question is, as was at first intimated, a matter of definition. Is it best to restrict the term Feeling to pleasurable and painful states of consciousness, or is it advisable for clearness and definiteness to widen the use of the term so as to include certain neutral states? From such analysis as has been made, I doubt the advisability. Appeal in such matters must always be made to analysis, and the advantage must be shown for a concrete example. The *a priori* idea or general impression that pleasure and pain is too small a basis for all feeling has no real weight. Moreover, it must always be borne in mind that psychology like all other sciences deals only with phenomena and not with essences, not with mind but with mental manifestations, not with feeling as mental entity having

properties, being pleasurable, painful, &c., but with these qualities in and for themselves. Thus the metaphysical fallacy hidden in such common expressions as pleasurable and painful feelings is to be constantly guarded against. The feeling is not pleasurable or painful, but is the pleasure or the pain. The feeling has no independent being apart from the attributes which in common usage are attached to it, nor is there any general act of consciousness with which these properties are to be connected. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, this common tendency has its psychological basis in the bringing under the term Feeling some of the more permanent elements of consciousness—especially the Ego-sense—which stand for metaphysics as beings and entities having properties. Knowledge, Feeling, Will, are for nominalistic science simply general terms denoting the three groups of mental phenomena which seem to stand off most clearly and fundamentally from each other, and Pleasure and Pain are most clearly and fundamentally set over against Knowing and Willing. It does not seem that Prof. Bain and others have made plain to us any better differentia.

If this definition of Feeling seems the best that descriptive classification can give us, it is certainly enforced by genetic considerations. The key to a really scientific classification lies in the history of mind in the individual and race. The greatest progress in psychology is not to be attained by the psychologist continually reverting to his own highly developed consciousness, but, as in all sciences, the study of the simple must be made to throw light upon the complex. Mentality like life is a body of phenomena whose forms cannot be separated by hard and fast lines into orders, genera, species; but there is a continuous development of radical factors. In the earliest forms of mind we find the most radical distinctions most clearly and simply set forth, and what Feeling is at first, it is by continuity of development the same for ever after. The earliest indications of conscious life show merest trace of apprehension of object, some organic pleasure and pain, considerable striving and effort. Mental evolution, like all evolution, is not by the elimination but by the expansion of its primal factors; and by the continuous amplification and intensification of these the highest development is reached. Pleasure and pain remain then for all consciousness as constant factors, and if the term Feeling is to indicate one element in tripartite mind it must be held to this meaning of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain in their most complicated colourings from developed knowledge and will, and in their most subtle interactions, remain true to the primal type; and when we find a state of consciousness in which neither is a dominant factor, we had best denote it by some other term than Feeling. This evolutionary reason seems to me the strongest one for making the term Feeling signify states of pleasure or pain, and, as I have suggested (MIND xi. 74-5), a genetic classification of the feelings must proceed upon this basis.

DR. MAUDSLEY ON THE DOUBLE BRAIN.

By Professor J. M. BALDWIN.

In his article "The Double Brain," in *MIND* No. 54, Dr. Maudsley makes three points, which may be stated logically thus: (1) the brain, as the organ of thought or consciousness, is capable of dual activity, this duality making it impossible for us to find unity of mind in the representative processes alone; (2) real unity is to be found in the affective or sensitive life, which (3) finds its basal principle of unity in the organic unity of the body, *i.e.*, in the nervous system. These points are closely interwoven, and present an account of the mental life to which spiritualists generally take broad exception. It is my purpose, however, simply to indicate a few considerations from a psychological standpoint which tend to show that Dr. Maudsley's physiological data do not suffice for the interpretation he gives them.

The facts bearing upon the dual nature of the hemispheres, and the functional interpretation of them which Dr. Maudsley gives, are conceded from the outset. It seems to be established that, besides the common functional activity of the hemispheres, that area over which they both have dominion, there is a residuum of motor function belonging to each alone, and that each may assume the performance both of the common function and of that which is peculiar to itself. It is when we pass on to consider "how the hemispheres act toward one another in thinking" (p. 166),¹ that is, how they are related to each other as respects consciousness and its unity, that the question of psychological interest arises.

In answering this question, Dr. Maudsley first cites the case in which we attempt to perform movements clearly involving the separate action of the hemispheres, as the performance of different movements with the two hands. He says (p. 166): "If a person who is performing one kind of act with one hand and another kind of act with the other hand will endeavour to think of both acts at the same moment, he will find that he cannot do so; although he can execute the respective movements simultaneously he cannot think them simultaneously; he must pass in thought from one to the other, a rapid alternation of consciousness takes place. The alternation, though rapid, is by no means instantaneous; it is distinctly successive, since there is an appreciable pause in the performance of it." After excluding other alternatives, such as the coexistence of two different consciousnesses, he concludes that "there remains . . . the supposition of an alternating action of the hemispheres corresponding to the alternating consciousness". This alternation,

¹ All page-references are to *MIND* No. 54.

he goes on to say, gradually yields on the part of the hemispheres, through repetition and education, to the uniting of the hemispheres in simultaneous activity as a single organ (p. 166), but consciousness preserves its method of "extremely rapid alternation". The conclusion, therefore, as respects intellectual unity, is that we find no basis for it in the functional activity of the hemispheres.

This conclusion may be true, but the analysis it employs of the psychological unity of the states involved is so meagre and false that we cannot take it alone with us in our search for the true principle of unity. By consciousness in this connexion Dr. Maudsley seems to mean *attention*. It is true that I cannot attend to the two movements at once, that my attention alternates usually, even when the movements are simultaneous; but it is not true that I may not be conscious of the two movements at once. Recent experimental work in determining the area of consciousness establishes the contrary. Repetition, also, tends to make the two movements elements of a single state of consciousness, just as repetition tends to make the hemispheres a single unit organ. A simultaneous consciousness is not a "distracted or dual consciousness," but an integrated consciousness, a new state, whose elements arise from previous states. Attention is a state of monoidism, but consciousness is not.

Now this integration of states in consciousness is possible only on the basis of a fundamental unity of mind, as necessary to the intellectual life as organic unity is to the members of the body in the variety of their physical functions. If I move my right thumb to the left, is the movement my only consciousness? Am I not simultaneously conscious that it is my thumb, my movement? Are there not unnumbered, organic, detached and stray peripheral affections bound up with the act or with its very conception? And when I shift my attention and move my right thumb to the left, is there a pause in my consciousness of *all* these things? I am just as conscious of my thumbs, of my organic affections, of myself between the movements as during them, and a simple change in my motor experience can in no sense be said to create a pause or break in my consciousness. Each hemisphere, instead of contributing a separate consciousness, contributes an element of content to my simple consciousness, a motor element.

And further, attention itself, as a principle of active unity, is dependent upon the complexity of the mental life. The selecting, relating, unifying, disposing function of attention has been so emphasised in recent discussion that it is needless to dwell upon it. In consciousness it is the outgoing of efficiency, the self gaining the ascendancy over the complex of its presentational life and asserting the principle of oneness which is its own nature.

I have thus briefly touched upon the elements of conscious mental unity which analysis seems to give, and which demand

explanation whatever hypothesis we adopt: first, a subjective reference of all mental modification, both motor and sensory; secondly, the subordination of conscious *incidents*, past and present, to the permanent fact of consciousness, which remains as the background of their flow; and thirdly, the grasping and disposing energy of attention, which is *always one*. The class of movements hitherto spoken of, those controlled by the different hemispheres individually, with no co-operation, bear only upon what I have called above *incidents*, and not upon the higher aspects of mental unity.

If the case rested simply upon this class of movements, Dr. Maudsley might make it stronger by extending the difference of function, not to the two hemispheres alone, but to each of the motor areas within either hemisphere. The centre for speech, for example, is distinct from the other motor areas. We can perform the movements of the speech-organs and the right leg simultaneously, but cannot attend to them simultaneously until a close association is brought about by education. Hence, as before, motor states lack unity, and even within the function of *one hemisphere*. From this aspect we have not two brains (centres), but perhaps a dozen. This tends to bring out our contention, that the unity of the mental life is not touched at all by the functional subdivision of the cerebrum.

Dr. Maudsley next proceeds to consider those movements in which the hemispheres co-operate: they "combine to dictate different movements of the two sides for a common end, just as the eyes combine their different visions of one object". The question here is this: "From what higher source do the hemispheres obtain their governing principle of unity? How is it that, when dictating different movements, they yet have an understanding to work together to a common end?" And the answer is again, that the unity of the motor consciousness is an educated unity, and that, like two acrobats, the hemispheres learn to perform together "by much travail and pain".

This is true, and its importance can hardly be estimated; but, again, it must be criticised from the standpoint of what it leaves out. We are forced at once to inquire, Whose is the "end or aim in view," "the conception or foresight of the act, its ideal accomplishment"? Certainly it is not the conception of the hemispheres themselves, though the figure of the acrobats would lead us to think so; for how could such a conception be acquired by either hemisphere before the action had been actually performed? And if then acquired, how could it be intercommunicated without a central bureau of consciousness, at which the progress of the co-ordinated movements might be apprehended and recorded? The conception which precedes all effort at motor execution is itself a fact of unity, higher mental unity, an ideal unity of the motor consciousness, to which the complex activity of the motor apparatus is to be reduced by long and wearisome effort. Here, again, is the outgoing of the self in its

relating and efficient activity, perceiving the many while itself is one, relating the many in an ideal which is one, and reducing the many to the unity of a foregoing ideal plan. Here, as in the former case, I find no fault with the account of what takes place in and for the motor consciousness, but cannot see how this consciousness can be considered for itself alone in independence of the higher thought-consciousness, in which alone the idea of motor co-operation can germinate and bear fruit. And the conclusion is that mental unity is, potentially at least, antecedent to co-ordinate movement.

The other figure which Dr. Maudsley uses in this connexion makes the case still plainer. He says the hemispheres are related to each other in such co-ordinated movements as the eyes are in binocular vision, their early binary images being reduced in experience to a unitary perception. Let us suppose that the eyes are the seat of consciousness, and that at first they did not give a single image. Then, either each eye has its own consciousness, or there is one consciousness for both eyes. If each has its own consciousness, there would be no consciousness of the discrepancy between them and no means of remedying it. If, on the other hand, there is one consciousness for both eyes, the unifying co-ordination of the images would be in virtue of this consciousness and not in the eyes themselves. It is only in the interpretation of a unit consciousness, which renders both images possible, that they can be reduced to the form of vision which is its ideal conception.

The mental unity, therefore, which is to be explained is something more profound than the simple consideration of the motor consciousness would lead us to expect; and it remains to ask whether the organic solution offered by Dr. Maudsley is adequate.

The two great questions here involved are these: Is the "unity of the intellectual life based upon the unity of feeling," and "this again upon the unity of the organic life"? These propositions are so comprehensive that one's opinion is what one's entire systematic thinking has made it, and I can only advance a general consideration or two in opposition to the equally general considerations of Dr. Maudsley.

First, the same line of argument by which Dr. Maudsley proves the absence of unity in the motor consciousness applies with undiminished force to the affective consciousness as well. Can we attend to two simple sensations in the peripheral organs at once—say, a taste and the pain of a wound on the hand? Not at all. The case is just the same as when we attempt to attend to two movements on different sides at once. There is the same alternation of attention, until the sensations become united in a single attention-complex. The emphasis of single affective states in the adult life is open to the same charge of psychological atomism as we found attaching to the similar isolation of motor states. Indeed, simple feelings of movement are *themselves affective states*, being simply intensive, and the argument in

regard to them applies to all states of the affective order. The feeling of effort which is bound up with feelings of movement is quite distinct in its nature, and seems, as has been said, to indicate a higher plane of intellectual unity, which Dr. Maudsley leaves quite out of account.

Secondly, we may well notice that either the manifoldness or the unity of feeling could not be apprehended as such in the absence of a circumscribing consciousness which, through its own unity, takes it to be what it is. Suppose we admit that in the beginnings of life the inner state is simply an undifferentiated, sensory continuity, what is it that *feels* or *knows* the subsequent differentiation of the parts of this continuity? It cannot be the unity of the continuity, for this is then destroyed; it cannot be the differentiated parts, for they are many. It can only be a unitary subjectivity additional to the unity of the sensory content, *i.e.*, the form of synthetic activity which reduces the many to one in each and all of the stages of mental growth. The relations of presentations as units must be taken up into the unit presentation of relation—to express what modern psychology means by apperception; or the “mechanical connexion” must become the “presented connexion”—to use the terms employed by Mr. Stout in *MIND* No. 53.

Thirdly, it is difficult to see how higher intellectual unity can find its basal principle, its originating cause, in the unity of the body as an organism. Admitting, with Dr. Maudsley, that ideas are a matter of organisation, that thought is the progressive organisation of residua,¹ I yet maintain that we never go outside the unity of consciousness to find these residua. There can be no such thing as a residuum except as it is the same in nature as that of which it is a residuum. However far back we go undoing organisation, we never get outside the subjective. Admitting, further, that the body is also an organisation, and an organisation which proceeds in the most intimate progressive parallelism with that of mind, we cannot, from this single fact, reduce either to the other. Mind remains an unexplained thing for itself until the following positions are proved: (a) That the law of organic and morphological growth of mind finds its proximate ground in the growth of body. That is, that the methods of physical organisation run also into mental organisation. Now, as a fact, the great principle of mental organisation, apperceptive synthesis, finds no counterpart in nature: its products have no objective realisation in the synthesis of physical organisation. It seems, as Lotze says, to be unique. (b) That there is a correlation of mental and physical force, a principle which Dr. Maudsley everywhere assumes, but nowhere, as far as I know, attempts to establish. (c) That the mind in its progressive organisation does not exhibit autonomic energies of its own, but owes its existence to its psychophysical connexion; and, further, that the

¹ The general doctrine of Maudsley's *Physiology and Pathology of Mind*.

twofold aspects of unity, mental and physical, are not themselves members of a third underlying principle to which they are both secondary—and which *may be mind*.

Contemporary thought is tending, I think, to the recognition of the fact—as wholesome to the idealist as to the materialist—that personality is one; that it includes mind and body in organic union; that mind is not mind without an object, and an object is not an object without mind; that a within is as necessary to a without as a without is to a within; and that rational unity lies deeper in the nature of things than either the empirical unity of the atomistic psychology or the functional unity of the nervous system.

'THE SENSES' IN A COURSE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

By G. LYON TURNER.

I suppose it will be admitted as a matter of fact that the phrase 'The Senses' has usually been taken in one of two ways—either as identical with 'The organs of Special Sense' or as practically equivalent to 'Sense-Perception'. In the first or narrower meaning, only such attention has been paid to 'The Senses' as is necessary to the understanding of Sense-Perception; and this latter has very generally been described as 'Perception *by* or *through* the Senses'. Now it is to the manner in which the latter subject has usually been treated that I would direct attention, with the view of suggesting an alteration of method in one or two vital points.

That 'Sensation' is the basis of 'Perception' all are now agreed. Even Hamilton distinguished between Sensation proper and Perception proper, though he failed to put them in their right relation to one another. Prof. Bain has brought into their right prominence the various classes and varieties of Special Sensation; and Mr. Sully has distinguished them as an element which must be supplemented by an Active Intellectual element before they can yield any true Perception.

But sufficiently patient and careful analysis of the Intellectual processes which must be superinduced upon Sensation has not yet been given. Prof. Bain seems scarcely to have realised that a distinctly *intellectual* element was necessary before any real Perception could result, or he would not have so sharply separated 'The Senses' from 'The Intellect,' nor have made them include so much of Perception as he actually has done. And even Mr. Sully has failed to point out the many Intellectual elements which are necessary for the formation of the simplest 'Percept,' and so has failed to place Perception in its proper relation to Memory and Imagination, and all three in their due relation to Sensation. In a 'Discussion-note' there is space only for the most condensed statement of conclusions. The meagrest exposition of reasons

would demand much greater space than can be here allowed. Suffice it then to say that careful analysis of the Perception of any strange or unfamiliar object—and the object must be unfamiliar for the analysis to be distinct and complete (else some component elements and constituent stages of the processes will be found to have been suppressed or dropped out of consciousness)—will reveal the following distinguishable stages or elements:—

1. First, there must be a careful determination of the exact *kind* of sensation experienced, alike in *quality*, in *intensity* and in *quantity*.

Now this preliminary question involves the distinctly Intellectual process of Comparison—a comparison tacit, if not conscious, with all other Sensations of the special sense concerned.

2. But this Comparison involves the twin faculties—so central and essential to all Intellectual processes whatever—of Recognising Similarities and Discerning Differences, and results in Classifications more or less minute and in general notions corresponding thereto.

3. For the complete formation of such Classifications, however, and for the determination in the case of any particular Sensation of the kind or class of Sensation to which it belongs, two other faculties or processes must be brought into play, *viz.*, Memory and Imagination: Memory, to recall the numerous varieties to be classified; Imagination, vividly to realise their probable surroundings and relations.

4. Furthermore, the faculty of Naming or Language is an absolute necessity to preserve the Distinctions observed, the Similarities traced, and the Classifications effected, as a permanent treasure of the mind.

5. Nor is this all. None of the processes enumerated are actually effected apart from the 'Association of Ideas,' which also so much abbreviates and facilitates operations in the first instance carried on without it; while the final Perceptive Judgment—which always takes the form of the solution of a causal problem, and assigns the sensation actually experienced to the action upon the nervous organism of some external material object—cannot be clear and sound apart from that Intellectual Tact which has been called Judgment as distinguished from Reasoning of a more regular and elaborate kind.

For the completion of the simplest Perceptive Judgment, then, or the formation of the simplest Perceptive Notion, Percept or 'Intuition' (Kant), the twin faculties of Recognising Similarities and Discerning Differences, Memory, Imagination, and the faculty of Naming, with 'Association,' Judgment and Reasoning, must all have been brought into play. And to these must be added the metaphenomenal ideas of Self, Other-than-self, Cause or Power, besides those of Chronological and Spatial relation—usually (but rather loosely) spoken of as those of Time and Space—which are all involved and implied in any such solution of the causal problem presented by Sensation.

I submit, therefore, that the order of exposition, in dealing with the Psychology of 'the Senses' or Sense-Perception, to be complete and adequate must be somewhat as follows:—

1. 'Sensation' should certainly be dealt with first as a separate subject, as it is by Prof. Bain and Mr. Sully.

But the natural and proper limits of the subjects must be carefully observed, and none of those '*interpretations*' which Intelligence puts upon its phenomena introduced or included until the Intellectual processes and faculties necessary for such an interpretation have been noticed and examined.

All that should be done thus at the outset is—

(a) Succinctly to explain its physical conditions, and

(b) Accurately to classify its numerous varieties.

We should thus have clearly presented to us, at the threshold of our psychological system, this lowest and simplest set of mental phenomena, recognising in them a group of subjective experiences of a purely *passive* order, fitted to be the foundation on which Intellect can build, the material on which Intellect can work, but in no sense the germ out of which, apart from Intellect, any knowledge could develop or be evolved.

2. We should then proceed to examine those processes by which alone these (and, indeed, any other mental phenomena) come to be grouped into more complex forms, and come to assume significance beyond themselves. These processes are two:—the one largely mechanical or automatic, *viz.*, Association; the other, essentially intelligent and active, *viz.*, Comparison.

(a) The first, of course, calls for a summarisation of the laws of Association, and suggests an inquiry into its *modus operandi* and probable basis.

(b) An examination of the second brings out the fact that the very essence of all intellection consists in the activity of the twin faculties of the Recognition of Similarities and the Discernment of Differences.

3. At this point, perhaps, more usefully and properly than later on, attention must be drawn to those ideas which Intelligence inevitably brings into use as soon as ever Intelligence begins to examine Sensations—critically and analytically—along the lines of the processes just named: ideas, which it discovers to be simple and unique in their nature, primary and underived from others as to origin, and metaphenomenal in their reference, *viz.*, Self, Other-than-Self, Cause or Power, and Spatial and Chronological Relations (or Space and Time).

4. This brings us naturally to the problem of the treatment of Sensations by the Intellect in these various Processes, and with the aid of these Primary or Elemental Ideas. We find that Intellect cannot choose but deal with every Sensation or group of Sensations presented to it, as a *causal problem*. By the very nature of our Intelligence, we cannot help seeing that each Sensation or group of Sensations possesses an objective signifi-

cance which carries us out of the phenomenal region to which, as a merely passive experience, it belongs. In other words, we cannot but view it as a phenomenal *effect* due to the interaction of *metaphenomenal realities*, as the effect upon the Conscious Intelligent Self of something other than self occupying Space, and therefore material.

5. But as soon as we look into the question from this point of view with proper care and with due candour, we find that the solution of the causal problem thus presented to Intelligence in every case varies in its nature with the differences observable in its circumstances. We find that it may come out as a Memory or an Imagination quite as legitimately as a Perception, although in all three we apply the same principles in the exercise by the Intellect of its twin faculty of the Recognition of Similarities and Discernment of Differences.

We shall have—

(a) a *Perception*, if the cause of the Sensation or group of Sensations is found to be a *material object* actually present ;

(b) a *Memory*, if its cause be found to be some *past* event or experience ; and

(c) an *Imagination*, if it be found to be the product only of some neurosis initiated within the limits of the nervous system of him who experiences it, or merely the result of some effort to forecast the *future*.

Properly viewed, then, 'Perception' is only *one* of three equally possible and equally legitimate solutions of the causal problem presented to the Intellect by any Sensation or group of Sensations of which the observer becomes conscious in the course of his experience. That being so, however, it is inaccurate and misleading, in any scheme or synopsis of Psychology, to place 'Association of Ideas,' 'Memory' and 'Imagination' as topics co-ordinate with 'Perception' to be dealt with after Perception, as merely using up the materials acquired in or afforded by Perception. 'Sensation' is the one topic properly preliminary to all three ; and for each and all of them the activity of the Intellect is absolutely necessary in all its varied processes of Comparison, Judgment and Reasoning. Bearing this in mind, and that 'Association' is at work from the very first, as well as that, throughout, the Intellect makes the freest use of the metaphenomenal ideas of Self, Other-than-self, Cause or Power, and Space and Time, a clear recognition is secured of the fact, which otherwise so easily fails of recognition, *viz.*, that only by the exercise of Intellect can we get to 'know' at all ; and we avoid the hopeless confusions which must inevitably arise if knowledge of any sort or kind be attributed to Sensibility or Feeling.

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Moral Order and Progress: An Analysis of Ethical Conceptions.
By S. ALEXANDER, Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.
London: Trübner & Co., 1889. Pp. xxvi., 413.

This is a thoughtful and carefully-reasoned book. It is also interesting from the circumstances of its production. Mr. Alexander is a pupil of Green, expressing very great obligations to him, but intimating "dissent from his fundamental principles". He has cast in his lot largely with what is currently known as Evolutionary Ethics, of which he reckons Mr. Leslie Stephen the most advanced and consistent expositor; but he has "come to the ideas borrowed from biology and the theory of evolution, which are prevalent in modern ethics, with a training derived from Aristotle and Hegel," and he claims to have found "not antagonism, but on the whole fulfilment". The advantages of such a training for such a task are obvious; and even if Mr. Alexander attributes more value than belongs to them to the biological ideas which are the ethical fashion of the day, they have undoubtedly had a stimulating influence upon his own thought.

The Introduction indicates the spirit and scope of his treatment. Attention is drawn to the convergence—"an agreement in spirit shown both in general method and in certain general results"—of the main opposing ethical theories, as represented in England at the present time by the evolutionary and the Neo-Kantian ethics. The author instances Green's doctrine that morality is a common good realised in individual wills, and Mr. Stephen's theory that conduct is moral according as it contributes to social vitality. Evidently both these theories lay stress on the organic connexion existing between the individual and his society. Though this fact has been perhaps most forcibly brought home to the average English thinker through the medium of biological ideas, Mr. Alexander rightly points out that the conception is an essential part of Hegel's doctrine. Through Hegelian and Comtian channels it was familiar to many thinkers, and was making way independently of the great impetus it undoubtedly received from the biological movement of the last thirty years. He also points out that the philosophical movement in this respect simply reflects the course of history, the revolutionary movement towards freedom from restraint and the economical principle of *laissez faire* having been largely supplemented in more recent times by the feeling of "moral solidarity"—a feeling which colours much of the legislation of the present day. In spite of sentimental mistakes and tendencies towards an ill-considered socialism, it cannot be denied that this feeling

is a necessary supplement to and corrective of the bald individualism which preceded it. This conception of "an organic coherence of the individual with society" necessarily leads, according to Mr. Alexander, to a view of morality as a social fact, and it is here that he recognises an affinity between the present current of thought and Greek ethics in its prime in Plato and Aristotle.

Recognising at the outset the normative character of ethics, as dealing not with facts as such, but with the application of a standard to facts, Mr. Alexander proposes to investigate "what it is that the moral judgment as such expresses," and to do so by means of an examination of the working conceptions of ethics. He thinks that this may be done without trenching upon metaphysics or the discussion of first principles, his aim being to restrict himself to ethical science proper. In like manner, while he assumes, or rather proposes to trace, the operation of evolution within ethics, he puts aside the question whether "man and his morality are derived from some lower form of life". The title of the volume indicates the two divisions into which it falls. The first ("Moral Order") deals with "the statics of morality," and asks "to what facts the central conceptions of good or right and of obligation correspond"; the second ("Moral Progress") is dynamical and "investigates the operation of the forces by which the distinction of good and bad grows and varies". But to these is prefixed, as preliminary, a semi-psychological analysis of conduct and character with a view to discover the phases of each to which we apply moral predicates. If this First Book, therefore, discusses the question "What is good?" the Second asks "Why is it good, or what does its goodness mean?" and the Third asks "How does goodness come into being, how is it maintained, how does it advance?". At the end of his Introduction, the author shortly indicates the gist of the whole volume, namely, that the idea of good or right implies nothing more than an adjustment of parts in an orderly whole, which in the individual represents an equilibrium of different powers, in the society an equilibrium of different persons.

The First Book, which corresponds to a partial 'psychology of the active powers,' contains a good deal of careful discussion and definition. One or two points may be noted. The object of desire, according to Mr. Alexander, is never a mere external thing, but always "a state of my mind which, in desiring, exists in idea, in the satisfaction, as a reality". This is perhaps open to misconception, but I do not understand Mr. Alexander to take the hedonistic side against Butler and Professor Sidgwick in the vexed question of the object of desire, but simply to protest against the externality of the desired object, which Butler and others have dwelt upon, probably by way of emphasising their own protest against the hedonistic view. Certainly the agent desiring does not separate the object from his own satisfaction in

it ; if he did, the mental fact would be not desire but perception or imagination. But if the object cannot be separated from the satisfaction of the agent, neither is the latter (cases of reflective self-indulgence always excepted) separated as pleasure from the object. This, I take it, is Mr. Alexander's contention. Proceeding in his analysis, he lays down the broad position that what is morally good or bad is always the will. We do not blame a man for his defective mental endowments, nor for his thoughts and feelings, except so far as he has nursed them into strength. Conduct is usually considered as the outcome of the will in external action, but "the real moral fact is conduct itself regarded as a whole of many elements and actions ; consequences and internal feelings have value for morality only in so far as they are elements of this fact". Here again, in similar terms to those used of desire, the author emphasises the internality of conduct, so far as it is moral. "In willing an external action the object is the state of mind which we call by the name of the action." That this is so is proved by the moral commonplace that for external action involuntarily caused the doer is not blamed, while he is blamed for a nefarious intention, even though its effect in the external world be frustrated. In ordinary circumstances, however, consequences are "the outer aspect of conduct, as feelings are its inner aspect". Character, again, is simply "that of which individual pieces of conduct are the manifestation ; it is the force of which conduct is the expression, or the substance of which conduct is the attribute. Conduct and character are thus the same thing facing different ways. Short of being equivalent to conduct, character sinks to the rank of what is merely disposition or temperament. But disposition comes up for moral judgment only according to the volitions in which it issues. Character is not the same thing as disposition, but it is built upon it."¹

The First Book ends with a short but rather interesting discussion of ethical method and the relation of ethics to metaphysics. As already indicated, Mr. Alexander insists on the necessity of keeping ethics distinct from metaphysics, though he admits that ethical inquiries "stand very near to metaphysics, and may be the most natural way of raising ultimate questions. Ethics has not to wait for metaphysics but to prepare for it." He joins issue on this point with Green ; but though he puts his finger very acutely, in my opinion, on the fallacy which lurks in Green's transcendental and timeless Self (note on p. 76), it is more difficult to show the possibility of treating ethics without metaphysical presuppositions of some kind. The Self demanding to be satisfied was introduced or postulated by Green to explain the

¹ In spite of this clear and accurate distinction, however, Mr. Alexander seems himself to confuse character and disposition in his short discussion of Free-will, pp. 336-42.

normative or preceptive character of ethics. Is Mr. Alexander's own conception of an organism of individual and social conduct demanding at every point a certain line of action for the preservation of its equilibrium—is this not also a conception of the same order as Green's Self, though it may not be open to the same objections? 'Metaphysical' is with some a term of reproach, but a conception is not less metaphysical because it is borrowed from biological science. This may be as good a place as any for remarking that Mr. Alexander seems to me to have been a little too much taken captive by the fashion of the day, which sees all things in biology. Why should we, as he says, "expect to find the truths of ethics analogous all along the line with those of the animal world"? Mr. Alexander answers, because both sciences deal with "types"; but the reason seems rather an *ex post facto* explanation of the influence which a dominant science has exercised upon his thinking as upon that of so many others. The intellectual impetus derived from contact with biology has undoubtedly been most healthful in many cases, and Mr. Alexander's, as I have already said, is no exception; but the thorough-going parallelism which he tries to set up between the evolution of species and the evolution of moral conduct seems to me at times, I must confess, a little forced, and the somewhat laborious comparison often adds nothing in the way of clearness to what is clear enough without it. The best proof that we need not go to biology for a master-key is furnished by Mr. Alexander himself when he remarks in his Introduction that something very like his own position is to be found in the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. The Platonic theory of the virtues, notably of justice or virtue *par excellence*, is, to say the least, a very close anticipation of the modern notions of equilibrium, function, social health, &c.

In the opening of his Second Book, Mr. Alexander indicates very clearly the line of thought he is to follow. He traces, in an interesting way, the movement of ethical theory in England from crassly individualistic selfishness, through Mill's Utilitarianism and the dualistic positions of Professor Sidgwick and Mr. Spencer to the full recognition of "the social character of morality" in Mr. Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics*. Similarly, in Germany, there was a movement from the bare universalism of Kant's categorical imperative to the Hegelian recognition of morality made objective in the customs of society and the institutions of the State. Taking this as the outcome of recent ethical speculation, Mr. Alexander makes the position enthusiastically his own. "To realise the social character of morality," he says, "is to seek the explanation of its authority, not in some categorical imperative, such as Kant's, but in the very nature of society itself." The question of the meaning of the conceptions, good and bad, or right and wrong, seems to him "identical" with the problem, "how the individual agent is related to the society in which he lives". The individual is first dealt with, however, in

provisional isolation from society. For the individual, the good life is defined as "a system of conscious acts, where each function has its limits prescribed to it by the demands of all other functions, so that no faculty shall perform its functions to the detriment of another. . . . In this proportion or adjustment consists the reasonableness or rationality of good conduct, and in this sense reason may be called the regulative principle of morality."¹ In accordance with what was said before, the same thing may be expressed with equal truth in terms of the internal. "The good man may be described either as an equilibrated order of conduct, or an equilibrium of moral sentiments, or of the parts of his nature." It is, however, to be understood that the equilibrium is not a state of rest, but a mobile equilibrium in which all the parts are shifting, and, moreover, "the equilibrium is a balance of the parts with one another, not simply an equilibrium of a man with his conditions". When we turn to the social equilibrium, we are told that the predicate "good" means that the act is one by which the agent seeks to perform the function required of him by his position in society. "Each person has a definite place which requires of him a determinate work; and, secondly, what that work is is settled by reference to the conflicting claims of all, or to the demands of the whole society. . . . The acts which are approved are never, as a matter of fact, identical for two individuals. Every individual acts under his own special conditions of personal characteristics and outward surroundings; and, though his duties may be practically indistinguishable from those of another individual, they are no more the same than any two acts he himself performs are the same. Morality, like history, never repeats itself." Hence "the moral precept itself is always individual, 'this is good or bad' ". Conduct is good, not because it leads to some further result, such as pleasure, or because it is determined by some inexplicable idea of good, but in virtue of the equilibrium it establishes between the various parts of conduct itself. "Good conduct, therefore, settled as such by an internal test, should contain within itself the whole justification of morality without requiring us to go outside. . . . It is the ultimate test and the ultimate object of morality."

The above contains the central idea of the volume, but any remarks to be made upon it will come in more fitly after Mr. Alexander's own criticism of competing theories. The next

¹ Mr. Alexander devotes several paragraphs to rebutting the notion that reason is, in any other sense, the author of the moral order, but surely he interprets the doctrine in a sense in which no one holds it. It has been very generally held that morality is bound up with the existence of a rational or self-conscious being able as such to envisage a law for himself. Does Mr. Alexander mean to deny this connexion between reason and morality? He only speaks of reason as a calculating faculty. It was hardly worth proving that the subjective process of calculating does not alter the objective facts calculated.

section is devoted to proving, what has hitherto rather been assumed, that the self-regarding virtues, as they are called, are really social, and consequently that all virtue is social in its character. Every act, says Mr. Alexander, if a bad one, lowers, if a good one, maintains or raises, the efficiency of the agent. Efficiency, as appears from the next sentence, is "efficiency for society". "It is because of the actual alteration in a man's character which such action involves that it is included amongst those energies *which he has to adjust to other persons' needs*, and is *therefore* called moral or immoral." No one is likely to deny that whatever lowers a man's moral tone injures to that extent his social efficiency, but the words which I have italicised seem to involve more than this: they seem to imply that the individual exists simply as a means for promoting the welfare of others. Besides the logical circle which this involves (seeing that the others also exist only as means), I was at first inclined to think that there was also implied an external or hedonistic conception of the moral end. But Mr. Alexander speaks in various places and with no uncertain sound of "character and conduct as the supreme good". Still, in praising thus the social character of morality he seems to me to tend to overlook its individual and personal character. No reasonable thinker, I imagine, supposes in speaking of an individual's duties to himself that a moral individual ever existed, or could exist, in solid singleness, to use a Lucretian phrase, apart altogether from society and its influences. But without denying the reality of what is called the social organism, that cannot after all be said to be real in the same sense in which the individuals who compose it are real. They are, as it were, its points of actuality—the centres in which it is alive to joy and suffering and thought. The moral individual is therefore primarily an end in himself; and though we may make his social efficiency an index to his moral character, it is perhaps a deeper view to regard even his duties to others as ultimately elements in his duty to himself—in Kantian phrase, to the humanity inhabiting his person. No doubt, the two views really emphasise opposite sides of the same truth, but the evolutionary and social treatment of ethics seems to me to be in some danger of obscuring the intensely inward and personal character of morality. Some of these dangers are, I think, reflected in Mr. Alexander's account of obligation or duty, which immediately follows. Obligation is defined as "that relation in which the single part of the order stands to the whole order, when it is confronted by the whole: whether we are considering the relations of a man's act to the whole of his character, or of a single individual to the institutions of society. . . . The whole has *authority* against the parts, and every particular duty is said to have authority just as it is backed by the whole mass of duties." Obligation, he repeats, is a relation which obtains between the parts of the moral ideal itself; and he re-

pudiates the view of duty as either (1) antagonistic to sense or (2) an action which is to be performed by an agent who is not yet what he ought to be. If sense be taken as equivalent to inclination (and it is so taken by Mr. Alexander), the two positions come to much the same thing. Mr. Alexander's argument against them is a round denial that the functions required by morality are antagonistic to inclination; they accord, he says, with "the inclination of the good man". "To the good man the law is an easy burden. . . . Morality is a spontaneous outcome of the moral nature." This is perfectly true, but we must not forget that "the good man" in this sense is non-existent; he is, as Kant would say, an archetype. Mr. Alexander's use of the term is ambiguous, for he frequently uses it as equivalent to what he calls (p. 195) "the average good man," and he talks of comparing "good men" with one another. He is led, therefore, to make assertions of the actual morality of the average good man which are only true of the ideal morality of the ideal good man. Thus we are told that the average good man does not do heroic acts, though he is none the less virtuous for that, not being called upon to do them. "In like manner his will is of moderate strength, *though strong enough to keep him whole*; and if he were placed in the position of temptation, he might therefore yield." The words which I have italicised and many similar passages seem to imply that though in other circumstances the average good man might be found wanting, yet, occupying the niche in society which he does, he fully and spontaneously meets the demands of duty upon him. Now, if true at all, this can be true only if we restrict morality to the comparatively external routine of 'my station and its duties'. But to do so is to substitute for the infinite content of personal duty a minimum of respectable observance. The aim of morality is no doubt the formation of moral habits or habitudes; and in proportion as these are formed the conflict between duty and inclination becomes less acute, and we come to do certain kinds of good actions spontaneously. But such imperfect approximation at a few points can never justify us in disavowing morality from the "negative" aspect of duty or obligation. Mr. Alexander himself admits this towards the end of his volume (p. 402) in criticising Mr. Spencer's position in the *Data of Ethics*; but still he cannot conceal his rooted dislike to the principle, for he immediately goes on to say that duty is not the highest moral principle because it conceals the spontaneity of morality, and to look forward (in a way which I cannot well distinguish from Mr. Spencer's) to "such modification as will replace it by a higher conception". And he again repudiates "the idea of antagonism to inclination" as not belonging of right to the idea of morality (p. 404). I would urge in reply that this "negativity" is of the essence of duty, and that obligation or submission to law is nevertheless the highest conception of ethics, not to say that on which the whole science depends. The

conception of spontaneity carries us out of the region of ethics altogether. Kant's position seems to me in this respect unimpeachable: "The moral law is for the will of a perfect being a law of holiness, but for the will of every finite intelligence a law of duty, of ethical constraint; nor is it congruous with our station in the ranks of intelligences, as men, when we presume to propose ourselves as volunteers, and set ourselves loftily above the idea of Duty; and when, as if we were independent of the law, we propose to do that out of our own good pleasure which we need no commandment to enjoin. We stand under a discipline of reason, and in all our maxims must never forget our subjection to its authority." As regards the conflict of inclination with duty, I would further quote against Mr. Alexander his own excellent account of the element of self-sacrifice in all good conduct (pp. 176-81).

Chap. v. contains a criticism of the main contemporary theories of the ethical End. Mr. Alexander objects to Green's principle of self-realisation on the ground that every exercise of power realises the self, and that what self is to be realised is not given in the conception, but has to be decided "by an appeal to that criterion of right and wrong which makes morality the supreme principle of life". The position that pleasure is the end is criticised at greater length, and here he points out very truly that the reason why a polemic like Green's is so unconvincing to the utilitarian is that Green's argument deals not with the pleasure and pain which are real facts in our mental life, but with the abstractions of a false psychology; whereas "utilitarian writers, though they speak of pleasures in the language of psychology, treat them as the familiar facts we know. Hence if we are to understand the reasoning, we must drop the psychological theory and think of the concrete facts the writers decide." If we do this, we find that the real reason why the greatest sum of pleasures is not adequate as the ultimate test of conduct, is that it neglects the cardinal fact that pleasures differ in kind, and cannot therefore be compared merely in respect of intensity. Pleasure, even in its strict sense of pleasantness, Mr. Alexander maintains, is subject to differences not only of degree but of kind. Pleasure and pain express the tones of sensations, but this simple antithesis is a very inadequate account of these varying tones. The pleasure of thinking is of a different quality from the pleasure of eating; or, without suggesting any distinction as higher and lower, there are qualitative distinctions of pleasure in drinking different wines. This element of quality in pleasure Mr. Alexander proposes to call the "preferability" of a pleasure, without, however, introducing the ethical idea that any pleasure is higher than others and *ought* to be preferred. This characteristic of pleasures, he argues, effectually disqualifies "the greatest sum of pleasures" as the test of conduct; for in making the calculation the qualities of the pleasures must be taken into

account, and these depend on the kinds of activities they accompany. In order to arrive at the knowledge of the greatest sum, we should therefore require to know the characters of the persons in question. The maximum of pleasure is thus a formula by which we can always express the end—it is a constant accompaniment of the end—but in itself it throws no light upon the constituents of the end. Although “an integral part of the standard of morality, it is not an independent standard”. Passing finally to the principle of social vitality, Mr. Alexander argues that, so far as vitality means simply continuance of existence, it is an abstraction, since all existence is determined—the existence of some type. Moreover, although we know by its survival that the moral society is the fittest (just as in the parallel case of an existing species), its survival is not the cause of its fitness, but is itself caused by the qualities which make the society moral. If, on the other hand, vitality means health, then health expresses metaphorically “that very fact of equilibrium which constitutes good conduct good”. In this way the conclusion is reached that the idea of equilibrium is fundamental and embraces all the other criteria as partial views.

It will be admitted, I think, by all who read his book that Mr. Alexander puts his criterion to excellent use, but those whom he here criticises might perhaps, if they had the opportunity, retort some of his arguments upon himself. A follower of Green might reply that the idea of equilibrium does not in itself, any more than the idea of self-realisation, instruct us as to the kind of actions which will realise the equilibrium. We can know this only by the inner test of a feeling of harmony which is exactly equivalent to that feeling of lasting satisfaction by which we attain in the process of experience to a knowledge of what is the true or higher self. A supporter of social vitality or social health might also ask whether the idea of equilibrium is after all any less metaphorical than his own principle. Two other considerations suggest themselves. While serviceable as a criterion, the idea of equilibrium is not one which could be appropriately proposed as an End of action; we are forced in that case to fall back upon the nature of the organism whose powers are to be equilibrated—in other words, upon the idea of the human self and a community of such selves. The principle of self-realisation, vague as it may be and requiring at every step to be instructed by experience, has at least the merit of keeping the End in view and of implying the immanence of this idea in the development from the beginning. Mr. Alexander, on the other hand, occupied with the process and its mechanism, seems at times to hand over the development altogether to the operation of chance-variations persisting by might rather than right. Now might is certainly right, if we assume the immanent rationality of the development to start with, but to say *sans phrase* that “the good is created by its predominance” (p. 315) is already to venture on slippery ground.

So, again, Mr. Alexander says: "If there were only one society, whatever forward movement it made must be considered progress, for there would be no other standard of judgment". Applied not to one society but to humanity, this gives us the position: "*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*". History is itself the bar at which institutions are to be judged. . . . To deny this is to find some other standard of advance than in the actual movement which has taken place, to put an *a priori* conception of development in the place of the facts." Mr. Alexander's meaning here is perfectly sound; it is, in its essence, familiar to us from Hegel and others. But such statements cannot be made without qualification. They were qualified in Hegel by his conception, everywhere urged, of the rationality of the whole world-process. We need not bring any specific conception of development with us to the facts, but this "*a priori* conception" at least we must bring, that there is a development towards a presupposed end, and not a mere outgrowth of sporadic varieties in incalculable directions. The second consideration that occurs to me is as to the sufficiency of equilibrium as a properly ethical conception. Might equilibrium not be attained by a purely selfish but perfectly clear-sighted man? All his actions would form part of a system or organism, but there would be no morality in the case, for the end would be base. Mr. Alexander himself allows (p. 137) that the "perfectly bad" man would really be in equilibrium, only adding that "the perfectly bad man is an impossibility". But as the perfectly good man is also a theoretical case, this hardly repairs the breach which such an admission makes in the theory. If an individual may, a society may also be conceived working smoothly on principles of enlightened selfishness, and though in both an equilibrium would be realised, yet the conduct would be entirely void of ethical content. In short, if equilibrium may be attained indifferently by perfectly good and perfectly bad conduct, it does not appear as if the notion of equilibrium afforded by itself an adequate explanation of morality. It is the surrender of himself to a law which, in spite of divergent inclinations, he recognises as the true law of his humanity that constitutes the basal fact or *conditio sine qua non* of morality. The realisation of this condition is followed by a feeling of harmony or peace which may be described as an equilibrium for the time being of the whole nature; but, severed from this condition, the latter does not supply an independent criterion, and, as I tried to show before, it is certainly not an End which we can propose to ourselves.

I have omitted much that is interesting and well-put in the Second Book; and in the Third Book, dealing with the facts of moral growth and progress, I can simply indicate in a sentence or two the course of the argument. At the outset the position is laid down that continuous variation or "a perpetual impermanence" is an essential characteristic of morality. In this con-

nexion the author criticises Mr. Spencer's Absolute Ethics, pointing out that in speaking of morality as an adaptation of man to his social environment we must not take the environment as something fixed and permanent, to which therefore an ultimately perfect adaptation is conceivable. Adaptation is a joint action of the individual and his environment. What the environment is depends upon the qualities of the individual. "The environment of the amoeba consists of the things which can come in its way to be used as food or rejected; everything else would be to it, in Kantian phrase, as good as nothing. With the enlargement of the animal's powers the environment changes, sometimes it may be in the actual range of its extent, sometimes in the wealth of its properties." Hence, while all adaptation, so far as it exists, is perfect adaptation, there can be no finality, no ultimate "best". The moral ideal essentially involves advance, because the act of adjustment implied in good conduct alters the sentiments of the agent and creates new needs which demand a new satisfaction. The mere doing of good actions does not simply intensify our tendency to do them, but may convince us of the necessity of doing new ones which were hidden from us before. The adjustment leads to a maladjustment because the qualities of the persons who are to enter into the moral relation are altered. The good becomes bad in virtue of performance. The second chapter of this Book discusses the origin of moral distinctions: not, however, how morality as such comes into being, but how any particular stage of morality—any particular moral ideal—arises. Mr. Alexander answers by reference to the development of species through the struggle of varieties. The good ideal is "created by a struggle of ideals in which it has predominated. Evil is simply that which has been rejected and defeated in the struggle with the good." It is in this connexion that some of those questionable statements occur to which I have already referred. The chapter which follows contains an able discussion of Punishment, Responsibility, Free Will and Education, but not in any special way dependent on the author's general conception. When he asks at the close of the volume whether we are in a position to formulate any law of moral progress, he suggests that it may be found in a law of Comprehension or growing comprehensiveness such as Green so well traced in his comparison of Greek and Christian virtues. In concluding a notice which, though long, is not too long for the importance of the work, I would only add that though I have been obliged to dissent from Mr. Alexander on important points, his book is one which every student of modern ethics will find his account in reading.

ANDREW SETH.

The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. By JOHN VENN, Sc.D., F.R.S., Fellow and Lecturer in the Moral Sciences, Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1889. Pp. xx., 594.

Mr. Venn has here published a selection from the lectures which for some years past he has been accustomed to deliver at Cambridge. The work is mainly a commentary on Mill, partly critical, partly reconstructive and supplementary, and it treats principally of the Inductive department of Logic. The reader is not to expect a complete systematic treatise; he is supposed to be already equipped with a knowledge of the ordinary text-books. In particular he will find no account of the processes of Immediate Inference and Syllogism, not even such scanty information as Mill gives about these subjects; though it is true that here and there some peculiar freshness of idea has tempted the author, as in the chapters on Terms and Propositions (especially Hypo-theticals), to introduce discussions that a purely Inductive treatise might have dispensed with. The whole is written in a style of as great lucidity and animation as the subject admits of; and an excellent assortment of examples serves to sustain the interest and to diffuse that miscellaneous information which is really no unimportant use of these modern works on Logic.

The extraordinary variety of general conception and exposition that Logic has proved to be susceptible of is now pretty well known. The non-logical may scoff at this as a sign of chaotic uncertainty, but logicians will rejoice at it (with due sobriety) as a proof of vitality and healthy growth. Jevons's work included so much more than we are accustomed to call Logic, that he perhaps did well not to call it by that name; though for my own part I am always too thankful for a good book to be punctilious about its title. However, amongst the familiar distinctions that have been drawn with regard to the treatment of Logic that between the pure or formal department on the one hand, and on the other the department in which formal principles are applied either to persuasion, as in Rhetoric, or to scientific investigation, seems to be really valuable. Until recently, indeed, the department of Applied or Modified Logic, as it was called, had been so little developed that it was perhaps best treated (as by Hamilton) as little else than an appendix to the science, and it needed no more than an epithet to distinguish it from the main body of the subject. Now, however, the application of Logical principles to scientific procedure has become a study so much more interesting and extensive than the pure science (even including formal Induction) that many good uses would be served by giving it a separate name, and for this purpose the term 'Methodology' lies very conveniently at hand.

'Methodology' would for several reasons have been a better title for Mr. Venn's work than that which he has chosen to give it. Nor is the title it bears at all favourably recommended by the

reason he offers for it. "By the introduction of the term Empirical into the title," he says, "I wish to emphasise my belief that no ultimate objective certainty, such as Mill, for instance, seemed to attribute to the results of Induction, is attainable by any exercise of the human reason" (Preface). Whether Mill attributed any such certainty to the results of Induction might be disputed. But at any rate "Empirical," as used in philosophy, does not directly connote *uncertainty*; it is only connected with uncertainty by the argumentation (perhaps erroneous) of those who oppose Empiricism. But Mr. Venn is not one of them: he nowhere shows the slightest leaning to them; and, besides, he says that certainty is not attainable "by any exercise of human reason". Why, then, is an epithet intended to imply uncertainty peculiarly appropriate to Inductive Logic? Is there any advantage, speculative or practical, in stigmatising the results of induction as specially uncertain? That they are uncertain we know, for we are always trying to correct them, but only by better inductions. Another reason, and a much more important one, for calling this work 'Methodology' may be found in the scope of its discussions. If once we leave pure Logic and enter upon the general scientific methods of investigating Nature, there is no good ground for confining our treatise to strictly logical or merely qualitative methods. And therefore it is quite consistent with Mr. Venn's object to introduce chapters on physical and psychophysical Standards and Units and on the data of Geometry, including such particulars as the interpretation of the hyperbola, the Archimedean spiral, and the principles of the Differential Calculus. Very good, though this is not Logic. But what can be more ungrateful than to find fault with an author for being better than the promise of his title page, and instructive beyond our expectations?

The first striking characteristic of the plan of Mr. Venn's book is the attempt with which it opens to assign fully the postulates of Logic. This has indeed been done to some extent by Prof. Bain in his well-known work; but Mr. Venn makes a more systematic effort to state the first principles of the science and the general condition of things that it takes for granted. He begins by showing how Logic presupposes the objective uniformity of the phenomenal world, its distinctness from the observer, its sameness for all observers, and its freedom from disturbance by the fact of logical treatment. Much of the very interesting discussion under these heads is indeed not peculiar to the needs of Logic, but belongs to the prolegomena of all science; and the same may be said of a good many disquisitions elsewhere in the course of the work; but to introduce them into logical treatises seems to be inevitable in the present condition of English philosophy. So little has been done by our representative thinkers to differentiate and construct Metaphysics and First Philosophy in harmony with their views

of the nature of knowledge, that we may be thankful for any essay that assists us to this end; and if such discussion cannot be had separately, it has more cohesion with Logic and Methodology than with any other department of thought.

A purely logical question is reached when Mr. Venn begins to discuss the character of Logic as objective or subjective or both. He decides that it is both, and according to his conception of the science he is no doubt entirely right. Methodology cannot be entirely objective (whether it may be wholly subjective we need not inquire). As Mr. Venn observes, "any attempt to confine ourselves to a bare statement or analysis of the facts of nature must be insufficient when what we are concerned with is *inference* about those facts; for inference turns almost entirely upon the distinction between what is known and what is unknown, and this distinction cannot be sought in the facts but in our appreciation of them" (p. 23). Pure Logic, however, it seems to me, may be regarded as having nothing directly to do with inference, but merely as stating the general forms of the relation and correlation of phenomena, with which all true inferences, the connexion of evidence and conclusion, must agree, and which Methodology shows us how to apply in order to test inferences. If so, this is a particular reason for carefully distinguishing Methodology from pure Logic and for treating the latter first.¹

Attention should be given to the suggestion at pp. 28, 37, of different standards of truth for different orders of assertion. The chapter concludes with a postulate of Logic in relation to Language, that "we must assume that our words have the same determinate meaning in the minds of all who use them" (p. 37). Upon which Mr. Venn observes that "it is absolutely necessary for scientific accuracy, and yet in practice so obviously untrue"; and this certainly raises a difficulty. It seems to me that we have here a postulate not belonging to Methodology, but to that ideal of scientific knowledge at which Methodology aims, and which the author treats of in ch. xxiv. Definition is surely a part of Methodology; but, coming to treat of Definition in ch. xi., Mr. Venn finds himself met by the doubt whether it can be of any use, since by the postulate a complete consent exists as to the meaning of all words! To avoid this difficulty he draws the distinction between Formal and Applied Logic: it is only, he says, in Formal Logic that definitions are obviously uncalled for and

¹ In a note to p. 22 Mr. Venn suggests that Mr. Spencer's well-known view does not much differ from his own, because that philosopher recognises the Science of Reasoning as subjective. But the term "Science of Reasoning," as used in *Principles of Psychology* (vol. ii., pp. 87-100), refers, I venture to say, neither to Methodology nor to Logic, but to a department of Psychology; and Mr. Spencer's difference from Mr. Venn upon this point is as clear as thought can make it.

useless. But if so, why lay the above postulate at the foundation of a work that is almost confined to Applied Logic? And what excuse can there be for urging this postulate (admitted to be obviously untrue) as a reason why a contradiction in terms is "not likely to occur except through lapse of attention or misapprehension of some kind"? (p. 297). Certainly without "misapprehension of some kind" a contradiction in terms can hardly occur; but how are we helped to avoid such misapprehension by assuming what is obviously untrue? Several other passages might be produced in which this postulate plays a very strange part.

Passing to narrower and more special assumptions, Mr. Venn takes up in ch. ii. the Law of Causation; and, tracing its history, he observes, after a brief notice of the Aristotelian doctrine, that in the modern conception of the law three stages of development may be discovered. There is first the popular conception, which does not distinguish between coexistence and succession, but is content with discovering any apparent connexion of things that enables one to be inferred from another. When dealing with sequences this primitive sort of thought singles out one antecedent and one consequent as signs of each other (pp. 52, 53). At the second stage the logician comes and endeavours to improve upon this popular view so as to make it suit his purpose. It might perhaps be questioned whether, until the influence of philosophical reflection has been felt, the popular mind is capable of any such conception as a general law of causation (or of connexion in general); but this may be waived. The logician's device for improving the conception is, says Mr. Venn, to insist (1) upon rejecting uniformities of coexistence; (2) upon enumerating *all* the elements of the antecedent, or all that can be considered relevant; and (3) upon the *closeness* of the sequence of cause and effect. Thus modified, the law takes the form it has in Mill. But it is still open to objections, for, in fact, in applying the law all antecedents are not enumerated, far from it; and by failing to enumerate the consequences as fully as the conditions, the unsatisfactory doctrine of a Plurality of Causes is admitted. This, says Mr. Venn, shows the essentially practical character of the conception of causation at the second stage of its development. At the final stage, "speculative interest gets the upper hand," and leads us to be thorough in introducing all the antecedents and all the consequents in any case of causation. We thus get rid of the Plurality of Causes; but on the other hand the law becomes entirely useless, since all the antecedents never recur, and if they did recur it would be impossible for the human mind to estimate their number and extent. Even if we yield to these considerations so far as to require the enumeration only of those antecedents that lie at hand, estimating them, however, with scientific accuracy, it will be necessary to regard the effect as strictly immediate, that is, no more than an initial tendency. So

that the attempt to attain to speculative consistency leads to a result that is practically of no value.

This discussion seems to me to illustrate again very happily the desirability of distinguishing Pure Logic from Methodology. In Pure Logic practical interest is at a minimum, and therefore a strict statement of the law of causation will present it with no difficulty but that of finding actual examples to aid the exposition. Then Methodology will find its true occupation in discussing the modifications of strict logical principle that may be necessary in the investigation of various departments of nature or of human life: in what circumstances it may be better to insist upon a less or more complete enumeration of antecedents or of consequents; when to be content with a merely hypothetical selection of causes as a basis for deduction and verification; when to recognise or reject a plurality of causes. This, indeed, is a practical inquiry, but not in any sense of 'practical' that is opposed to speculative; it is, on the contrary, essential to all speculation outside the abstract sciences; and it is surely only in this sense that it can be suggested that "speculative interest" has not "the upper hand" in Mill's *Logic*.

But, of course, it is the fate of lectures on such a subject as this to become disproportionately critical: criticism is their function. And this must explain why Mr. Venn seems to have a sort of quarrel with the Law of Causation, treating it to some dyslogistic phrases as belonging to "popular science," or "first-class popular thought": meaning apparently that the law is only qualitatively determined. But granting that quantitative determination belongs to the ideal of science, to deny the name of science to everything else, or to qualify it as "popular" (as if for consumption at the Polytechnic), is an idol of the mathematician's den. Besides, if a quantitative law is demanded, why not discuss along with Mill's law the interpretation of Causation as Conservation of Energy, which has been given by Prof. Bain, and accepted in his last corrected edition by Mill himself? The omission to do so is the more remarkable since in ch. iv. Mr. Venn has pointed out the ways in which Conservation supplements and extends Causation. A pedantic logician might, indeed, have objected to any appeal to quantitative considerations; but in a work on Methodology, like the one before us, that is far from avoiding mathematical topics, its constructive value would have been greatly increased by treating of Causation in its fullest meaning. This would have led to considerable modifications of ch. xvii. on the Inductive Methods; and it would have been a task to which Mr. Venn's powers and training are wonderfully adapted. Even the criticism of Causation must then have become more valuable, as directed against the doctrine in its least vulnerable shape. But his desire to take the Law of Causation down a peg or two appears still more surprisingly in the next chapter.

Ch. iii. treats of Coexistences, and endeavours to present a "rival" law over which the law of Causation can claim no "such decided superiority" as it is too commonly assumed to have. Mr. Venn begins with a quotation from Mill (bk. iii., ch. 22, § 4), which, as he justly says, amounts to alleging "a definite failure on the part of Nature" to supply a general law of Coexistence from which we might make methodical inductions just as we do from the law of Causation. But to find the grounds of Mill's complaint we must refer back to the discussion of Causation (ch. 5, § 9), where we read: "Since everything that occurs is determined by laws of causation and collocations of the original causes, it follows that the coexistences that are observable amongst effects cannot be themselves the subject of any similar set of laws distinct from laws of causation". Hence "the coexistences of phenomena can in no case be universal, unless the coexistences of the primeval causes to which the effects are ultimately traceable can be reduced to an universal law; but we have seen that they cannot". The only independent coexistences invariable enough to be called laws are those that obtain "between different properties of the same natural agent". Now, since Mr. Venn, however much he may criticise statements of the law of Causation, does not, I believe, dispute the fact of it, he would have done well to begin his investigation of Coexistences by trying to refute the above argument. He would then probably have saved himself a good deal of pure speculation. The gist of his endeavour is to establish a parallelism between the stages in the development of the law of Causation described above, and corresponding ways, which he suggests, of regarding relations of Coexistence. The first stage is common to the two laws, since the primitive mind, as long as it can find some ground of inference, does not distinguish between connexions of succession and those of coexistence. Then, just as Hume, Herschel and Mill refined upon the popular view of Cause, so there may be suggested a second stage in the development of a law of Coexistence. The chief difficulty, according to Mr. Venn, is that "when the *time* variable is omitted, as in coexistences, it becomes mere tautology to talk of introducing all the elements" (p. 76). We may say: A (all antecedents) has been followed by *x*, therefore it will be again; but if we say: A (all coexistents) includes *x*, therefore it will again—this is mere repetition.¹ The formula of the second stage must therefore be framed thus: "If all the coexistent elements, *except one—viz.*, the one which occupies the place corresponding to that of effect—be repeated, then this one also will necessarily be secured" (p. 77).

The degree of trust due to this formula in Mr. Venn's own judgment is not easy to determine; for at p. 80 he says it is "of

¹ In the seventh line from the foot of p. 76 there seems to be a misprint: the first *x* should, I presume, be A.

much about the same cogency and value" as the corresponding stage of the Law of Causation; whereas at p. 77 we read that "when over-refined these Laws of Coexistence seem of distinctly less value than those of Sequence when similarly reformed". It is a serious objection, he says, that to attempt to omit one fact or attribute from a total coexistence raises the difficulty of determining its individuality and circumscription amidst the tangle of its infibulations with the rest. Still, in a popular way, this may be evaded, as in the following instances: in a pear the qualities will always be much the same; a man standing before a wicket with a bat in his hand implies a bowler, though we may not be able to see him; and a breakfast-cup of coffee most likely contains some milk and sugar (p. 78). But clearly none of these instances exhibits a coexistence independent of causation: the pear is a 'natural kind' (of which more presently); the batsman implies a bowler only if we assume that he acts upon ordinary motives and is not a lunatic; the adulteration of coffee with milk and sugar is an effect of the prevalent taste, though some take it black with cognac, and others omit the sugar. Whatever the certainty of these laws, therefore, not one of them is an example of that uniformity of pure coexistence which Mill complained of Nature for not having provided.

In the third and final stage to which the Law of Coexistence may be carried by insisting upon the most rigid scientific interpretation of it, the above-mentioned difficulty of individualising attributes becomes so great, that it is necessary to abandon the attempt to treat of coexistent attributes, and to fall back upon the molecular and mechanical constitution of any body or system (p. 79). Then, however, we arrive at coexistences that determine one another with as much precision as cause and effect. Thus, action and reaction being equal and opposite, if in a pile of bricks we know the pressures experienced by all *except one*, we also know the pressure upon that one; and similarly with regard to gravitation. But as to this, it may be suggested, that whilst the statement of the law of action and reaction is in terms of Coexistence, the interest of it in Methodology is connected with Causation, and refers to such points as these: that to state only the action of any cause is to give only half the effect; and that to alter the number or positions of any bodies in a mechanical system is to change their mutual pressures in such and such ways. And as to the molecular constitution of bodies, should biologists or chemists succeed in discovering it with the utmost precision, they will only be the more bent upon discovering the causes to which such constitution may be traced. In other words, the scientific mind will never be satisfied with coexistences (not merely geometrical) that seem to be independent of causation; though the limitations of human reason may compel us to put up with such things. On the whole, it seems that no formula of Coexistence has the slightest chance of rivalling the law of Causation, especi-

ally when we remember that, by Mr. Venn's own showing in ch. iv., the law of Causation is immensely reinforced by the law of the Conservation of Energy. By what alliance will he redress the balance in favour of Coexistence?

Passing on to enumerate the chief classes of laws of Coexistence, Mr. Venn mentions (1) Natural Substances; (2) Natural Kinds; (3) what may be called Social Groupings, as in the arrangement of a law court or of the players at cricket; (4) Geometrical Properties. The causation of substances, at least of elements, is still, no doubt, obscure enough. As to natural kinds, we now have a general theory of their causation. Mr. Venn, indeed, says that Mill regarded them as uncaused; and in his early editions (of which I have no copy at hand) he may have done so; he was, perhaps, a little slow in assimilating the doctrine of evolution: but in the last corrected editions he says of organised beings that "there is reason to believe that none of their properties are ultimate, but all of them derivative, and produced by causation" (bk. iii., ch. 22, § 6).¹ As to social groups, they are clearly causal. In geometrical properties, indeed, we have abundant derivative laws of coexistence obtained by Deduction; and being properties of pure space (or of the spatial relations of matter), they can have nothing to do with Causation, which is concerned only with matter and motion in the concrete; but where there is no connature there is no rivalry.

The fourth chapter deals with the Uniformity of Nature, a phrase which, as the author points out, covers a good deal besides Laws of Causation and Coexistence. He first particularises Rhythmic Series, such as day and night and the seasons; and he considers these, though ostensibly sequent, to be best classed with coexistence (p. 101): so eagerly would he rob Causation to pay Coexistence. And yet his reason for it is that these rhythms have not "the causal characteristic of rigid regularity. But surely they are rightly treated by Mill as the progressive effects

¹ There are other passages in which Mr. Venn has the same remark upon Mill's doctrine of Natural Kinds. Indeed, his references to that author are, in several instances, inaccurate. At p. 279 he says, "the names of simple sensations, which, strictly speaking, possess denotation only, may yet, according to Mill, yield a kind of definition": whereas Mill expressly says that "the only names that are unsusceptible of definition" are those of the simple feelings, though the attributes founded on them and the things in which they inhere may be defined (i., 8, 2). At p. 470, he attributes to Mill the view that geometrical surfaces and lines are "a sort of entities that can exist apart"; whereas Mill says (ii., 5, 1), "nothing remains but to consider geometry as conversant with such lines, angles and figures as really exist; and the definitions, as they are called, must be regarded as some of our first and obvious generalisations concerning those natural objects". At p. 555 he says that Mill used the expression "fabled heaven" on his wife's tombstone; whereas the true phrase is "the hoped-for heaven," and the context would not bear "fabled" (cp. Prof. Bain's *J. S. Mill*, p. 167, note).

of more or less permanent causes; their whole methodological interest is causal; their explanation as derivative laws is obtained by appealing to causation. As Mr. Venn says, however, such cycles are neither necessary (for the causes might alter) nor ultimate; so that they seem not to deserve mention amongst the postulates of Logic as a special class of Uniformities. He next brings forward the Conservation of Energy, and shows how it supplements the ordinary law of Causation by more readily interpreting continuous changes; by assimilating the different forms that causes may take, electrical, chemical, &c.; and by providing for quantitative determination. Here the only criticism needed is that, as this law is not a Uniformity distinct from Causation, it would have been better treated of under that head. Mr. Venn then mentions the Statistical Uniformities which he has more fully discussed in his admirable work on Chance. And, finally, he advances a principle of Continuity to cover a miscellany of cases in which things remain without sensible change of position or nature for some considerable time; his example is a felled tree which the woodman expects to find next morning much as he left it. This expectation, he says, cannot "without extreme violence" be grounded on Causation; for causation, according to Mill, only applies to changes, and the phenomenon in question is the absence of appreciable change. But if I rightly understand Mill's meaning here, it is, that causation only applies to changes as distinguished from the absolute *origins* of primeval causes, not as distinguished from the duration of things subject to change. The law that every change has a cause implies what Prof. Bain would call the "material obverse," that where there is no change (in changeable matter) there has been no cause for it. How long a felled tree will lie without appreciable change depends upon the quality of its wood, the climate, and other causes of change; and it is upon his knowledge of these causes and the rate at which they operate that the woodman's expectations rest. If on his way home he should hear that an army of white ants was marching that way, he would be glad to sell the log pretty cheaply for ready money.

The above list of Uniformities might have been extended by adding the principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, the axioms of Mathematics, Mill's axiom of the Syllogism, the Persistence of Matter, and the commensurability of Times and Spaces: all which are Uniformities of Nature.

I see with dismay how long this review is growing, how little progress has been made with the volume in hand, and what an erroneous impression on the whole the reader must have of the impression the volume makes upon me. In vain have some critics warned the rest of us that fault-finding is the baser part of our trade: we feel an irresistible impulse that way, like those swine of the Gadarenes. In reality every chapter of the book is both entertaining and highly instructive; but it is impossible

to show this upon a scale corresponding with the foregoing objections without risking an action under the law of copyright. Some idea, however, of the remaining contents may be briefly given. After a chapter on the Subjective Foundations of Induction, Mr. Venn takes up Language, Terms and Propositions. The whole treatment of these subjects is remarkably fresh and suggestive. The chief apparent omission is some discussion of Mill's division of Propositions according to Equality, Coexistence, Sequence, &c. We next come to Definition and Division; and chapter xiii., on Classification, seems to me the best in the book. Chapter xiv. is on the process of Induction. Chapter xv., on the relation of the Syllogism to Induction, contains some very disputable matter. Then, after a luminous discussion of Hypotheses, we are brought to the Inductive Methods. Here there are excellent remarks on the shortcomings of the usual device for symbolically representing the phenomena investigated with their circumstances by means of letters, and important criticisms upon Mill's 'Joint Method,' with other points of interest. We next find chapters on Standards and Units physical and psychical, on Geometrical Data, and on Explanation. The work concludes with chapters, somewhat in the nature of appendices, on a Universal Language, on the extension of our powers of Observation, on the Ideal of Science, and on Speculation and Action. This last chapter treats chiefly of some of the ways in which a scientific investigator, especially when dealing with the laws of human society, may by his own conduct so modify the facts as to frustrate his conclusions. Toward the close of it the author suggests a general *Practic*, or theory of the *form* of Art, corresponding to Mill's Teleology, or system of the ends of Art.

CARVETH READ.

Knowing and Being. By JOHN VEITCH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1889. Pp. viii., 323.

This book, consisting of lectures given by the author to his advanced students last winter, is a criticism, or rather an attack upon what, "for lack of a better word," Prof. Veitch (like several other people) calls the "Neo-Kantian" way of looking at things (p. 11); and it is an attack of the most vigorous and vehement kind. If one did not know the writer's point of view, it might be difficult to understand this vehemence. But Prof. Veitch sees all things in Hamilton, and naturally feels himself uncomfortable amid a generation that knows not his master. He is evidently aggrieved that T. H. Green did not deal with the "Natural Realists" but only with the Sensationalists (cp. pp. 101 ff.). But Green was speaking to a generation that had been influenced by Mill. Prof. Veitch cannot expect to find his own position criticised

in Green; it has been criticised already in Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*—nay, long before that, in Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Yet, perhaps, a "Neo-Kantian" should welcome this protest of Prof. Veitch's as a clear indication of the complete difference between the position of Green and that of the "Intuitionists". The "Neo-Kantian" theory of knowledge and of morals has suffered great misunderstanding from being confused with the doctrines of the Intuitionist school, which can safely be left to the Sensationalist to deal with. The Neo-Kantian can hardly be expected to do over again the work of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. It becomes tiresome to kill the dead too often.

Prof. Veitch obviously cannot find any ground common to himself and the thinkers he is criticising. And I—the reader must excuse my speaking in the first person, because I do not know how far I am entitled to speak in the name of anyone else—I really cannot find any common ground with a Professor of Logic, who will not allow the use of the term *Prius* in any but the temporal sense. "No thought," we are told, "can be said to be prior to its object—these are contemporaneous" (p. 210). Are the distinctions laid down by Aristotle in the *Categories* (c. 12) not to be accepted any longer? They at least should have the merit, in Prof. Veitch's eyes, of being very old-fashioned: they are not—what he scorns so much—"new and advanced" conceptions (p. 239). All that I could say by way of argument against the main contentions of this volume, I have already said in a review of Prof. Seth's *Hegelianism and Personality* in *MIND* No. 50. I could only now repeat more strongly what was there urged; and I cannot find in Prof. Veitch's book the interest that Prof. Seth's awakened, because the former has clearly never for a moment allowed himself to occupy the position he is attacking. Referring to a phrase of mine about our having no resource but hypothesis regarding the relation of the timeless self to the individuals of time, Prof. Veitch exclaims (p. 247): "Yet this is a philosophy which scorns humbler systems, and professes to lay bare the universe!" I can assure Prof. Veitch that, though wishing to know all that can be known about the universe, I am much more diffident about what I know and can know than he is. *E.g.*, Prof. Veitch says: "I am conscious of a resisting force" (p. 199). Now, I may be conscious of being resisted; but I could not, in any careful use of language, say that I was conscious of a resisting force. If I said that, and attached any definite meaning to the very ambiguous term "force," I should be, in a rather careless expression, giving a hypothetical explanation of the feeling of which I am at the moment conscious. I (I continue to speak only for myself, or for those who may happen to be like me) am unable to consider myself conscious of things that are not in my consciousness. I do not claim to know things in themselves, nor anything about them. I only know the states of my consciousness, in Berkeley's phrase, my "ideas". Any-

thing beyond that is to me a matter of inference and conjecture. So that my opinion differs from Prof. Veitch's as to which system is the "humbler"—and, I should add, the more profitable.

Again, with reference to another phrase of mine in the same article (MIND xiii. 261).—'If I knew another individual person through and through, I should be that person,' Prof. Veitch remarks, "We are obviously in imminent danger of losing our individuality, owing to too great intimacy with our neighbour" (p. 248). He need not be alarmed in his own case; for (on p. 119) he assures us: "Nothing can be more foreign to me than another self".—Not even stocks and stones? It is a mysterious dictum; but still stranger remains behind. On p. 317 Prof. Veitch tells us: "I stand in contrast to God, the Supreme Ego, as not possessing the qualities which He possesses, or which I attribute to Him". As Prof. Veitch's consciousness reveals these things to him, the statements cannot be gainsaid; but another person would hardly like to have suggested them. These are matters, however, on which it is best not to dogmatise.

There is, indeed, *one* passage in which Prof. Veitch seems to promise us some common ground. He does attempt what, so far as I could find, Prof. Seth never did, a complete definition of Reality. (1.) On p. 113 it is said: "In its primary application the *real* means something apprehended as existing, in opposition to that which is not so apprehended, or in opposition to the absence of any appearance whatever". Thus the *primary* meaning of the *real* to Prof. Veitch is the *apparent* (cp. pp. 85, 86). The illusions of *delirium tremens* are terribly real—to the patient; but not to him if he recovers and becomes a sober man, nor, let us hope, to most other people. This does not seem a very "common sense" use of "Reality"; yet Prof. Veitch makes it "primary". (2) *Real* "means also what is supposed to be, whether it is an actual object of consciousness or not" (p. 115). Now, this certainly is what people generally mean by reality, and it is exactly what Green meant by "a permanent system of relations" and similar phrases. Even Prof. Veitch defines *this* reality in terms of our thinking, "What is *supposed* to be"; yet immediately afterwards he goes on to talk of this reality as if it were the "thing-in-itself". "It is reality outside of our consciousness" . . . "the real as having an existence in its own nature somehow for itself" (p. 116). But then he adds: "In the widest sense of the term, *real* embraces both forms of existence [the first and this second sense of *real*], though the latter, as not actually apprehended in consciousness, but only conceived by us, may fairly be regarded from our point of view as *ideal*" (p. 117). Could an Idealist ask for more? (3) "Further, there is still a third application of the term *real*. It applies not only to what is—to what is actually realised, but it is used for what may and ought to be." Is not this just the sense in which Hegel identified the Real and the Rational?

After this fairly satisfactory passage it is distressing to find that the writer continues in the same strain as before. His epithets of abuse for Neo-Kantian arguments are singularly rich and varied—"mere verbalisms," "empty verbalisms," "trifling verbalisms," "self-deceptive verbalisms," "tautological verbalisms". I will frankly admit that, "though the words are strong," I am generally very much perplexed in trying to comprehend the meaning of the book. Let the reader understand my perplexity from a few specimens, remembering that they are written by one whose business it is to use words precisely and who demands this of other people.

P. 4. "Although *being* does not appear as the *summum genus* of the categories of Aristotle, still it is there influentially." Is there here some confusion between Porphyry's tree and Aristotle's Categories?

P. 13. "Kant's method of determining those conditions—viz., that known as Transcendental Deduction, or the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories." What is the meaning of the "or"?

P. 253. "Have we not thus a dualism, and a confronting, thwarting, irreconcilable Non-Ego? a Non-Ego in the shape of the lowest form of materialism—merely animal organism?" Is the animal organism a philosophical theory or "ism"? or is materialism, in Prof. Veitch's eyes, a kind of beast? The possibility suggests itself that "materialism" is merely a slip for "matter"; but, then, does Prof. Veitch hold that the animal organism is the lowest form of matter?

Pp. 303, 304. "But, further, there must be straightforward intellectual dealing with this 'thought,' 'organic reason,' or whatever it may be called, in which Man, Nature, God, are both [*sic*] moments, which is the unity of all, and which I am said to get as a presupposition of my self-consciousness,—consciousness of subject and object in experience." The grammar could only be justified at the risk of exposing Prof. Veitch to the charge of "a desolating Pantheism," or something equally terrible.

P. 311. "How then could this grand Monism come to anything but the most isolated Monadism? Certainly nothing else." How is one to parse "nothing"?

Pp. 315, 316. "These are in the mind as the subject of inference—as its special constitutive properties." The two "as's" create a difficulty.

P. 322. "The only philosophy and the only religion worthy of the name is that which, &c." Prof. Veitch may intend to identify philosophy with (his) religion; but if so, why does he trouble himself with philosophy at all?

These examples may serve to excuse the feeling of baffled bewilderment which the book produces. There is often great difficulty in knowing to what opinions exactly the criticisms refer. Prof. Veitch certainly gives quotations from Green; but he

makes us wonder whence have come his ideas about Hegel. Thus on p. 319 it is urged that "the indefinite—the indefinitely increasable—never can be identified with the infinite". This is said as if it went *against* Neo-Kantians and Hegelians! With a feeling of relief the reader lights upon *one* actual quotation from Hegel with a reference attached (p. 308 and *note*); but the reference is to "Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 9, 10 (Eng. ed.)". The passage cited comes, not from a book of which there is no English translation, but from the *Philosophy of History* (Bohn's Series).

Towards the end of the volume we find the reason that compels Prof. Veitch to his uncongenial task of tilting against the new philosophy (as he considers it). He thinks it adverse to the interests of ethics and religion, and that in his own appeal to consciousness he has a securer defence for the beliefs he values most. There are one or two passages by which the worth of this appeal can be estimated, e.g., p. 162: "The nature here referred to turns out to be not *what we ordinarily suppose nature to be*—something in opposition to intelligence, the one member of a dualism in which intelligence is the other member." Again, p. 301. "The facts" of religion are said to be "so eviscerated of meaning" [in a Hegelian Philosophy of Religion] "as to cease to be *what they were formerly regarded*". (The italics are mine.) It is obvious from such passages that Prof. Veitch brings with him a standard of customary uncritical opinion with which to judge philosophical theories. A saying of Hamilton's occurs to the memory: "Consciousness is to the philosopher what the Bible is to the theologian" (*Lectures on Metaphysics*, i. 83). Each can find in it the dogma he wishes to find.

But in the revelation of Consciousness Prof. Veitch seems to find things that we should have thought not at all acceptable to orthodox belief. It may reasonably be objected to the late T. H. Green that he philosophised too much, and not too little, in the interests of theology. But in the matter of orthodoxy neither St. Paul nor St. Augustine nor St. Athanasius would fare well at the hands of Prof. Veitch. Because of a rash phrase used to the Athenians, St. Paul would be accused of "a domineering and desolating Pantheism" (p. 311). When St. Augustine said: "Non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore," he would doubtless be told that he had emptied of meaning the idea of creation (p. 21); and there is a solemn joke about "an unparalleled and unbegotten *twinity*" (p. 22) in reserve for the opponent of Arius.

Of course, these heterodox tendencies would be quite irrelevant, were it not that Prof. Veitch evidently judges philosophical systems according to the degree in which he thinks they serve the interests of his theology. He appears to have an affection for atoms (p. 303), which might indicate a leaning to pure materialism. And in one place (p. 54) he appeals to "the

scientific man". Perhaps if Prof. Veitch would follow scientific men, who also take an interest in philosophy, like Prof. Huxley or the late Prof. Clifford, he would look more favourably on such thinkers as Berkeley and Spinoza, and would write more profitable criticisms on Hegel and Green.

D. G. RITCHIE.

L'Activité Mentale et les Éléments de l'Esprit. Par FR. PAULHAN.
Paris: F. Alcan, 1889. Pp. 588.

This is not, as the title might lead us to suppose, a work on the lines of the later psychological thought, which treats of the active as opposed to the passive side of mind, and shows how in all mental phenomena, even sensations, there is involved a mental activity reacting on, combining and rearranging the passively given elements. M. Paulhan does indeed aim at exhibiting the essential activity of mind, but his conception of this activity (and of mind in general) is very different from that of most modern psychologists. He does not recognise in mind a central activity constantly assimilating and synthesising elements; on the contrary, while asserting the need and the universality of systemisation or synthesis of elements, he regards the system-forming activity as a tendency inherent in the mental elements themselves, a tendency so to *associate* as to form systems. The mental activity treated of is then an associative tendency, and we have here a return to the old standpoint of the English Associationist school (of which, as he tells us, M. Paulhan was formerly an adherent), though with a considerable difference. Combined with the associationist point of view is the post-Kantian recognition of the value of synthesis, and also a new governing principle, that of "finality," introduced by M. Paulhan himself, in place of mere contiguity and resemblance. And there is further the important difference that, although, as we have said already, the activity of the mind is not conceived as primarily or essentially a central activity, we do yet arrive in M. Paulhan's exposition of Associationism at a relatively central activity; for the elements lose their independent activity, or at least retain it only in a lesser and latent degree, so soon as they are associated into a higher system. The activity of the elements is in a great measure transferred to the system of which they form a part, and such a system (especially in the culminating form of mind or personality) has thus, acting as a whole, an activity superior in degree to that of the subordinate elements. Thus, when a mind is once formed, it can "associate" fresh elements in a manner not unlike the 'synthetic activity' recognised by other psychologists, and the relation between the "condensed" activity of mind, so to speak, and the relatively passive, because unsystematised, elements answers in

some degree to the relation between the active and passive mental elements. But although with this new associationism we arrive in mind at a very superior piece of mechanism, it is a piece of mechanism only, and the laws of its composition are merely mechanical laws; while the claim of "finality" to be the universal and fundamental principle of mind is as likely to be disputed as that of contiguity or resemblance. In M. Paulhan's conception of mind there is, however, much that is suggestive, if not convincing, while his treatment of the subject is clear and always copiously illustrated.

M. Paulhan treats first of the elements of which mind is composed, then of the laws of its composition, and finally of mind as a whole, in its concrete manifestations, and in its relations to the physical world and to society.

As regards the mental elements, M. Paulhan does not, like the older associationists, stop at sensation as the ultimate unit. In the light of later psychological analysis, it is evident that what we ordinarily think of as single sensations are really complexes, and from M. Paulhan's point of view they are *systems* formed by that same associative activity which at a later stage produces minds. The ultimate psychical elements he identifies with Mr. Spencer's nervous shocks, but as we know them they are already formed into systems, each with its own independent activity unimpaired so long as it is unattached to a higher system, but losing it as soon, and in so far, as it is thus subordinated. Thus, in the highest psychological system, the *ideal* mind, when subordination is complete, there is only one centre of action, and none of that conflict between systems which is found in all *actual* minds. Some expressions which occur later in the book make it a little doubtful how much M. Paulhan intends to attribute to the most elementary systems. Their inherent activity one naturally supposes to be the tendency to systematic association, which indeed is the only kind of activity clearly recognised anywhere; but when later we are told that the subordinate systems also think, remember, &c., each for itself, the conception of the psychical elements seems changed from combinations of nervous shocks to Leibnizian monads. Still, taking the whole treatment into account, it seems clear that such expressions can be only intended to apply to the more complex subordinate systems, such, *e.g.*, as manifest themselves as complete sides to a character, and in certain pathological cases give rise through their independence of action to the phenomenon of a double-personality. These and similar pathological cases seem indeed to have very strongly influenced the whole of M. Paulhan's conception of mind as a "system of (usually subordinate, but sometimes insubordinate) systems". So far from really conceiving thought and other conscious manifestations as activities inherent in the elements as well as in their combinations, he treats of them in detail as phenomena at once manifesting and

resulting from the laws of systematic association, precisely as sensations and unconscious tendencies, and, except in respect of complexity, on precisely the same level as these. For, however much or little M. Paulhan intends to ascribe to the ultimate psychological elements, there is no mistaking his statement that all differences in the higher mental phenomena are due to differences "in the elements and in their grouping;" and, as he gives no hint of differences between one nervous shock and another, the differences in phenomena must ultimately rest upon differences in grouping only.

The laws which govern this grouping occupy in their exposition and application the greater part of the work. The novel idea introduced by M. Paulhan as determining association is, as has been said, that of "finality"; and his main law is of systematic association in view of ends with its complementary law of inhibition in view of ends. The statement of these laws is as follows: "Tout fait psychique tend à s'associer et à faire naître les faits psychiques qui peuvent s'harmoniser avec lui, qui peuvent concourir avec lui vers une fin commune ou des fins harmoniques, qui, avec lui, peuvent former un système," and "Tout phénomène psychique tend à empêcher de se produire, à empêcher de se développer ou à faire disparaître les phénomènes psychiques qui ne peuvent s'unir à lui selon la loi de l'association systématique, c'est-à-dire, qui ne peuvent s'unir avec lui pour une fin commune"; and the operation of first one and then the other is exhibited at some length in sensations and perceptions, in the intelligence (images, ideas, judgment, reason), in phenomena of feeling and tendencies, in "le pouvoir personnel" (consciousness, attention, will), and in the personality. M. Paulhan is careful, however, to warn us that these various phenomena are not of importance in themselves, but only as examples or illustrations of the one essential phenomenon—the "activity of the various tendencies produced by the different mental groupings". Perceptions, ideas, and so forth are not themselves so much active tendencies as accompaniments of such tendencies. And, in fact, in the detailed account of these several phenomena it is not the phenomena themselves which are described or explained, but the associative activity as manifested in these. M. Paulhan does not apparently so much fail to recognise the inexplicability of consciousness and the various conscious phenomena by his laws of association, as considers this of no importance; he looks upon consciousness in its various forms as a mere insignificant accompaniment to the one essential associative activity, an activity which is not itself conscious, being present equally in reflex movements and, as we shall see later, in phenomena which are not psychological at all. And yet the failure of this point of view is strikingly shown in the chapter on the intelligence, where M. Paulhan quotes a criticism of M. Janet's on the English Associationist school. He allows the force of the argument that thought (*e.g.*, judgment) cannot be

explained by association, as holding against association by resemblance or contiguity, but conceives that the case is altered when the notion of "finality" is substituted. He says: "Mais la théorie associationiste prend un autre aspect si l'on remplace les principes de ressemblance et de contiguïté par le principe de la finalité immanente. Un livre qui est devant moi a une couverture jaune-orangé. Le jugement que je porte sur sa couleur n'est pas seulement une juxtaposition de la couleur jaune-orangé et des autres qualités qui, pour moi, constituent ce livre; c'est une synthèse systématique; et j'entends par là que certains rapports sont établis entre cette couleur et les autres qualités—rapports qui, *étant perçus par moi*, servent à faire naître en moi certaines autres idées ou à diriger certains actes". The words "*étant perçus par moi*" are not italicised in the original, but it is sufficiently evident that the force of the argument rests upon the substitution of a conscious relation for that between a higher (*i.e.*, more complex) system and a lower one. To these primary laws M. Paulhan adds a third, derived from their combined action in all cases where systematisation is incomplete, with conflict in all actual minds as result (though not in the ideal as yet unattained). This is the law of contrast, of which we need perhaps only say, that it includes much of what is usually called reaction, and that here too a certain confusion arises from the want of a distinction between conscious and unconscious phenomena. More briefly the laws of resemblance and contiguity are also treated of, being resolved into special forms of systematic association; not the relation of resemblance or contiguity between the elements, but their relation to a common system is the bond of connexion.

There is one thing to be said in favour of M. Paulhan's account of the nature and laws of mind, that, if it is an accurate description and a sufficient explanation of the normal mind, it does away with the difficulties connected with the abnormal phenomena of double-personalities and the like. If mind is essentially a system of systems, it is readily comprehensible that it may take the form of two main co-ordinate systems, or, since in the best of actual minds systematisation is but imperfect, that a properly subordinate system may act for itself in defiance of the main system. It is scarcely necessary to observe that this is not enough to justify a theory which fails to explain, almost to recognise, the essential characteristics of mind in general; which reduces consciousness to a mechanical activity, or conceives it as a more or less insignificant accompaniment to such activity; and which, without accounting for its origin or the variety of its manifestations, degrades consciousness from its usual place as the subject-matter of psychology, as a special field of experience requiring full and patient investigation. But these pathological facts have evidently had great weight with M. Paulhan; it is under their influence that he denies the essential unity of mind,

and bases such unity as he recognises on systematisation and connexion with the organism. Throughout the work his copious illustration is almost exclusively drawn from pathology, and one cannot but feel that his psychology is primarily intended to explain these abnormal phenomena, while the characteristics of everyday mental life are read too exclusively in their special light.

The third part, though much shorter and rather supplementary to the main exposition, is perhaps the most interesting and suggestive to a reader who is not convinced by the psychological theory. In it M. Paulhan treats of mind as a whole; exhibiting the operation of systematic association first in such concrete "partial synthesis" as love and language, and then in a complete personality. For this he takes Darwin's life as an example, and traces in an effective way the appearance, suppression or persistence of various conflicting elements and the gradual formation of a harmonious system with a definite and governing end. He next passes to the more abstract consideration of mind in its relation to the organism and to external phenomena both physical and social. The notion of mind as a compound of psychical elements (presumably consciousness) plus the brain—the latter being a complex of sensations, &c.—is not very material to M. Paulhan's general theory, but may be touched on as an instance of what seems a more general confusion of the actual difference between mind and matter. The brain and the correlative psychical phenomena are conceived as two series really conjoined but only observed apart, answering to the appearance of a flute and the sounds proceeding from it but not necessarily known to proceed from it. It is obvious that the analogy will not hold; for, apart from the essential distinction between introspection and an external sense, the *same* observer cannot perceive the conscious series and the conjoined organism, but must examine his own consciousness and another's organism. M. Paulhan's treatment of mind in relation to its surroundings is marked by greater freshness, while his view of the place of psychology among the sciences serves to illustrate and explain his theory of mind. Degree of systematisation is what serves to distinguish the subject-matter of psychology from that of physiology on the one hand and sociology on the other. No hard and fast line can be drawn, but psychology occupies a midway position, its higher systems being social elements as its elements are physiological systems. In this relation to sociology, too, we have the only general description of psychological "finality". It now appears that the end for psychology of systematic association is fitness to become a social element and to respond to the social activity. Degree of systematisation is also what distinguishes mind from its elements, the relation between them being compared to that of a watch to the parts of which it is composed. The view of mind in connexion with its surroundings is of subordinate importance in the psychological account of its laws and

nature, but is an interesting application of the notion of systematic association to mind in its developed form and as operating in a complex and developed society. Noteworthy, also, is M. Paulhan's view of the influence exercised by the mental background (or the main system) on the new elements presented to the mind and of the consequent difference in the way of looking at things where previous experience has been different, as again of the influence of the condition of society in determining the general mental background. There can be little doubt that, however the conception of systematic association may fail to yield a theory of the nature and development of mind, it is of real service for the treatment of such facts as these, or for such analysis of developed character as M. Paulhan attempts, with striking effect, in the case of Darwin.

M. E. LOWNDES.

Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie. Von FRIEDRICH JODL, o. ö. Professor an der Philosophie an der deutschen Universität zu Prag. Band ii. "Kant und die Ethik im 19. Jahrhundert". Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1889. Pp. xiii., 608.

The second volume of Prof. Jodl's history, completing the work, fully maintains the high reputation gained by the first volume (reviewed in *MIND* viii. 295). It is in all respects a masterly production: as well in comprehensive knowledge of the literature of the subject, in insight into both the speculative ideas and the wider influences which determined ethical thought, and in lucid as well as logical style of exposition. The present volume is divided into three books: the first dealing with German ethics from Kant to Feuerbach; the second with French ethics, chiefly Cousin and Comte; the third with English ethics from the Scottish philosophers to J. S. Mill. Feuerbach, Comte, and Mill: these are the final stages for Germany, France, and England respectively. With later writers the author does not deal. The living do not belong to history. We cannot but regret this omission of more recent work, as well as the omission of the review of results which the author promised in his first volume, but which he now finds would need a volume for itself. Yet it is not difficult to discover from the author's mode of treatment what he considers to be the outcome of the systems, through the intricacies of which he treads with so sure a step. It is not by accident that the development of the three great national philosophies is made to end, in each case, in a form of positivism. Like many noted historical works—Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus*, for instance—this history of ethics is a *Tendenzschrift*. And its purpose seems to be to show, from the evolution of ethical ideas, that naturalism is a sufficient basis for morality.

The dependence of ethical ideas upon the method and results of an author's general philosophical conceptions is usually so close and intimate that a history of ethics must contain much more than ethics to make these ideas clear. The connexion is recognised by Prof. Jodl; yet his tendency is to treat ethical principles, as far as possible, by themselves, or to connect them with the circumstances and ruling ideas of the time more closely than with the developments of speculative thought of which they may have been but the highest result in an author's mind. And it is difficult to see how an historian can do otherwise, without going a long way towards writing a history of metaphysics as well as of ethics. Yet there are obvious difficulties connected with the author's mode of treatment, especially in its application to Kant and the systems immediately succeeding. It creates the false impression that the ethical ideas of a system can be fully understood by themselves, and that the development of ethical systems can be traced apart from the development of the underlying metaphysical conceptions. To a large extent this can be done in dealing with the English moralists of last century. But the same cannot be said of many of the systems with which the present volume deals.

The exposition of German ethics given in bk. i. occupies nine chapters. The first of these deals with Kant, or the ethics of the categorical imperative; the second, with Schiller's æsthetic morality; the third, with Fichte, or the ethics of creative genius; the fourth, with speculative idealism—Krause, or the standpoint of mystical feeling, and Hegel, or the standpoint of dialectical construction; the fifth is entitled "Speculative reconstruction of Church doctrine," and treats of Baader, Schelling and again of Hegel. The sixth chapter is on Schleiermacher and the harmony of Idealism and Naturalism; the seventh, on Herbart, or the ethics of æsthetic formalism; the eighth, on Schopenhauer or the ethics of Pessimism; the ninth, on Eudæmonism—Beneke's psychology of morals, and Feuerbach's positivism.

It is chiefly in the criticism of Kant, Fichte and Hegel that the want of fuller metaphysical treatment is felt for understanding the connexion of the systems. The discussion of Kant's ethics is brief, but brings out clearly his leading conceptions, and sharply emphasises the contradictions involved in his use of them. Yet both the nature of these conceptions and Kant's failure in applying them can only be satisfactorily explained through bringing out their intimate connexion with the positions of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. This is not brought out, and the resultant judgment of the author on Kant's ethical achievements is consequently, as it seems to me, unduly severe. Kant's distinction from the English Intellectualists, Cudworth, Clarke and Price, from whom it requires some trouble, according to Prof. Jodl, to distinguish his standpoint (p. 43), consists just in this that Kant does, and they do not, attempt to show how the absolute nature

of morality is connected with the ideals disclosed in the pure reason. It is true that Kant's ethics, like his epistemology, never gets rid of the inconsistencies flowing from that "dualism of sense and reason," which, as Prof. Jodl says (p. 32), dominates his whole thought. But the recognition of this dualism, and the constant endeavours to reconcile its conflicting elements, clearly mark off Kant's position from the abstract intellectualism of the English school, and show the fuller import of his thought, if they also betray its radical defect. In spite of the "hidden sophisms," which Prof. Jodl says are combined with the "convincing truth" in Kant's definition of morality, its "fatal influence" (p. 15) is not made apparent.

The discussions of Fichte and Hegel are appreciative and interesting. In Fichte, Prof. Jodl sees the highest form of the ethics of the categorical imperative; while Hegel's mode of grasping and explaining the fundamental facts of law and morality is subjected to a critical estimate "with complete disregard of the metaphysics of the system" (p. 19). Yet here, as in the criticism of Kant, the avoidance of metaphysics is a loss. If we keep to purely ethical ground we can only see the superficial points of connexion between the Fichtean and Hegelian ethics and the Kantian. Especially in the case of Fichte, it is the connexion of metaphysical points of view that is of greatest importance and that determines the fundamental character of the ethical conceptions.

Outside the direct line of the "metaphysical succession" this difficulty becomes less troublesome. Special praise is due to Prof. Jodl's account of Schleiermacher's ethics, to which he assigns a prominent and important place from its comprehensive treatment of human morality as part and member of the reciprocal life of nature and mind (p. 161). Herbart is made to head the opposition to the Kantian movement—an opposition continued afterwards in very different ways by Schopenhauer, Beneke and Feuerbach. With Herbart, judgments of value or worth take the place of cognitive notions of morality; and ethics is consequently completely separated from metaphysics. As Prof. Jodl points out, we have in Herbart a revival, in more elaborate and formal manner, of the æsthetic morality of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Herbart "held an intermediate position between Kant and German Eudæmonism similar to that which Hutcheson and Shaftesbury held between the pure utilitarians and the pure intellectualists in England" (p. 200). The similarity of Hutcheson's positions to those of Herbart seems to me especially great. In addition to other points of similarity, which he shares with Shaftesbury and Adam Smith, his treatment of the sense of beauty is in such close correspondence with his treatment of the moral sense as to suggest at once the assimilation of moral to æsthetic judgments. At the same time, Prof. Jodl properly emphasises Herbart's differences from his English predecessors.

For the moral sense he substitutes a judgment of value; while he does not, like them, determine the nature of morality by a reference to general happiness. In these respects Herbart's standpoint bears more resemblance to some forms of modern English intuitionism. And Prof. Jodl's criticism of the practical ideas of Herbart—that they afford no means of understanding the history of morals and the development of moral standards and criteria—is just the criticism which modern forms of intuitive ethics find most difficult to meet.

With the discussion of Beneke's ethics we come upon more direct influence of English thought. It was Beneke, says Prof. Jodl, who made Bentham's theory of legislation into a system of ethics, by passing from an external to the internal standpoint, and finding the distinction between law and morality in the distinction between the consequences of actions and the worth of dispositions (p. 252). The subjectively-formal principle of the good will is added to the objectively-material principle of universal happiness; and this is regarded as a combination of "German idealism" with English empiricism (p. 259).

In Feuerbach, German ethics arrives at what the author seems to regard as its consummation. Feuerbach's Hegelian stage was, according to the author, only a transition-period in his development similar to Kant's period of English empiricism. His final stage is a return to Eudæmonism, supported by an empirical theory of the origin of moral notions and impulses. In its origin, conscience is but the result of the power or opinion of another. "The voice of conscience is an echo of the injured man's cry for vengeance" (p. 280). In its development it leads to the ideals which are the only supernatural. With his exposition of this German positivism—from which all criticism is significantly absent—the author closes the first book of the present volume.

Bk. ii., on French ethics, consists of three chapters: the first on the ethics of Spiritualism, dealing with Cousin, Jouffroy and Proudhon; the second on Comte and positivism; and the last on the ethico-religious problem as dealt with by those thinkers. A full account is given of the movement of French thought initiated by Cousin, whose famous eclecticism is described by Prof. Jodl as Hegel's method of treating the history of philosophy translated into French (p. 296). On the movement as a whole, the author's criticism is severe, though perhaps not too severe. He adopts Proudhon's judgment that "the spiritualism of the 19th century, instead of completing the work of the 18th century, called German and Scottish and Platonic philosophy to its aid, and, from fear of materialism, became the standard-bearer of reaction" (p. 325). But the author is surely a little hasty in crediting it with the moral defects which he finds in the French people of the time.

A more sympathetic and equally interesting account is given of Comte's ethics. The emphasis Comte laid upon the organic

basis of morality separated him clearly from the one-sided school of Condillac and Helvetius; but the author contends that his principles include, and do not exclude, Utilitarianism. And this, at any rate, may be admitted: that if modern naturalism continues to define the morally good in terms of pleasure, it must yet seek elsewhere—in the conditions of life and in social development—for the explanation of the moral disposition.

In opening bk. iii.—that on English ethics—the author remarks on the different character which the philosophical movement of the 19th century bore in England from what it did in Germany and France. In the former it did not, as it did in the latter, undergo entirely new developments of thought, but quietly continued in its former course, until the influence of the new German culture made itself felt. Thus the author says very strikingly:—

“If by any accident everything were lost which England has done of a humanistic and philosophical kind since 1770, the English people would certainly lose much that is beautiful and of value; but they would still remain in possession of a culture in all essential elements the same. Were the same fate to overtake Germany, she would be simply a beggar dependent on her gleanings from foreign wisdom and foreign art” (p. 400).

This is certainly true on the whole. Yet, in a comprehensive work like the present, some further recognition might have been looked for of the influence of the French Revolution upon the writers of the end of last century—writers, for instance, such as Godwin on the one hand and Burke on the other. Perhaps their position, almost at the meeting-point of the two centuries, has led to their being dropped out between vol. i. and vol. ii.

After a chapter of general characteristics, this book deals in succession with the Intuitive school—Stewart, Whewell and Mackintosh; and with Utilitarianism—Bentham and J. S. Mill. A final chapter on the ethico-religious problem concludes the volume.

Great praise is due to the author for his thorough knowledge of this period of English thought. There is an almost complete absence in his book, not only of the minor errors which any writer is apt to fall into, but also of that want of due perspective which it is so much more difficult to avoid in treating of a foreign country. The citation of Sedgwick's famous *Discourse on the Studies of the University* (a Trinity College Commemoration Sermon) as a “Cambridger Rectoratsrede” (p. 600) is surely the most venial of errors. It is a more serious misunderstanding, however, to say that J. S. Mill “was obliged to reserve his last word for posthumous publication so as not to incur the odium of the society from which he got his daily bread” (p. 554). This is in direct contradiction of Miss Taylor's evidence in the “Introductory Notice” to the *Three Essays on Religion*: “The volume

now given to the public was not withheld by him on account of reluctance to encounter whatever odium might result from the free expression of his opinions on religion⁵⁵. The delay was simply caused by his caution in forming and expressing opinions—especially on religious subjects—until they had stood the test of time and repeated examination. Perhaps it should also be said that in the last chapters the picture is incomplete which paints in striking colours the attitude of Byron and Shelley, and finds no place or mention at all for Wordsworth, in spite of his much greater influence and the more representative character of his ideas.

With regard to the strictly ethical writers, it may seem that greater prominence is given to Whewell and Mackintosh than their importance warrants. Yet, within the author's prescribed limits, no better examples could be found of the types of thought he has to criticise.

The treatment of Bentham and J. S. Mill will be turned to with more interest, both on its own account and as revealing to some extent the author's own position. The merits and defects of Bentham's work are touched upon with good judgment: his assumption of the greatest-happiness-principle as axiomatic being given as an example of his want of philosophical interest (p. 433); while his great merit in systematically applying the principle and his importance as the English representative of the philosophy of the Revolution are pointed out. The onesidedness of his theory consists, according to Prof. Jodl, in its purely legal and external character, and its reduction of all subjective tendencies to morality to egoism. How Bentham's view was deepened and, so to speak, moralised by J. S. Mill, is shown in the author's interesting and sympathetic, but, as I cannot but think, unsatisfactory, account. It would almost seem as if the author were too much in sympathy with the different lines of thought which meet in Mill to show the difficulty he had in reconciling them. Mill went a long way towards giving up his traditional creed in ethics as well as in political economy; and a certain air of incompleteness cannot but belong to any account of the development of thought of which he is the final stage. This adds to our regret that the author's conception of his subject has prevented him from carrying any further the lines of thought which were beginning to be opened out. But, as it is, his work is to be welcomed as the most thorough, penetrating and lucid account of modern ethical systems that has yet appeared.

W. R. SORLEY.

Wahrnehmung und Empfindung. Untersuchungen zur empirischen Psychologie. Von GOSWIN K. UPHUES, Privatdocent der Philosophie an der Universität Halle a. d. S. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1888. Pp. xiv., 289.

Ueber die Erinnerung. Untersuchungen zur empirischen Psychologie. Von GOSWIN K. UPHUES, Privatdocent an der Universität Halle a. d. S. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889. Pp. xii., 100.

These two books have in common the attempt to establish a direct knowledge, given in external perception, of an object distinct from states of consciousness. Knowledge, as the author puts it, is first directed to the exterior and not to the interior. It is therefore with perception in some form, and not with sensation, that we must begin the psychological construction of actual knowledge. In the volume on *Perception and Sensation* this view is applied chiefly to the problem of the external world. Dr. Uphues's later essay seeks to explain memory as a form of "mediate knowledge" requiring for its basis a knowledge of external objects, to which the images or "representations" that are the immediate object of memory are referred. The earlier book being in great part critical, and its positive argument being repeated at the beginning of the later, *On Memory*, this essay of 100 pages, rather than the larger volume, may be selected for special examination. Of the earlier volume it may be said here that its critical part is distinguished by careful attention to the work of English writers of all schools, and that the author's realism is limited in an interesting way by the distinction drawn in the concluding pages between the merely "momentary" reality which he supposes to be given immediately with each kind of sense-impression and the highly mediated knowledge which is all that he supposes us to have of things as persistent realities (pp. 282-9).

"External perception," Dr. Uphues maintains in the introduction to his shorter essay, "is the immediate knowledge of something external, internal perception the immediate knowledge of something internal." This position is founded on a distinction between "sense-impressions," or "sensible qualities," and "states of consciousness". Sensible qualities, not being states of consciousness, are not "subjective" or "internal". There is therefore nothing to hinder their being known directly as belonging to external things. The impressions of all the senses, instead of appearing first as subjective and internal, and being afterwards "projected" outwardly, from the first "press upon consciousness or press themselves upon it". For this reason there appears in them a "for itself," our knowledge of which is strictly immediate, "not nominal, not conceptual". This "for itself" opposes an obstacle to our activity. We learn to know it with special clearness in our muscular sensations of hindered effort. "Internal

perception" is the special act by which knowledge of states of consciousness becomes possible. Like external perception, it is immediate, "not nominal, not conceptual". The difference is that it is not a relation to something external, but to states of consciousness as such. "It is a simple apprehension of states of consciousness as states of consciousness, or as furnished with the mark of being conscious, and inseparable from it." Memory is the first stage of mediate knowledge, or knowledge by representations. In memory, representations are recognised as images of the objects of immediate knowledge. A further stage of mediate knowledge is that in which objects are known by inference, through concepts. In this stage representations are applied to objects of which they were not originally formed as images. For memory it is not necessary that the original psychical states themselves should remain; it is sufficient that their images should rise again in consciousness. The representation, or present image, is not the object in memory, but is referred to the object. The essence of memory is the conviction of having perceived before the object that is now thought of. This conviction is mediate knowledge. All our immediate knowledge in memory is of present representations. The present content of consciousness is not "posited" as past. It is immediately known as present, and in relation to it the past is known as past. The relation to the past object is the relation to the object foreign to consciousness, or to the object in itself; and this relation is only possible by means of a "conviction". Along with representation of an object belonging to the past, memory includes as an equally essential and indispensable constituent the representation of our earlier perceptive activity directed to the past object. The representation of the former act of perception, however, for the most part does not come in a clear and distinct manner before consciousness; we usually think expressly of nothing but the formerly perceived object. This representation of the past object simply as an object is at first quite indeterminate. It gets all its definiteness from the present representation in memory.

Such, in outline, is the general result of the author's investigations. So far as developed memory is concerned, it may be at once admitted that this involves reference to objects thought of as having existed in the past. When we first begin to examine memory introspectively the thought of an object-world is, of course, already completely formed. The question really in dispute concerns external perception. Is some kind of perception to be assumed as an ultimate element in knowledge, or can perception be derived psychologically from elements of feeling and the relations among them? Our "conceptual" knowledge of objects, the author admits, cannot be assumed as present from the beginning. It has to be analysed into its elements, and then explained scientifically from these. In common with other

psychologists, he takes "sense-impressions" as his elements. His difference from those who carry analysis furthest begins when he lays it down that sense-impressions are from the first known as external to one another in space; for that seems to be the result of his discussion of the meaning of "externality" (*Ueber die Erinnerung*, pp. 11-15). Further, he tries to find in the sense-impression itself an element which is somehow prior to sensation and yet forms the essential part of knowledge. Here, as might be expected, he does not succeed in giving anything but approximative descriptions of certain modes of feeling. All that can really be shown is that "modes of feeling" are later to be explicitly recognised than the objective side of knowledge. But this is no argument at all that, when recognised, they are not to be taken as psychologically prior. As to "externality," the question for readers to decide is whether analysis has not been carried beyond the point to which the author carries it. If analysis has gone a stage further, then his realism, attenuated as it is, loses the psychological support he attempts to give it. From the philosophical point of view, he thinks that to banish realism would make knowledge illusory. But what, in this case, becomes of our "conceptual" knowledge of things, which, as he himself holds, is not immediately "given"? The experiential answer is that conceptual knowledge of external objects has its real meaning in the possibility of verifying the judgments into which our conceptions of things enter by reference to sense; and this is probably the answer that Dr. Uphues would make. Does his theory of "externality" as primitively given in sense-impressions add anything to the verification of this most developed form of knowledge? If not, the validity of knowledge in general can hardly be dependent on it.

THOMAS WHITTAKER.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

[These Notes (by various hands) do not exclude Critical Notices later on.]

Natural Religion: the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Glasgow in 1888. By F. MAX MÜLLER, K.M., Foreign Member of the French Institute. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889. Pp. xix., 608.

Invited last year by the Glasgow professors to become their first Gifford lecturer on Natural Religion, the author, with his splendid facility, was not only ready by the winter-months with the twenty lectures which he supposed were required of him for his introductory course, but also was able at once, as soon as they were delivered, to give them to a wider public in the present volume. Apparently (p. 25) he has allowed the unsought academic call to determine for him the mould into which shall be cast that crowning work of his philosophic life which he shadowed forth to the readers of *The Science of Thought*. This was to be a "Science of Religion," prepared for by all that in one way or another he had ever been able to make out and set forth concerning the human faculty of thought-speech or spoken-thought. In the lecture-form now accepted (rather than adopted) for the work, the ground would be covered in four courses altogether. Upon the present introductory view of "Natural Religion," defined and then surveyed in respect of its method and materials, Prof. Müller would proceed (p. 164) to treat, in order, of "Physical Religion," "Anthropological Religion" and "Psychological Religion". "Physical Religion" is all that, under the two-year rule of tenure of the Gifford lectureship, he can in the first instance commit himself to (p. 574); but one may pretty confidently predict, as well as hope, that the Glasgow Senatus will not fail to renew its mandate for the necessary two years more, since (by the founder's deed) even six successive years may be allotted to one lecturer. We should thus end by learning more exactly than can be gathered from the concluding paragraphs of the present volume how his three divisions of Natural Religion are related to the threefold conception of God as Father, Son and Holy Ghost. The division is based on the fact, as he takes it (p. 164), that "Nature, Man and Self are the three great manifestations in which the infinite in some shape or other has been perceived" by man; religion being at last, after a quantity of curiously mixed reckoning (as is the *philosophical* way of Prof. Müller) with all manner of thinkers, declared (p. 188) to consist "in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man". The practical reference is now for the first time added, in obviation of hostile criticism directed against previous definition by the author, but does not seem to count for anything in his argument as still conducted. His chief position remains what it was: that knowledge, as beginning with or from sense, is essentially finite at all stages, but yet "the limitation or finiteness," in whatever way taken, "always implies a something beyond" (p. 122), which he calls the infinite. The "always" is not very clear, for we are soon told of such sensible objects as "stones, bones, shells, flowers, &c.," that these "are complete in themselves and no one" [What! Not even the poet who plucked a certain flower from 'the crannied wall'?] "would suspect anything in them beyond what we can see and touch" (p. 150); but, however this may be, Prof. Müller is sure that it is quite otherwise

with trees, mountains, rivers, &c. Again, he might have made it more clear how exactly from his declared basis of sense—limited to sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste—he arrives at a knowledge not of Nature only, nor only of Man as object, but also of Man as subject or self. Perhaps it may be enough here to remark that the psychology involved is of the same extremely general, not to say rudimentary, character as was made to do service in *The Science of Thought*. But the lectures, as a whole, must have been good to hear. Profusion of personal reminiscence, dear always to mixed audience; swiftest kaleidoscopic turning of subject, not less dear;—nobody has the art of them like Prof. Müller.

Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers. By JOHN P. MAHAFFY, D.D., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin, &c., and JOHN BERNARD, B.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, &c. A new and completed Edition. 2 Vols. London: Macmillan & Co., 1889. Pp. xix., 389; xi., 239.

After first appearing as expounder and defender of Kant with a translation from K. Fischer, Prof. Mahaffy stood forth as an independent commentator in 1872. Two years later he broke off in the middle of the *Krit. d. r. V.*, though not without having accomplished the last part of the service he intended for the "English reader" in a translation of the *Prolegomena*. Now, after fifteen years, the outstanding parts of the *K. d. r. V.* ('Transcendental Dialectic' and 'Methodology') have, by the labour of a coadjutor, Mr. Bernard, been treated in such a way as to complete, on fairly equal scale, the exposition of Kant's fundamental work; and, Mr. Bernard having besides carried out a careful revision of Prof. Mahaffy's previous text, the English reader now gets in handier, as well as cheaper, form all or most of what was originally planned for him. Not quite all; for, while with minor changes or corrections Prof. Mahaffy's other chapters are reproduced, the long controversial one on "Kant's Æsthetic and the Sensual School" is wholly dropt out. And this is well; because, though the case for Experientialism has still a good deal more life in it than Prof. Mahaffy seems now to imagine, it is certainly not in the midst of such a commentary as his on Kant that the best he might yet be able to urge against it would be usefully said. But, since he is of opinion that Associationism is a thing of the past, he might at least have omitted, from the remodelled Preface of the first volume, his grotesque reference to Prof. Bain—ill pointed even when first made in 1872. In reviving (also with little change), for vol. ii. of the new edition, his old preface to the translation of the *Prolegomena*, Prof. Mahaffy appears still not to know what Wirgman had done towards making the treatise accessible in English long before Richardson (see MIND iv. 422 n.). As to the whole contribution to English Kantian literature, though it cannot be said now to have the same importance that it would have had if completed at the time of its first projection, when students were so poorly provided with other help to the understanding of Kant, yet is it to be gratefully acknowledged. Prof. Mahaffy's exposition of the *Kritik*, so far as it went, had too many merits to be left in the awkward form of its first piecemeal publication; and, upon a first survey (more careful examination unavoidably deferred), Mr. Bernard appears well equipped for the serious task, whether of revision or of completion, that without him would not have been undertaken. [The first paragraph of the footnote on p. 23 of vol. i., reproduced from the earlier edition, must have been overlooked when Prof. Mahaffy set himself to consider what he would *not* reproduce of his old preface.]

Essays upon Heredity and kindred Biological Problems. By Dr. AUGUST WEISMAN, Professor in the University of Freiburg, in Breisgau. Authorised translation, edited by EDWARD B. POULTON, M.A., SELMAR SCHÖNLAND, Ph.D., and ARTHUR E. SHIPLEY, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889. Pp. xii., 455.

One of a series of "Translations of Foreign Biological Memoirs," this volume, though addressed to the biologist, cannot be too urgently commended to the psychologist, upon whom also lies the shadow of Heredity. It is but recently that English readers have been made aware of Prof. Weisman's strenuous efforts for some years back to throw light upon the great mystery. Though anticipated to some extent in his main conception by Mr. F. Galton (see *MIND* i. 267), he has brought, during the last eight years, in a way of his own, the experience and insight of a working biologist to the gradual elaboration of a strictly scientific theory of heredity. The steps by which he has so far arrived at a result of some definiteness are represented by the eight papers here given in the order of their appearance, the author himself seconding the care of his translators by supplementary notes. For the present, the titles of the Essays (in order from 1881 to 1888) may indicate sufficiently the general scope of his progressive inquiry:—"The Duration of Life," "On Heredity," "Life and Death," "The Continuity of the Germ-plasm as the Foundation of a Theory of Heredity," "The Significance of Sexual Reproduction in the Theory of Natural Selection," "On the Number of Polar Bodies and their Significance in Heredity," "On the supposed Botanical Proof of the Transmission of Acquired Characters," "The supposed Transmission of Mutilations".

Socrates and Christ. A Study in the Philosophy of Religion. By R. M. WENLEY, M.A., Lecturer on Mental and Moral Philosophy in Queen Margaret College, Glasgow; Examiner in Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1889. Pp. vii., 274.

Viewing Christianity as prepared for at once by Jewish monotheism, Greek philosophy and the universal Roman polity, the author seeks to show the special relation of Socrates to the later philosophic movement of ancient thought and of this to the other lines of preparation. Although doctrines such as theism and the immortality of the soul are attributable to Socrates, it is a mistake, he thinks, to suppose that in them specifically he did much to prepare the way for Christianity. "Far rather he was the initiator of that movement towards the consideration of things spiritual which, in the end, produced thinkers who were conscious of a want that philosophy could not supply. The gradual development of this sense of helplessness, in its several phases, is the historical bridge between Greek philosophy and Christianity; it is also an essential cause of the difference between Socrates and Christ." Accordingly, having given some account of the "Antecedents of Socrates" and of his "Mission and Philosophy" (cc. ii.-iii.), the author proceeds to sketch the history of philosophy from Socrates to the eclectic schools that preceded Neo-Platonism (cc. iv.-vi.); going on, after a chapter on "The Importance of the Contact between Jew and Greek" (c. vii.), to treat of "Philo Judæus and his Significance," "The Jewish Ideal of God," "Judaism and Jesus" (cc. viii.-x.); and ending with a chapter on "Socrates and Christ" (c. xi.) that sums up his conclusions, as the introductory chapter of the same title (c. i.) states what he proposes to show. He finds that all the elements of Christianity were present in Philo's philosophy, but that the living force requisite to

mould them into organic unity was as yet absent; and that this could only be given by the personality of Christ. Socrates himself had not despaired of philosophy, nor had the thinkers who followed him, but every school failed in turn, and at length the ancient world, having become "sick of life," left "the abstract problem of man's individual freedom," so powerfully dealt with by the Stoics, for "that of concrete individual salvation," which it found in a transcendent God and a mediating personality. The importance of Socrates in the movement towards this consummation depends on his having been "in a sense the first of the Greeks who was not entirely Greek"; but at the same time his actual affinities with Christianity are not to be exaggerated; it was to the philosophical and not to the religious problem that he primarily addressed himself. "Whatever praise may be his, it must always be remembered that the end was not then. When, through what Socrates had not done, 'philosophy had grown sad by thinking beyond its depth,' there was necessity for a greater than he."

The Philosophy of Necessity: or Law in Mind as in Matter. By CHARLES BRAY. Third Edition, revised and abridged. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889. Pp. vii., 407.

A shortened reprint of a book which, first published in 1841, was recast in 1861. The social applications of the author's theory, made with reference to a state of facts now somewhat antiquated, are curtailed and thrown into an appendix. From the body of the work is omitted his phrenological analysis of mental faculties. A necessitarian and theist by intellectual conviction, Bray was a man of happy, sanguine temperament, who found himself altogether at home in a mundane realm of universal law, where he was able to gratify his benevolent impulses. He was not a very profound or learned thinker, but could write with force and directness.

Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays. By ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. Selected and translated by T. B. SAUNDERS, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1889. Pp. ix., 117.

A well-executed translation of selected essays from Schopenhauer's *Parerga und Paralipomena*. The selections—"Religion: A Dialogue," "A Few Words on Pantheism," "On Books and Reading," "On Physiognomy," "Psychological Observations," "The Christian System"—make a very readable little volume.

Kant's Doctrine of the "Thing-in-itself". A Thesis presented to the Philosophical Faculty of Yale University in connexion with his application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. By RIKIZO NAKASHIMA, A.B. (West Res. Coll.), B.D. (Yale Univ.). New Haven, Conn.: Prince, Lee & Akdins Co., 1889. Pp. 104.

This doctoral thesis, having a special interest as the work of a Japanese student, is divided into two parts—i. "Exposition" (pp. 5-68), ii. "Historical Explanation" (pp. 69-100). In part ii. the author seeks to explain how the doctrine of the thing-in-itself took shape in Kant's own mind. It was, he finds, an attempt to mediate between Idealism and Realism. The distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself he finds to be untenable, and Kant's attempt at mediation therefore unsuccessful.

The Beginnings of Ethics. By Rev. CARROLL CUTLER, D.D., formerly President of Western Reserve College. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1889. Pp. xiv., 324.

Substantially written and put in use, in the form of lectures and dictations, sixteen years ago, this book is now offered to a wider public than that of "College and professional students". The title is intended to indicate that it is genetic rather than constructive in method. "The chief aim is to show how Ethics arises psychologically and logically out of the nature of the soul and the necessary assumptions of its thought and action." Among those who have most influenced his thought the author mentions Butler, Aristotle and Dugald Stewart, "though the most central and shaping thought of all came from the late President Walker of Harvard College". The book is, in fact, a treatise on Ethics from a strictly intuitional point of view. Moral sense, or the feeling of obligation in the sensibility, is found to be "an original gift," matched in the intellectual sphere by an intuitive notion of duty, "which cannot be analysed, derived or defined". "Conscience," again, "as the term is here employed, cannot be logically defined." "The will" is to be treated as a special faculty, if we speak of faculties at all. If we do not speak of faculties, then the will, as Green says, is simply the man. It is the nature of the soul "to be a rational, ethical originator and director of its own acts; that is, to act with moral freedom".

A Plain Argument for God. By GEORGE STUART FULLERTON, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1889. Pp. 110.

The author's argument infers a divine mind from nature regarded not as an effect or as a means to an end, but as a manifestation related to God as the human body is related to the human mind. He distinguishes his doctrine both from Deism and Pantheism; going on, in conclusion, to argue that even if universal necessity, evolution and the eternity of matter should some day be proved, they could not affect the theistic argument set forth.

Les Sensations internes. Par H. BEAUNIS, Professeur de physiologie à la Faculté de médecine de Nancy, Directeur du laboratoire de psychologie physiologique à la Sorbonne. ('Bibliothèque scientifique internationale,' lxxvii.) Paris: F. Alcan, 1889. Pp. 256.

Meaning by "internal sensations" all that are not referable to the common five heads of sense, Prof. Beaunis, in this latest French contribution to the 'International Scientific Library,' furnishes the proper complement to Bernstein's *Five Senses of Man* (MIND i. 435) in the same series. In point of psychological value, the complementary treatise is very decidedly in advance of its predecessor; and an English translation should be altogether welcome, if entrusted to a competent hand. The most distinctive feature of the book is the elaborate treatment (1) of the Muscular Sensations (pp. 61-146), (2) of Pain (pp. 169-236). As to the first, Prof. Beaunis is led on into discussions that lie considerably beyond the sphere of mere sensation; still it cannot be said that he forgets over these his proper task. He gives a more comprehensive account of the manifold research brought to bear on the 'muscular sense' than can easily be found elsewhere, and does the work of critical sifting the more effectively because he has made his own original contribution to the inquiry. On the vexed question of the sense of central innervation, he comes after carefully balanced survey of the evidence *pro* and *con* to the conclusion that, over and above (or prior to) all afferent sensation entailed by the muscular act, there is a real element of immediate conscious experience involved in the sending forth of impulse from within. His treatment of Pain in all its variety of modes

deserves even warmer acknowledgment: it is rarely indeed that a physiologist shows such psychological discernment as is displayed throughout these chapters. Especially noteworthy is his discussion of skin-pain in relation to the other kinds or modes of integrumentary sensibility. Under the name "besoins," the 'appetites' receive careful handling; nor are the obscurer phenomena of "sense of orientation," "magnetic sense," "meteorological sense," and the like, passed over. More reference, however, might have been expected to the sensory function of the semicircular canals.

L. Automatisme psychologique. Par PIERRE JANET, Professeur agrégé de philosophie au lycée du Havre. Paris: F. Alcan, 1899. Pp. 496.

This is a specially noteworthy book. It is the work of one of the most active members of the new French school, which seeks to turn the phenomena of hypnotism to general psychological account. By help of two Havre physicians, Drs. Gibert and Powilewicz, Prof. Pierre Janet has been able to conduct an elaborate system of hypnotic experiments upon a number of hysterical or other patients, but more especially four women with variously impaired sensation. His observations are here all brought to bear upon the question of human automatism, discussed heretofore upon speculative rather than experimental grounds, at least from the side to which the author ranges himself. For him, "automatism"—meaning "human activity in its simplest, most rudimentary forms"—is always so essentially a psychological fact that, in the end, he does not hesitate to say that, while the two sciences of physiology and psychology are inter-related as no two other (because dealing with the same phenomena only in two different ways), it is from psychology, at least for the moment, that the physiologist is driven to take the cue. We shall hope to return to the work and consider in detail whether or how far the author is able to establish his general position; following him also through the varied study of the elementary forms of sensation and of consciousness which is involved in his theory of the elementary forms of activity. The treatise falls into two main parts. The first, "Total Automatism," deals with catalepsy and somnambulism, in respect more especially of the phenomena of consciousness, of forgetfulness on waking, of alternating memory, and of suggestion, as manifested in the two states. The second part, "Partial Automatism," is occupied with partial catalepsy, post-hypnotic suggestions, "systematised anæsthesias" (*i.e.*, suggested losses of particular sensations), plural consciousness; concluding with two chapters on the different forms of psychological "disaggregation" (spiritism, thought-reading, impulsive madness, fixed ideas, hallucinations, &c.), and on moral force and weakness.

La Philosophie de Gassendi. Par P. FELIX THOMAS, Docteur ès Lettres, Professeur au Lycée de Brest. Paris: F. Alcan, 1899. Pp. 320.

This is an excellent piece of work. Gassendi, though he had a fair share of monographic treatment thirty or forty years ago, has for a long time received scant justice from general historians of philosophy. Lange only, working with special view over the general field, has not failed to see that no philosopher of the seventeenth century stands in more intimate relation to some of the most characteristic thought of the nineteenth. It is with a like persuasion of Gassendi's claims to be considered as a thinker of more than passing import that the author of the present volume has set to work. Professing to expound and hardly at all to discuss, he yet is able throughout, by suggestive touches in text or footnotes, to invest with living interest his extracts from the pages of

the most learned and open-minded of churchmen. The inaccessibility of Gassendi's folios and the diffuseness of their erudite method go far to account for the comparative neglect into which they have fallen. All the more thanks are due to a writer like Prof. P. F. Thomas for the labour he has undergone in sifting out and for the patient skill he displays in presenting. We get from him here exactly such information regarding the matter and manner of Gassendi's properly philosophical thought as was greatly wanted, whether for immediate understanding or for convenient reference. If there had only, in addition to the clear introductory statement of the occasion and import of the different philosophical writings, been given some consecutive account of Gassendi's life and wide-spreading relations with his contemporaries, the monograph might have been pronounced altogether satisfactory and likely to be definitive. No one can have worked among the thinkers of the seventeenth century without feeling how provokingly inadequate, when not quite misleading, are the references of the common books to the rival whom Descartes has been allowed far too much to overshadow. It is much to be desired that Prof. Thomas may have and may use the opportunity of completing the service he has done to his author. One thing may be noted as clear from the exposition—that Lange was not justified in asserting that Gassendi's cosmological speculations left him with little concern for psychology: in no department of philosophical inquiry is his record more remarkable than in this. [There is a slip at p. 11, as to Gassendi's appreciation of Newton, who was still only a boy of thirteen at the time of the philosopher's death. Newton's high estimate of Gassendi, reported by Voltaire, is given on p. 56.]

La Philosophie dans ses Rapports avec les Sciences et la Religion. Par J. BARTHÉLEMY-SAINT HILAIRE, Membre de l'Institut, Sénateur. Paris: F. Alcan, 1889. Pp. 280.

The author's point of view remains unchanged since the publication, in 1879, of his Introduction to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (see MIND iv. 446), in which volume he had already defended the claims of philosophy against science and theology, and had affirmed Cartesianism as his metaphysical doctrine. "Cartesian spiritualism," he now repeats (p. 96), is the truth itself." It was this doctrine that Cousin had the merit of restoring to French philosophy; for his "eclecticism" had no permanent value. The method of philosophy is not eclectic, but is reflection by consciousness on itself. This method, though it was used systematically by the ancients, and in particular by Aristotle, still at the beginning of the modern period needed definite formulation. Descartes formulated it with such clearness that henceforth it became an inalienable possession of the human mind. The sciences, though now temporarily opposed to philosophy (and in their hostility to "free metaphysics" at one with theology) cannot remain permanently aloof from it; for on the one hand the prolonged analyses of special science call for a philosophical synthesis, and on the other hand it is from metaphysics that scientific principles derive their certitude. The reconciliation of philosophy with religion presents greater difficulties than its reconciliation with science, since both claim supremacy over the whole mind; but even here reconciliation is not hopeless. It may be found in a "reciprocal toleration" such as existed between ancient religion and philosophy. Philosophy must, by its very nature, place reason above faith; but now that its freedom is again secure, as it was in antiquity, it can recognise the beneficence of religion as a moral agency, and the superiority of Christianity, and more especially of Catholicism, to all other religions.

Theology and philosophy seek the same end by different ways, and are in agreement as regards the essential truths of "spiritualism". This being so, they can afford to leave each other undisturbed in their respective spheres of activity: philosophy recognising that it is essentially "individualistic," and exercising tolerance by refraining from attacks on the common faith; theology on its part recognising the independence of reason, and not seeking to transgress the limits that have been imposed upon it in the interests of civil life.

Le Procès de Socrate. Examen Critique des Thèses Socratiques par G. SOREL. Paris: F. Alcan, 1889. Pp. 396.

The result of this critical examination of the Socratic theses is that, although Socrates is not to be classed with the Sophists, his opponents were quite right in regarding his teaching as hostile to the old Athenian constitution. They failed to restore the old ideas, but we ought to judge them with the more impartiality that we see more clearly than they did the disastrous consequences of the new doctrines. "The State transformed into a Church, public force put at the disposition of the sects, such was the ideal of the Socratics." Under the government of chiefs marked out by their scientific competence—a conception which, though exaggerated by Plato, was in its essence Socratic—the citizen would have been allowed no liberty but "the liberty of good," as "good" was conceived by the chiefs. The intellectual tolerance characteristic of Greek life would have disappeared. Nor were the tendencies of the Socratic school, any more than those of the Sophistic schools, without influence in bringing about the gradual demoralisation by which the period was marked. The contempt of the school for the heroic ideals of the older poets, as well as for the institutions of Athenian democracy, is notorious. At the same time they were the recipients of Asiatic influences, religious and social, made a point of admiring Sparta, and sympathised with the oligarchical factions of Athens. The accusation of Socrates was thus not founded on any misunderstanding, since it was part of an attempt to suppress political innovations and to restore the old ethical spirit. For a true—as well as for the most favourable—representation of Socrates, the author thinks, we must go to Xenophon, and not to Plato, who disfigured his master's thought and exaggerated the anti-Hellenic tendencies of the Socratic school. The testimony of Aristophanes is not to be neglected, for his attack on Socrates had a serious purpose, and his representations are confirmed from other sources. On the whole, the book is an interesting and suggestive presentation of 'the other side' of the case. The writer intends application to be made of his ideas to modern times, but in what direction it is not easy to infer. His incidental expressions of opinion seem occasionally a little inconsequent.

L'Art au point de vue sociologique. Par M. GUYAU. Paris: F. Alcan, 1889. Pp. xlvii., 387; xvi., 306.

What Guyau has sought to develop in the first of his posthumous works now published is "the properly sociological point of view, which places the essence of art, like that of morality and religion, in a development of the social instinct". M. Fouillée contributes an introduction of 40 pages, in which he gives an outline of the argument. For the present, a general view of the subjects discussed may be got from the titles of the chapters, which are:—i. "La solidarité sociale, principe de l'émotion esthétique la plus complexe"; ii. "Le génie, comme puissance de sociabilité et création d'un nouveau milieu

social"; iii. "De la sympathie et de la sociabilité dans la critique"; iv. "L'expression de la vie individuelle et sociale dans l'art"; v. "Le réalisme—Le trivialisme et les moyens d'y échapper"; vi. "Le roman psychologique et sociologique"; vii.-ix. "L'introduction des idées philosophiques et sociales dans la poésie"; x. "Le style, comme moyen d'expression et instrument de sympathie"; xi. "La littérature des décadents et des déséquilibrés: son caractère généralement insociable. Rôle moral et social de l'art."

L'Avenir de la Métaphysique fondée sur l'Expérience. Par ALFRED FOUILLÉE.
Paris: F. Alcan, 1889. Pp. xvi., 306.

"M. Fouillée a montré dans un précédent ouvrage la crise que traverse la morale; la métaphysique en subit une semblable et non moins digne d'attention. Il existe à notre époque, chez beaucoup d'esprits, une tendance à dépouiller la métaphysique de toute valeur comme savoir, pour en faire, soit une poésie supérieure, soit une simple conséquence de la morale, soit une religion individuelle où les mythes sont remplacés par des symboles abstraits. M. Fouillée montre que la métaphysique est impérissable, parce qu'elle est le complément nécessaire de la science positive et de la morale positive; mais, selon lui, la métaphysique doit être désormais une speculation fondée sur l'expérience, et cette conception nouvelle de la métaphysique est celle qui prévaut de plus en plus dans les divers pays. En déterminant les rapports exacts de la métaphysique avec la science, avec la morale, avec la religion—problèmes d'importance capitale—l'auteur se tient à égale distance des positivistes, des criticistes et des dogmatistes. S'efforcer, par induction, de reconstruire l'univers dans ses traits essentiels, en prenant pour règle que cette reconstruction soit d'accord tout ensemble avec les résultats les plus généraux des sciences objectives et avec les données les plus primordiales de la conscience, ce ne sera plus construire des 'palais d'idées' dans la région mouvante des nuages."

Croyance et Réalité. Par LIONEL DAURIAC, Professeur de philosophie à la Faculté des lettres de Montpellier. Paris: F. Alcan, 1889. Pp. xxxvii., 338.

In these essays (part of which have appeared in the *Critique Philosophique* between 1883 and 1888) the author, who is a disciple of M. Renouvier (to whom the book is dedicated), sets forth the principles of the "criticist" philosophy with some of their applications. An interesting introduction (pp. i.-xxxvii.) gives a sketch of the stages of development of his thought. The book itself begins with chapters on the theory of belief, in relation especially to free-will (pp. 1-98), goes on to discuss the question of reality—whether to be found in "substance" or "phenomenon" (pp. 99-258)—and ends with three well-written essays entitled "Genesis of Metaphysics," "Art and Philosophy," "The two Moralities" (pp. 259-336). The author's conclusions are for phenomenism, for the Kantian doctrine of duty, and for indeterminism as inseparably joined with this.

J. PUTSAGE. *Nécessité Sociale.* Bruxelles: Imprimerie Veuve Monnom, 1889. Pp. 18.

The "social necessity" referred to is the necessity of a social transformation in accordance with the principles of the author's work, *Études de Science réelle* (see MIND No. 54, p. 293).

HERBERT SPENCER. *L'Individuo e lo Stato*. Traduzione di SOFIA FORTINI-SANTARELLI. Con Prefazione di GIACOMO BARZELLOTTI. Città di Castello: S. Lapi, 1886. Pp. ciii., 163.

In introducing this translation of *The Man versus the State* to Italian readers Prof. Barzellotti has sought, not indeed to "confute" Mr. Spencer's Individualism, but to "temper" it by some historical considerations. He traces, in his Preface, the various currents of individualistic and socialistic speculation that have influenced Europe during the present century, making many interesting remarks by the way, and showing how the various political ideals in turn predominant have appealed to the needs of each time and to each national character. The conclusion indicated is that the principles of individual "autonomy" and of State-control are not mutually exclusive but tend to reconciliation. The range to be assigned to each is not wholly a question of science. That is to say, it cannot be fixed once for all by any theoretical deduction, but can only be determined by the practical art of government in relation to the special circumstances. This conception Prof. Barzellotti finds to be that which is, on the whole, predominant both in the practical politics and in the political thinking of Italy and of England: Mill's *Liberty*, which is far from being wholly unfavourable to State-interference, best representing the spirit of English political life; and a certain moderate conception of the office of government, opposed alike to the excesses of French centralisation and to the German "pedagogic" view of the State, yet not going to the extreme of *laissez faire*, having become traditional in Italy.

Psicologia del Comico. Memoria letta all' Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche della Società Reale di Napoli dal Socio Ordinario FILIPPO MASCI. Napoli: Tipografia della Regia Università, 1899. Pp. 80.

The comic, in the author's view, is a phenomenon of intellectual contrast. Further, the contrast must be a "descending contrast"; the reality must appear inferior to our idea of it. The contrasted representations tending to combine and being hindered, there is a phenomenon of "alternation" producing an effect resembling brilliancy or pungency of sensation. The descending intellectual contrast and the alternation are accompanied by the feelings of "superiority" and of "free motion," the first of which was noted by Hobbes as the cause of laughter, and the second of which is due to a "reaction from (false or artificial) seriousness".

GIUSEPPE CIMBALI. *Nicola Spedalieri, Publicista del Secolo XVIII*. Città di Castello: Tipografia dello Stab. S. Lapi, 1888. Pp. xc., 368; 296.

The author has devoted much enthusiastic labour to reviving the memory of an almost forgotten Italian publicist, Nicola Spedalieri, who has already attracted some attention from Mamiani and others as a liberal Catholic of the 18th century. The result of his industry now appears in two volumes, divided, after an introduction on the 18th century ("The Century of Spedalieri," pp. xxi.-xc.) into three parts.—i. "Life" (vol. i., pp. 3-192), ii. "The Apologies for Christianity" (vol. i., pp. 195-368), iii. "The Rights of Man" (vol. ii.). Spedalieri's political work is based on the contract-theory. His chief apologetic work is a long *Confutation of Gibbon*. The author has found a reference to this by the great historian, which he quotes (i. 301, note). Referring to the provision by the Italian translator of the *Decline and Fall* of "an antidote against the poison of his original" in the form of letters from

an anonymous divine to his friends, two English students at Rome, Gibbon proceeds:—"The critical essay at the end of the third volume was furnished by the Abbate Nicola Spedalieri, whose zeal has gradually swelled to a more solid confutation in two quarto volumes. Shall I be excused for not having read them?"

Le Opere Latine di Giordano Bruno esposte e confrontate con le Italiane.
Da FELICE TOCCO, Professore di Storia della Filosofia. Firenze:
Successori Le Monnier, 1889. Pp. vi., 420.

The author classifies Bruno's Latin works into "Lullian," "Mnemonic," "Expository and Critical," and "Constructive". These he studies in the first four parts of his book; most space, as is right, being given to the last group, consisting of the *Summa Terminorum Metaphysicorum* and the three Latin poems, *De Minimo*, *De Monade* and *De Immenso* (pp. 125-326). Finally, in a fifth part (pp. 327-416), he expounds Bruno's philosophy as a whole, tracing it to its sources, and comparing the Latin with the Italian works. He seeks to show a development of the philosopher's thought, but in the opposite direction to that which has been contended for by Carrière. In his view Bruno begins with a doctrine of emanation, implying "transcendence," which he derived from the Neo-Platonists. This is expounded in the *De Umbris Idearum*. Afterwards it was transformed into a monism like that of the pre-Socratics, in which the Eleatic doctrine of the One was combined with the Heraclitean doctrine of Evolution. This finds its expression in the Italian dialogues. Finally Bruno developed a doctrine of atomism, or rather monadism (since the atoms are regarded as animated), which is expounded, though not with perfect consistency, in the *De Minimo*. His theory of knowledge went through corresponding changes. First he held the Neo-Platonist doctrine of the attainment of truth by "ecstasy," then a doctrine, resembling Hegel's, of the identity of being with thought and of thought as a dialectical process, from which he was going on to an empiricist doctrine of sense as the test of truth. The author's view is carefully worked out, and there is perhaps more to be said for it than for the opinion that Bruno's later works give evidence of a transition from pantheism to theism. Prof. Tocco has to admit, however, that Bruno himself was unconscious of the change; and to make out his case he has to ignore part of Bruno's thought at each stage. Only in one point, *viz.*, that there is a growing opposition to the Platonist doctrine of "transcendence," can the case be regarded as satisfactorily made out. Here Bruno himself was perfectly conscious of the opposition, and it may be contended that the doctrine of "immanence" was really present to him (since it finds expression in his earliest extant writing) from the beginning of his philosophical activity, but that he afterwards saw, as he did not at first, the necessity of opposing the Platonic phraseology if his own doctrine was to be maintained. Prof. Tocco all through quotes copiously (in footnotes) from Bruno himself, and, in his last part, illustrates his views by appropriate citations from the ancient thinkers from whom Bruno drew. (The way in which references have to be given to the Latin works reminds us that a complete and uniform edition of them is still a desideratum.)

Lotze's Philosophie. Von EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Leipzig: W. Friedrich, 1888. Pp. xii., 188.

An estimate of the philosophical work of Lotze. In the author's view, Lotze's work is most important in theory of knowledge and in the

branches of philosophy related to it; for although he rarely arrives at determinate results, his searching treatment of the most difficult problems of philosophy has stimulated discussion and has been specially meritorious in an unmetaphysical time. He may be regarded as "the epistemologist of the speculative theism of the nineteenth century". In his attempt at a positive reconciliation of the speculative view of the world with the view of natural science, as in his theistic doctrine itself, he has, however, been by no means successful. His religious doctrine, in particular, is a falling back on the "optimistic theism" of the last century, and entirely lacks the pessimistic element that is an essential part of a true philosophy of Christianity.

Sprache und Religion. Von Lic. Dr. GEORG RUNZE, Privatdozent an der Universität zu Berlin. Berlin: R. Gaertner (Hermann Heyfelder), 1889. Pp. xvi., 235.

Accepting the general doctrine of the inseparability of thought and language—of which he regards Prof. Max Müller's *Science of Thought* as the most perfect expression—the author proceeds to ask, What is the influence of this doctrine on the theories of knowledge and belief, especially religious belief? With a view to the decision of this question, he first illustrates the influence of language on Aryan mythology—here again accepting from Prof. Max Müller the view that myths are essentially determined by misunderstandings of the meanings of words. He next applies the linguistic theory of mythology to the Bible; here finding that both in the Old and New Testaments there are distinct "mythological" elements traceable to the influence of language. This conclusion, he then argues, in no way decides the question as to the truth of those doctrines that contain such "mythological" elements. What has been shown so far is merely the influence of language on the origin and development of religion. The truth of religious thought itself remains a problem—to be solved in the light of the conclusions reached. Now linguistic science, in making clear the manifold determination of thought by words, appears at first to result in a kind of "theoretical scepticism". When, however, the self-determining power of the will is considered, the result becomes a "radical Criticism". For while language explains the mythological element in religious thought, it does not explain the moral will. On the contrary, the moral will places a limit to the influence of words on thought. Problems that can be solved neither empirically nor logically—i.e., by "linguistic consequence"—can be solved by a decision of "free-will" made under ethical motives. The ultimate criterion in theory of knowledge being, accordingly, ethical, it is the duty of the thinker, even within the limits of science, to decide in accordance with the interests of Church and State. Since there is no theoretically absolute rule, apart from "the ethical will-moment," for criticising the documents of Christianity, this moment must here furnish the ground of the decision. The results of linguistic science in its application to the origin and development of religion thus turn out to be altogether favourable to theology.

Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntniss. Von FRANZ BRENTANO. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889. Pp. xii., 122.

The author aims at showing, from the empirical point of view, that while there is no "natural," in the sense of "innate," moral or juridical law, there is nevertheless an ethical law that is natural in the sense that it is independent of all social authority. The moral will, he finds, must

have an internal superiority over the immoral will, such as the logical has over the illogical judgment. "Belief in this superiority is an ethical motive; knowledge of this superiority the right ethical motive, the sanction, which gives security and validity to the ethical law." To promote "good" in the most general sense is the end of life. Positive law and morality, to be really obligatory, must agree with the rules made known by reason as duties of love towards the highest practical good. Prof. Brentano's essay—read Jan. 23 before the Juristic Society of Vienna—is now provided with abundant notes (pp. 47-108) and supplemented (in relation to special points discussed) by a review reprinted from the *Wiener Zeitung* (13th and 14th Nov., 1888) of "Miklosich über subjektlose Sätze" (pp. 112-122).

Montaigne als Vertreter des Relativismus in der Moral. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde an der philosophischen Fakultät zu Jena. Von IVAN GEORGOV. Leipzig: Gustav Fock, 1889. Pp. 48.

The author—a Bulgarian by birth—gives in the first part of his doctoral thesis an effective presentation of the ethical "relativism" of Montaigne, in which he finds implicit the modern conception of the social origin of conscience. In his second (critical) part he urges against the "relativistic" position some considerations from the Kantian point of view.

Neue Grundlegung der Psychologie und Logik. Von GUSTAV TEICHMÜLLER. Herausgegeben von J. OHSE, Privatdocent an der Universität Dorpat. Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner, 1889. Pp. xii, 348.

This posthumous work was projected by Prof. Teichmüller as part of the foundation of the "Philosophy of Christianity" announced in his *Religionsphilosophie* (see MIND xii. 306). It wanted only the author's final revision, and has now been edited with great care and fidelity. The matter is distributed (according to the author's scheme) into two parts:—i. "New Foundation of Psychology" (pp. 1-236), ii. "New Foundation of Logic" (pp. 237-340). The leading ideas are those indicated already in the *Religionsphilosophie*, viz., the distinction of "consciousness" from the "cognitive function," and the conception of thought as essentially a "system of co-ordinates".

Die Menschenseele. Ein Beitrag zur Analyse und Erziehung des Menschen. Von L. CARNIO. Wien: Carl Konegen, 1889. Pp. 118.

An argument for belief in the existence of an immaterial soul, on the ground that such belief is suggested by an instinct or "feeling-potency," "the universal God in us, which teaches us better than the short-sighted understanding what is profitable for the wide aims of humanity".

Der angebliche Heraklitismus des Skeptikers Ainesidemos. Von EUGEN PAPPENHEIM. Berlin: R. Gaertner (Hermann Heyfelder), 1889. Pp. 67.

According to the author, "The Heracliteanism of Aenesidemos" is erroneously inferred from what is reported by Sextus Empiricus. Aenesidemos was not in reality a Heraclitean, nor is he described as such by Sextus, but certain Heracliteans of the time "Aenesidemised," and Sextus controverted their views, defending the Pyrrhonist against the Heraclitean interpretation of Scepticism.

Ueber Phantasie-Vorstellungen. Von ANTON ÖLZBLT-NEWIN. Graz : Leuschner & Lubensky, 1889. Pp. 180.

An accumulation of facts from all sources—equally from literature, from scientific monographs and from introspection—on the images of the “phantasy” as distinguished from those of memory. For the classification of the facts the distinction between “generative” and “constructive” imagination is chiefly made use of. There is a chapter on the physical conditions of the spontaneous production of imagery, and one on the phantasy of animals.

Einleitung in die englische Philosophie unserer Zeit. Von Dr. HARALD HÖFFDING, Professor an der Universität in Copenhagen. Autorisirte Uebersetzung von Dr. H. KURELLA. Leipzig : Theodor Thomas, 1889. Pp. vii., 249.

Dr. Kurella, who has already translated an interesting psychological work from the Danish (see *MIND* xiii. 304), here offers to German readers a translation of Prof. Höffding's *Introduction to contemporary English Philosophy*. In a short preface he remarks on the merits of English Association-psychology and their insufficient recognition in Germany ; mentioning that for clinical observation he himself “owes more to the Mills, Bain and Spencer than to many native German doctrines of cerebral physiology”. The modern cerebral physiology of cells and fibres is, he points out, for the most part unconsciously to its authors, based on Association-psychology (p. v.). Prof. Höffding—who is already known to readers of *MIND*—treats of English philosophy down to 1874 (the date of the first appearance of his work) ; adding some reference to recent developments in a “Conclusion” (pp. 239-249) re-written in 1887. His chapters are—i. “General Characteristics” (pp. 1-23), ii. “Pure Empiricism” (J. S. Mill and Prof. Bain ; pp. 24-112), iii. “The Critical School in England” (Whewell, Hamilton, Mansel ; pp. 113-149), iv. “The Philosophy of Evolution” (Mr. H. Spencer ; pp. 150-238). The work is, on the whole, appreciative. As was pointed out by Mr. Sully (*MIND* xii. 606), the author is not exclusively devoted to English thinkers. He regards Experientialism as in need of development under the influence of German thought, and refers in terms of praise to Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* ; but, in concluding, the first point on which he insists is the coherent development of English Experientialism as contrasted with the changing systems of Continental philosophy.

John Stuart Mill. Ein Nachruf von THEODOR GOMPERZ. Wien : C. Konegen, 1889. Pp. 49.

Two essays published by the author soon after Mill's death are here reprinted in a revised form with the addition of notes (pp. 33-49). They are of much interest, the author having been in personal relations with Mill for over twenty years. Passages are given, partly in the original and partly in German translation, from Mill's letters to Prof. Gomperz during that period.

Der Weg zum Glück. Auf Grund einer Darstellung der Entwicklungslehre Herbert Spencers. Von ALBERT RÖDER. Leipzig : O. Spamer, 1888. Pp. viii., 135.

A clearly written exposition of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. “The way to happiness,” in the author's view, is scientific knowledge—but scientific knowledge organised into a philosophical system. Holding that Mr. Spencer's systematisation of science is of more value than any

other for determining the means to the ethical end, he offers this little book not as an adequate account of the Spencerian system, but as an introduction that may promote its study.

System der Philosophie. Von WILHELM WUNDT. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1889. Pp. x., 669.

This important work will, it is hoped, receive notice in the next number of MIND. Though Prof. Wundt's "System" has only been set down in its present form within the latest years, its fundamental views date from more than twenty years since, having first begun to shape themselves on occasion of the appearance of the small work, *Die physikalischen Axiome und ihre Beziehung zum Causalprincip* (1866). A little later the author composed a "Sketch of Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics," but delayed its publication till he had gone more deeply into the special branches of philosophical science. The results of this occupation are contained in his *Physiologische Psychologie, Logik und Ethik*. Philosophy, in his view, must henceforth be a system of knowledge based on the special sciences. It is still to be called (or at least its central part is to be called) Metaphysics, because its general aim is that which was always the aim of metaphysics, viz., the organisation of knowledge into a consistent whole. The book falls into an Introduction and six Sections:—(1) Thought, (2) Knowledge, (3) The Concepts of Understanding, (4) The Transcendent Ideas, (5) Chief Points of Philosophy of Nature, (6) Outlines of Philosophy of Spirit.

Beiträge zur Experimentellen Psychologie. Von HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, Dr. phil. et med., Privatdocent der Philosophie an der Universität Freiburg. Heft i. Freiburg i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1889. Pp. xii., 188.

This is the beginning of a very remarkable enterprise. The author of *Die Willenshandlung* (MIND No. 51, p. 463), and of *Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit* (No. 54, p. 298), the former, at least, of which ought before now to have received the detailed examination due to its great freshness and vigour of treatment, here engages in a task which does not more bespeak his exceptional courage than promise uncommon advantage to scientific psychology. Having instituted a psychological laboratory at Freiburg, and started a wide-reaching scheme of experimental research, he means to keep up a serial publication of results, and hopes to produce yearly as many as three parts of some ten sheets each (matter for four such parts being already accumulated beforehand). Since the investigations are not only laid out upon a careful plan of his own, but are also carried out by himself (in conjunction with the necessary assistants), while the critical appreciation of the results and the whole writing-out are his exclusively, it is apparent at once to what a herculean labour he stands committed. One can but wish him health and strength—and the merited encouragement—to go on as he has now begun. In the present first part, after preliminary explanations, and a general treatment of the relation between consciousness and brain (pp. 1-68), defining his consistently psychophysical attitude, he gives detailed and reasoned account of two separate researches directed on the question of Voluntary and Involuntary Combination of Ideas (*Vorstellungsverbinding*). He gets what he holds to be clear experimental refutation of Prof. Wundt's theory of Apperception, which has drawn so much attention of late years as an allowance, by the great psychophysical pioneer, that there is a range of mental activity lying beyond the province of physiological psychology—or rather that all proper

mental activity so lies. Prof. Bain, in *MIND* No. 46, sought from his own Associationist point of view to reclaim against such allowance, and the present writer has but recently noticed that in the third edition of the *Physiologische Psychologie* (published in 1887), ii. 389 n., Prof. Wundt complains of having been seriously misunderstood and misrepresented by his critic in these pages. It is but due to a thinker of his mark that the matter should not be left there. An effort will accordingly be made, on returning to 'Critical Notice' of Dr. Münsterberg's most important research, to do justice at the same time to that doctrine of Prof. Wundt's which the research so powerfully assails. To say thus much of Dr. Münsterberg's work gives, however, even preliminarily, no notion of its value and interest as a contribution to psychology, in regard to quite a number of questions now to the front. Every forward worker should make haste to peruse it; hardly will any such reader fail to look out for the parts that are to come.

RECEIVED also :—

- T. Fowler, *Inductive Logic*, 5th ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. xxv., 364.
 G. v. Giżycki, S. Coit, *A Student's Manual of Ethical Philosophy*, Lond., Swan Sonnenschein, pp. viii., 304.
 S. E. Jarvis, *Rosmini, a Christian Philosopher*, &c., 2nd ed., St. William's Press, Market Weighton, pp. 86.
The Sacrifice of Education to Examination (ed. A. Herbert), Lond., Williams & Norgate, pp. xxxii., 204.
 E. D. Bunsen, *Islam or True Christianity*, Lond., Trübner, pp. xii., 176.
 H. D. Macleod, *The Theory of Credit*, vol. i., Lond., Longmans, pp. xii., 336.
 T. T. Lynch, *Gatherings from Notes of Discourses*, 2nd Series, Lond., J. Clarke, pp. viii., 220.
 T. Clarke, *The Fate of the Dead*, Lond., F. Norgate, pp. xv., 196.
 P. Carus, *Fundamental Problems*, Chicago, Open Court, pp. 267.
 Dr. O'Mahony, *Des Jugements qu'on doit appeler Synthétiques à priori*, Dublin, M. H. Gill, pp. 16.
 L. Tolstoi, *Ueber das Leben* (übers. S. Behr), Leipzig, Duncker u. Humblot, pp. 264.
 G. H. Störing, *J. S. Mill's Theorie über den psychol. Ursprung des Vulgärglaubens an die Aussenwelt*, Halle a. S., pp. 40.
 K. Fischer, *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, 3te Aufl., Heidelberg, C. Winter, pp. xix., 622.
 E. Adickes, *Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, mit Einleitung u. Anmerkungen, Berlin, Mayer u. Müller, pp. xxvii., 723.
 R. Seydel, *Der Schlüssel zum objectiven Erkennen*, Halle a. S., C. E. M. Pfeffer (R. Stricker), pp. 116.

NOTICE will follow.

VII.—FOREIGN PERIODICALS.

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.—Vol. xxi., No. 3. D. J. Snider—A Study of the Iliad (Bk. vi.). G. Garrigues—Shakespeare's Sonnets. W. Boulting—A Universal Telos the Presupposition of all Inquiry. [An argument to the effect that "on the ground of merely intellectual data we are compelled to posit a Reason from which our phenomenal world of being and becoming, of the real and the valid, of the transient event and the timeless law, derives itself".] Leibniz—Critique of Locke (tr.). Bonaventura—The Soul's Progress in God (tr.). Notes and Discussions, &c.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.—Vol. ii., No. 3. W. Noyes—Paranoia. A Study of the Evolution of Systematised Delusions of Grandeur. [Continuation, from Vol. i., No. 3, of an account of the development of the mental disease of a patient confined in the Bloomingdale Asylum. Originally an artist of irregular power, he continues to throw off sketches, which are here reproduced both as illustrations of his artistic skill and as indicating the changing phases of his disease.] C. F. Hodge—Some Effects of electrically stimulating Ganglion Cells. E. C. Sanford—Personal Equation (iii.). W. H. Burnham—Memory, historically and experimentally considered (iii.). [On "pseudo-remembrances or the phenomena of paramnesia". These are arranged, according to a modification of Kraepelin's terminology, under the heads of (1) "simple paramnesia," in which "the images of the imagination, as they spontaneously arise in consciousness, appear as memories," (2) "identifying paramnesia," or ordinary "double memory," in which actual events are taken to have been experienced before, and (3) "suggested or associating paramnesia," in which "an actual impression suggests an illusion or an hallucination of memory".] Psychological Literature (The Nervous System; Experimental; Abnormal; Miscellaneous). Notes.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.—An. xiv., No. 7. F. Evellin—De la possibilité d'une méthode dans la science du réel. [Philosophical method requires some fact to start with that is beyond doubt. This is found in the existence of the phenomenon. The existence of the phenomenon implies the plurality of being. In the order of existence being is first, in the order of knowledge the phenomenon. Accordingly, if we begin with a definition of being, we may arrive at "monism," or the doctrine of its absolute unity; but we can never succeed in effecting a transition from this to the phenomenon. If, on the other hand, we begin with the phenomenon, then we see that "for the phenomenon to be possible it is necessary that being in a sense should become multiple, and that at its surface at least division should appear". This points to a doctrine of "polydynamism" as opposed to monism; for the meaning of "being" is "autonomous action, action in itself".] C. Féré—L'énergie et la vitesse des mouvements volontaires. [Among the results arrived at (by experiment on (1) hysterical, (2) epileptic, (3) normal 'subjects') the following may be selected: 'Reaction-time' diminishes or increases as energy of muscular effort increases or diminishes; Duration of reaction-time varies as duration of reduction of oxyhemoglobin, that is to say, intellectual activity is in relation with activity of nutrition; Rapidity and abundance of the "nervous avalanche" are greater as the ways of discharge it can take are less numerous; All conditions that exaggerate intensity of nutritive exchanges develop energy and rapidity of movements along

with physical activity in general.] F. Paulhan—Les formes les plus élevées de l'abstraction (fin). [The essential phenomenon in abstraction is "orientation of the mind". This "orientation" consists in a disposition of the psychical elements such that certain excitations tend to determine certain acts. The idea is "a sort of weak excitation of a system of various psycho-physiological elements". "Our general ideas, our abstract ideas, answer to what there is in common in an indefinite number of perceptions and acts." The mind consists of elements grouped into "organico-psychical systems," and each of these systems is an "abstract tendency".] Analyses, &c. (H. M. Drummond, *Les lois de la nature dans le monde spirituel* (tr.), &c.). Société de Psychologie physiologique (Congrès international de psychologie physiologique. Comité d'organisation et de patronage: Programme du Congrès. Society for Psychical Research). No. 8. G. Tarde—Catégories logiques et institutions sociales (i.). [The logical and teleological categories for the individual mind are: Matter-Force, Space-Time, Pleasure and Pain; for the social mind: Divinity, Language, Good and Evil. The notion of divinity plays the same part in social intelligence as the notion of matter and force in individual intelligence, and "deism" is as essential to the former as "realism" to the latter. Language may be called "the social space of ideas," but, more exactly, it corresponds to both space and time in the individual mind; the verb standing for time and the substantive for space. There is a conflict, not yet resolved, between individual and social logic; the former, under the name of science, at present striving to subject the latter to itself.] L. Dauriac—La doctrine logique de M. Delboeuf. [An exposition and criticism of Prof. Delboeuf's *La Matière brute et la Matière vivante*.] Notes et documents (A. Binet—Contribution à l'étude de la douleur chez les hystériques. L. Belugou—Une nouvelle Laura Bridgman). Analyses, &c. Rev. des Périod. No. 9. C. Bénard—L'esthétique contemporaine: La mimique dans le système des beaux arts. ["Mimetics," or the art of imitation by means of gesture, is not entitled to an independent place in the system of the fine arts, but is subordinate to all of them; having a relation of instrumentality to each in turn.] J.-M. Guardia—Philosophes espagnols: Gomez Pereira (i.). G. Tarde—Catégories logiques et institutions sociales (fin). [Imitation is "social memory". Society is (or tends to become) rather a "collective brain" than a collective organism; what corresponds to the rest of the organism being the cultivated territory of the society, its subjugated fauna and flora, &c.] Analyses, &c. Notices bibliographiques.

LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE (Nouv. Sér.).—An. v., No. 6. C. Renouvier—Victor Hugo. Le poète et le songeur (vi.). . . . G. Lechalas—A propos d'une page de M. Taine. [M. Taine, though he begins by repudiating all "dogmatism" in art, ends with a dogmatism of his own. Not only so, but, while professing to be a despiser of "the classical spirit," he anathematises, in landscape-painting, everything that is not classical.] . . . F. Pillon—Un nouveau manuel d'instruction civique (ii.). C. Renouvier—*Traité des principes de la connaissance humaine*, de Berkeley, traduit pour la première fois en français (i.). No. 7. C. Renouvier—Victor Hugo, &c. (vii.). Berkeley—*Traité des principes*, &c. (ii.). F. Pillon—La chose en soi dans la philosophie allemande. [Summarising a thesis of M. Louis Ducros, presented some years since at the Sorbonne, on the transformations of the "thing-in-itself" from Kant to Schopenhauer, the author points out incidentally that although both Fichte and Schopenhauer make will, in some sense, the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer's theory is really the antipodes of Fichte's.] L. Ménard—Une question intéres-

sante. No. 8. C. Renouvier—Victor Hugo, &c. (viii.). [This series of articles keeps up its interest, both literary and philosophical. In the present three, M. Renouvier discusses the combination in Victor Hugo of "the optimism of the century," as regards the future, with a certain pessimism of his own, as regards life in the present. To illustrate the critical results arrived at, the concluding sentences of the first and third articles may be quoted: "En attendant, l'analyse de la *Fin de Satan* nous laisse dans la conviction renforcée que le grand poète de la France est un homme qui appartient par l'esprit au cycle des Sanchoniathon et des mythographes de la Grèce antique, beaucoup plus qu'à la race des Boileau, des Racine et des Voltaire dans laquelle le sort l'a fait naître". "Mais où trouver des auteurs sans défaut? Victor Hugo, ce grand écrivain, n'est pas un écrivain naturel."] C. Renouvier—Une question intéressante. E. Pécaut—Le cours d'histoire des religions au Collège de France. [On M. Albert Réville's work in the history of religions.] F. Pillon—Th. Ribot, *Psychologie de l'attention*. Berkeley—*Traité des principes, &c.* (iii.).

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA.—An. iv. 2, No. 1. F. Bertinaria—Il problema capitale della Scolastica. [An account of the Scholastic doctrines of the Universal—whether *ante rem*, *in re* or *post rem*—with an attempt at solution of the problem by the assignment of a true meaning to all three answers. Scholastic philosophy is maintained to be—contrary to the opinion embodied in a definition of Cousin—scientific in substance while religious in form.] V. Benini—Dell' integrazione artistica. [Art must select in view of an "integration" of its own, not merely copy nature.] L. M. Billia—Questione rosminiana: Sempre per la verità. Bibliografia, &c.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA SCIENTIFICA.—Vol. viii., No. 5. G. Sergi—La coltura nella vita odierna. [Humanism having fulfilled its office, and science having now taken the leading place in modern civilisation, Latin and Greek ought to be banished from general education of all grades, and put in the same class with special studies such as Sanskrit and Hebrew.] E. Tanzi—Gli allucinati. [Hallucinations are of intellectual origin; abnormal excitations in the sense-organs or elsewhere being only a point of departure, which becomes assimilated to the subjective order of ideas. The proximate cause of hallucination is a spasm of the centres of sensation in the cerebral cortex.] N. Colajanni—Un sociologo ottimista: Icilio Vanni. Questioni del Giorno (F. S. de Dominicis—La chiesa cattolica e il Rosminianismo. Congressi internazionali di psicologia fisiologica e di antropologia e archeologia preistoriche.) Riv. Anal. Riv. Bib., &c. (J. Le Conte, *Evolution and its relation to Religious Thought, &c.*). Nos. 6, 7. B. Labanca—Il divino o l'umano nella Bibbia? D. Axenfeld—Intorno all' origine della nozione di spazio. [The primary fact that gave origin to the notion of space was the preservation of the body in a position of equilibrium by motions excited, on disturbance of equilibrium, by the weight of the osseous levers.] G. Marchesini—L'unità delle sensazioni e il senso tattile. [The tactile sense is the tree of which the other senses are the branches.] F. Gabotto—L'astrologia nel Quattrocento in rapporto colla civiltà: Osservazioni e documenti storici. Questioni del giorno (F. S. de Dominicis—Rosminianismo e positivismo). Riv. Anal. Riv. Bib., &c.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, &c.—Bd. xcv., Heft 2. A. Meinong—Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie. [A detailed exposition of a view of "phantasy" which is summed up in the definition of it as "capability of production of intuitive representations". The relations of this (new) production to the laws of association and to the position,

"Nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu," are discussed at length; the principal result arrived at being that in any case "production," as distinguished from reproduction, of images of phantasy, must be maintained as a fact.] H. Siebeck—Die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie in der Scholastik (ii.). [Conclusion of the account of Duns Scotus.] A. Lasson—O. Pfeiderer's Religionsphilosophie. J. Mainzer—Erwiderung auf Prof. Dr. J. Witte's Artikel, "Die simultane Apprehension bei Kant". Recensionen, &c. (Lotze, *Outlines of Philosophy*, translated and edited by G. T. Ladd; Schopenhauer, *Two Essays*, translated). R. Eucken—August Krohn. Bd. xvi., Heft 1. H. Vaihinger—Mitteilungen aus dem Kantischen Nachlasse. J. Volkelt—Das Denken als Hilfsvorstellungs-Thätigkeit und als Anpassungsvorgang (i.). [A criticism of some recent "positivistic" doctrines of the nature of thought; Shute's *Discourse on Truth* being taken as one example of modern "positivism".] L. Busse—Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte Spinozas (v.). J. Witte—Kleine logische und methodologische Beiträge zur Philosophie der Gegenwart. Recensionen.

PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE.—Bd. xxv., Heft 9, 10. A. Lasson—Vorbemerkungen zur Erkenntnisstheorie. [Theory of Knowledge is "pre-suppositionless," not as making no pre-suppositions, but as making none that it is not conscious of. Its essence, therefore, is to be "critical". Critical philosophy finds the criterion of thought in thought itself; necessity and universality being unattainable by mere observation and experiment. Certainty is in "self-controlled" thought, not in internal any more than in external perception. "Experience does not ratify thought, but thought ratifies experience." Beyond its own forms thought needs material in the shape of "facts"—themselves already in part the result of a thought-process. By these it has to direct itself, but not to subject itself to them.] A. Elsas—Kritische Betrachtungen über die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Recensionen. Literaturbericht, &c.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VÖLKERPSYCHOLOGIE U. SPRACHWISSENSCHAFT.—Bd. xix., Heft 2, 3. F. Krejčí—Das charakteristische Merkmal der Volks-poesie. [The characteristic of "folk-poetry" as distinguished from artistic poetry is its dependence on the uncontrolled action of the "psychical mechanism". Folk-poetry appears at a lower level of culture, and disappears with the diffusion of culture. With culture goes logical control over the psychical mechanism. Absence of this control, therefore, may be taken *primâ facie* as characterising folk-poetry. This conclusion is confirmed by the more distinct manifestation of national characters in folk-poetry; culture tending to reduce these to uniformity. An effect of the unrestricted action of the psychical mechanism is the profusion of metaphors in epic narrative. This profusion, appearing originally in the folk-epic, is afterwards imitated in the artistic epic; but the essential difference remains that the metaphors of the artistic poet are deliberately chosen for their beauty, while those of the folk-poet are taken just as they are offered by the psychical mechanism. Particular modes of mechanical combination are characteristic of particular peoples; some manifesting themselves in the epical, others in the lyrical, folk-song. The unvarying character of these in each people and each special kind of effusion is a proof of their "mechanical" character, that is, of the absence of deliberate selection.] K. Schulz—Die Rede (ratio, λόγος). T. Achelis—Zur Würdigung G. T. Fechners. R. v. Sowa—Die Mundart der westfälischen Zigeuner. F. A. Mayer—Ein deutsches Schwerttanzspiel in Ungarn. M. Hoefler—Kalendarium

der oberbayerischen Kultzeiten. A. Hirzel—Gleichnisse und Metaphern im Rigveda. Beurteilungen.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE.—Bd. xiii., Heft 3. R. Wahle—Fragen, betreffend "Ähnlichkeit" und "Intensität". [Puts the questions whether sensations are to be regarded as consisting of different elements, such as independently varying qualitative elements, tone and "intensity," and whether "resemblance" as a relation of sensations is original. Several possible answers are stated and the difficulties of each pointed out.] F. Staudinger—Identität u. Apriori (Schluss). A. Marty—Ueber Sprachreflex, Nativismus und absichtliche Sprachbildung (v.). R. Henke—Bemerkung zu Richard Avenarius' Kritik der reinen Erfahrung. Anzeigen. Selbstanzeigen, &c.

ARCHIV FÜR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE.—Bd. ii., Heft 4. P. Tannery—L'hypothèse géométrique du *Ménon* de Platon. O. Immisch—Zu Thales' Abkunft. [An additional argument against the supposed Phœnician descent of Thales (see *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.*, ii. 2).] H. Siebeck—Zur Psychologie der Scholastik. [On Averroes as a psychologist, and on the impulse towards naturalistic pantheism given by the combination of his philosophical doctrines with empirical directions, already entered upon, in psychology.] W. Lutoslawski—Jordani Bruni Nolani Opera inedita, manu propria scripta. [A minute examination of the "Noroff MS.," entitled as above (now in the Rumianzow Museum in Moscow). According to the author's results, the MS. is not wholly Bruno's, but consists partly of matter transcribed for him.] G. Heymans—Einige Bemerkungen über die sogenannte empiristische Periode Kant's. [Kant's thought has no "empirical period" such as historians suppose when they thus describe the years from 1755 to 1770. What took place during this period was no revolutionary change—such as a passage from Rationalism to Empiricism and from this to Criticism would have been—but a progressive development. Kant's point of view during the sixties was that of a "formal, epistemological, realistic Rationalism". Intermediate between the points of view of Wolff and Hume, this appears from one side as Wolffian Rationalism, from the other as Empiricism.] W. Dilthey—Die Rostocker Kanthandschriften. Jahresbericht (H. Diels, E. Zeller). Neueste Erscheinungen.

PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH.—Jahrgang ii., Heft 2. J. Costa-Rossetti—Die Staatslehre der christlichen Philosophie (ii.). [Contains a defence of "the doctrine of mediate divine right of sovereigns" (wherever the sovereignty in a State may be placed; the particular form of government being, directly, of human institution). This is maintained to be the true scholastic position, as opposed at once to the doctrine of the immediate divine right of kings and to the contract-theory.] G. Grupp—Die Anfangsentwicklung der geistigen Cultur des Menschen (iii.). [On the development of religion among primitive men; the author's previous article (i. 3), containing parts i. and ii. of the paper, having treated of the development of language and literature.] F. X. Pfeiffer—Zur Lehre vom ästhetischen Contraste mit specieller Rücksicht auf die landschaftlichen Contraste im Hochgebirge. [The æsthetic effect of contrast which man experiences in viewing mountain-scenery, since it is not experienced by animals, refutes Darwinism and Materialism. Bringing forcibly to mind the contrast between man and animals, it suggests the correlation of man and nature (of which animals form part), and so, by indicating the necessity of a principle standing above both terms of the correlation, furnishes an argument for Theism.] Recensionen und Referate. Zeitschriftenschau. Novitätenschau. Miscellen und Nachrichten.

VIII.—NOTES.

THE CONGRESS OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY AT PARIS.

Professor William James of Harvard has kindly thrown off, at request, the following brief report of proceedings at the Paris Congress of Physiological Psychology, referred to in the last No. of MIND :—

"The first meeting was on Tuesday, Aug. 6, and morning and evening sessions were continued during the week. Five sub-sections were formed to discuss special subjects and bring them before the general sessions in the afternoon. One of these sub-sections debated the Muscular Sense; another, Heredity; another, Hypnotism; the fourth, a project for an international census of Hallucinations on lines proposed by the English Society for Psychical Research; whilst the fifth dealt with the subject of Abnormal Association of Sensations of one kind with those of another, M. Grüber of Jassy having reported a very extraordinary case of 'coloured hearing'. Finally, a supplementary committee reported a permanent plan of organisation.

"The attendance at the general meetings varied from about 120 to 60 or 70. A medical congress, devoted especially to Hypnotism, of which M. Bérillon was the moving spirit, seemed to form a powerful derivative in the last few days. M. Charcot, president of the Société de Psychologie physiologique, which had issued the invitations to the Congress, did not appear at all. Professor Ribot was present on the first day, and gave the opening address, on the *status* of contemporary psychology; showing in simple but impressive words how it advances by combining physiological and pathological observation and experiment with the older introspective method, and urging the investigators of all countries to share in the work now become common. Professor Charles Richet, the general secretary, was present at all the meetings, and his tact and good sense proved most useful at times in steering the devious course of discussion; his hospitality also will not easily be forgotten by the foreign visitors. MM. Gley and Marillier played an indispensable part in the proceedings.

"The committee of arrangements had prepared a program of subjects with a rather full printed syllabus of conclusions and suggestions. Of these subjects, several, for lack of time, failed to come to a full discussion. Such were (1) the part played by movements in the formation of mental images; (2) the appetites in idiots and imbeciles; (3) psychic poisons; (4) automatic writing and other unconscious movements; (5) the action of magnets on the organism. The subjects more thoroughly debated have been mentioned above. Largely under Mr. Galton's guidance, a circular of questions relative to Heredity was adopted by the Congress, and an international committee appointed to take charge of it. Similar action was taken upon the census of Hallucinations. The result of the discussions on Attention and the Muscular Sense was to show the need of a better understanding than we yet possess of the feeling of mental effort, the study of which was recommended as a *desideratum* to all psychologists. In the numerous questions relative to Hypnotism, great diversities of view came out, showing how much more work has still to be done in this field. The partisans of the Nancy School were decidedly in the majority at the meetings; and everyone seemed to think that the original Salpêtrière doctrine of hypnotism, as a definite pathological condition with its three

stages and somatic causes, was a thing of the past. Dr. Bernheim even expressed doubt whether any such thing as hypnotism distinct from sleep and suggestion existed at all.

"The most striking feature of the discussions was, perhaps, their tendency to slope off to some one or other of those shady horizons with which the name of 'psychic research' is now associated. Amongst those who took a more active part in debate may be named MM. Marillier, Gley, Binet, Pierre Janet, Bertrand, Espinas, Bernheim, Liégeois, Ochorowicz, Danilewsky, Grote of Moscow, Delbœuf, Forel, Galton, Sidgwick, F. W. H. Myers. The open results were, however (as always happens at such gatherings), secondary in real importance to the latent ones—the friendships made, the intimacies deepened, and the encouragement and inspiration which came to everyone from seeing before them in flesh and blood so large a part of that little army of fellow-students, from whom and for whom all contemporary psychology exists. The individual worker feels much less isolated in the world after such an experience. The entire number of persons who gave their 'adhesion' to the Congress (the membership-fee being 10 francs) was not far from 400, the majority naturally French. From England the only persons present were Mr. Galton, Prof. and Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, Mr. F. W. H. Myers and Dr. A. T. Myers. The United States furnished Profs. James and Jastrow and Mr. Riley. Russia counted more 'adherents'. From the German Empire, though many eminent men sent in their names, Baron von Schrenck-Notzing and Drs. Münsterberg and Sperling were (I think) alone present. This is the more to be regretted, as the absent ones can now never realise how altogether gracious and hospitable a welcome they would have received. The Congress wound up on Saturday night with a feast of other things than reason and a flow of something besides soul on the platform of the Eiffel Tower, where, amongst other toasts, one was proposed by Prof. Lombroso to the health of Prof. Richet as the "*représentant de l'anti-charvinisme dans la Science*". Reason and soul were there too, however; and hardly could finer subjects of contemplation for both of them have been found than the wonderfully illuminated landscape of exhibition grounds, palaces and fountains spread out below, with all the lights and shadows of nocturnal Paris framing it in.

"The Congress decided to institute a permanent organisation, under the name of the *International Congress of Experimental Psychology*. It voted that its next meeting should take place in England three years hence. A permanent Committee of Organisation was named, with members in the principal countries which had taken part; and a vote was passed expressing the hope that every member who was engaged in investigating a particular subject would put himself through this Committee into communication with psychologists similarly employed in other countries. The Committee is constituted as follows:—MM. Beaunis, Bernheim, Bertrand, Espinas, Ferrari, Gley, Marillier, Ribot, Richet (France, 9); Galton, F. W. H. Myers, Sidgwick (England, 3); Münsterberg, v. Schrenck-Notzing, Sperling (Germany, 3); Danilewski, Grote, Ochorowicz (Russia, 3); Forel, Herzen (Switzerland, 2); Benedikt (Austria); Delbœuf (Belgium); Neiglick (Finland); Lombroso (Italy); Grüber (Roumania); James (United States): in all, 26."

The Committee appointed at the Congress to prosecute the statistical study of Hallucinations consists of Profs. Sidgwick, James and Grote, Baron v. Schrenck-Notzing and M. Marillier. Prof. Sidgwick sends the following statement as to the work undertaken:—

"The statistical inquiry into what may be distinguished as the 'casual

hallucinations of sane persons' has two main objects. Its first object is to ascertain approximately what proportion of persons in England—or any other country—have had experiences of this kind. With this view, it is proposed to collect as many answers as possible, from persons over 21, to the following question: *Have you ever, when believing yourself to be completely awake, had a vivid impression of seeing, or being touched by, a living being or inanimate object, or of hearing a voice; which impression, so far as you could discover, was not due to any external physical cause?* To all who may answer this question in the affirmative a further set of questions will be sent, in the hope of obtaining details as to the experiences with a view to examining into their cause and meaning,—this being the second object of the inquiry.

"In the section of the International Congress of Experimental Psychology, formed for the consideration of this inquiry, the desire was expressed by several speakers that the work of collection should be as far as possible in the hands of experts; on the other hand it was urged, and generally admitted, that it would be practically impossible to obtain the quantity of answers required without accepting the aid of all intelligent persons willing to assist. I am accordingly conducting the inquiry in England on this comprehensive plan: at the same time, I attach a special value to the co-operation of psychologists. I should therefore be very glad if any reader of *MIND* who may be willing to take part in the investigation will communicate with me without delay. In answer to any such communication—addressed 'Professor Sidgwick, Cambridge'—I will at once send the necessary documents, and any further information that may be required.

"I ought perhaps to say that, while my own interest in this statistical inquiry is largely due to the fact that such study of these phenomena as I have hitherto been able to make has led me to the conclusion that some of them are to be explained by 'telepathy,' I am far from being desirous to confine the work of collection to persons willing to admit this explanation. On the contrary, I should be particularly glad to have the co-operation of persons who do not admit it. I may mention that M. Marillier, who is conducting the inquiry in France, does not at present accept the 'telepathic' hypothesis."

THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY (22 Albemarle Street, W.). Proceedings since last record:—June 17, Symposium, "The Nature of Force," Professor A. Bain, Professor Wyndham Dunstan, and Dr. Johnstone Stoney, F.R.S. July 1, Business meeting. All the members of the Committee were re-elected. The first meeting of the eleventh session is fixed for Monday, Nov. 4, at 8 P.M., when the President (Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson) will deliver an address on the question, "What is Logic?"

Mr. Thomas Case, author of *Physical Realism*, has been appointed to the vacant Waynflete chair of Moral Philosophy at Oxford.

ERRATUM. For *Warnehmung* read *Wahrnehmung*, p. 590 l. 1, p. 591 heading.

